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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
SUSTAINABLE PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEM FOR FLORIDA LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: FINANCIAL SOLVENCY, PARADIGM SWITCH, AND
INTERPERIOD EQUITY
by
Yongqing Cong
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Howard A. Frank, Major Professor
The issue of increasing unfunded pension liabilities of state and local
governments has drawn increasing attentions in the last few years, especially after the
2008 stock market downturn. To maintain sustainability many state and local
governments have put public pension reform at the top of their priority list. Previous
research and practices provide two strategies to reform the current pension systems:
Incremental changes to amend the existing defined benefit plans (DB plans), and the
pension model switch from the DB model to defined contribution plans (DC plans).
This study aims to uncover reform strategies to cope for public pension systems.
It first examined the appropriateness of the incremental reform strategies by identifying
the determinants of the financial solvency of DB plans, utilizing the existing panel data
of 151 local DB plans in Florida municipalities. Second, it gathered the primary data
through the surveys and interviews with the Finance and HR directors in Florida local
governments to analyze their perceptions of public pension reform and reveal their
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readiness to conduct the public pension paradigm switch. These approaches revealed
the critical interperiod equity issue along with the impact of the two-tier benefit
structure during the recent pension reform.
The results suggest that incremental reform strategies that reduce benefits and
increase contributions are not effective in improving the financial solvency of public
DB plans. The alternative reform approach—the DB-to-DC transition—is attractive to
local governments because it will relieve the employer of the pension cost burden and
transfer the investment risk to employees themselves. The transition is also politically
palatable because the taxpayer sentiment is not supportive of what are perceived to be
generous retirement benefit of public employees. Meanwhile, local governments are
hesitant to implement the paradigm switch due to prohibitive transition costs, political
pressure, and perhaps more importantly, the potential negative impacts to public
recruitment and retention. Local officials do not perceive a reduction of morale with
the two-tier benefit structure at the present time; they believe this issue will solve itself
along the retirement of senior employees.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC

1.1 Introduction to the Public Pension System in the United States

Following the genesis of military pensions, which was the first public sector
pension plan, retirement plans were disseminated to state and local employees in the
late nineteenth century (Clark, Craig & Wilson, 2003). The original purpose of these
plans was to increase the competitiveness of the public sector employment with
guaranteed retirement benefits, compared to the private sector, which often offered
higher salaries for the comparable placement (National Conference on Public
Employee Retirement Systems [NCPERS], 2008).

Broadly speaking, pension plans can be characterized as either defined benefit
(DB) or defined contribution (DC) plans. Unlike the private sector, where employers
switched from DB plans to DC plans over the past three decades, DB plans remain the
predominant pension model providing retirement benefits to public employees. In 2011,
about 78 percent of public sector employees participated in DB plans, compared with
only 18 percent of private sector employees (Government Accountability Office
[GAO], 2012). Typically, state and local government pension models include a DB
plan and a supplementary DC option for voluntary savings (GAO, 2007). In addition
to DB and DC plans, some entities offer “hybrid plans” which contain characteristics
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of both DB and DC plans, another distinguishing characteristic compared to private
sector practice.

In the public sector, DB plans, with very few exceptions, provide employees a
retirement benefit calculated by a formula that is “a function of a benefit multiplier,
years of service, and the final average salary”(Papke, 2004, p. 330). The benefit is paid
in the form of a lifetime annuity, i.e., participants receive benefit payments over their
lifetime or the lifetime of beneficiaries. State and local government frequently offer
postretirement cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) under DB plans.

State and local government employees are generally required to contribute a
percentage of their salaries to their DB plans, unlike private sector employees with DB
plans. All assets accumulated from both employers and participants’ contributions to
DB plans are invested by the retirement board or a central agency responsible for
managing government funds to fund the retirement benefits (Matson & Dobel, 2006).
Therefore, the investment risk is generally borne by the employer—state and local
governments. Any unexpectedly high return on the assets may lead to reductions in the
amount of employers’ future contributions, while unexpectedly low investment return
make it necessary to increase future contributions and/or reduce retirement benefits.

By contrast, in a DC plan, the key determinants of the amount of benefits are
the contribution rates of the employee and employer to the employee’s individual
account, and the rate of investment return gained from the assets available in the
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account over time. Under a DC plan, employees steer the investment of their pension
assets and take over the investment risk and fees. There are no COLAs for DC plan
participants; however, after retirement a DC account balance could continue to earn
investment income on their remaining assets until depleted. During tight financial time,
the DC account can be liquidated to offer budgetary relief at the cost of taxes on the
withdrawn amount plus an early-withdrawal penalty.

In general, DC plans are advocated because of their greater payout flexibility
and portability, potentials for higher returns through investment, and the ability to
continue to accrue earnings after retirement (Giertz and Papke, 2007). Compared with
DC plans, DB plans usually provide more generous benefits through guaranteed
lifetime income and automatic COLAs. Generally, DB plans are more useful to attract
and retain risk-adverse, less mobile, public workforce with more tolerance of vesting
requirements and limited portability of accrued benefits. From the operational
perspective, a DB plan is a safer option since it is relatively immune to economic
fluctuation and it theoretically allows for any unfunded liabilities to be resolved in 20
to 30 years (Frank, Gianakis, & Neshkova, 2012).

1.2 Public Pension Reforms since the Economic Downturn in 2008

Prior to the recession, public pension plans were generally deemed well funded,
so there was no immediate pressure to reform public pension systems by either
increasing contributions or curtailing benefits, although some scholars argue that this
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is a misleading belief (Clark & Sabelhaus, 2009; Giertz & Papke, 2007; Novy-Marx &
Rauh, 2008). However, the stock market crash in 2008 exacerbated the public pension
crisis and forced state and local governments to rethink the funding status of DB plans
and to acknowledge certain risks associated with their pensions. During fiscal years
2008 and 2009, state and local pension plans lost more than $672 billion in investment
earnings, based on the data from Census Bureau. Although most plans still have enough
assets to cover their benefit liabilities in the near future, there is a widening gap between
public pension assets and liabilities. In fiscal year 2010, the shortfall between state
pension assets and obligations was $757 billion, which posed serious long-term fiscal
challenges (The Pew Center on the States [Pew], 2012).

Since the economic downturn of 2008, many states and localities have taken
action to counter fiscal pressures and increasing annual required contributions. Various
reform strategies have been implemented to increase the financial status of current
public pension systems, i.e., DB plans. Generally there are two streams of pension
reforms: One is to reform the plan design of DB plans to alleviate the fiscal burden to
plan sponsors by reducing pension benefits and increasing participants’ contribution;
the alternative is to include a DC component to transfer cost and risk to employees.
Figure 1.1 reveals the notable changes to state pension plans due to the multiple reform
measures after the stock market plunge (GAO, 2012).

On the basis of the GAO’s analysis of state legislative changes reported by
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), during 2008 to 2011, 35 states
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reduced pension benefits through at least one of the following three actions: 1)
adjusting the benefit formula used to calculate provided benefits; 2) raising the age or
years of service required before retiring; 3) limiting the annual COLA increases.
Benefits reductions mainly apply to future employees due to the legal protection to the
retirement benefits of current employees and retirees.

Figure 1. 1 Notable Changes to State-Sponsored Pension Plans, 2008- 2011

Source: GAO analysis of annual NCSL reports, 2012.
Twenty-five states required members to contribute a larger amount to the
pension fund, in doing so the states transferred the pension costs from sponsors to
employees. Georgia, Michigan, and Utah have pursued more comprehensive reforms
by implementing hybrid approaches, which incorporate a DC component, ensuring
their retirement systems will not become a future cause of fiscal distress. In addition
to the states that GAO analyzed, Rhode Island in 2011 and Virginia in 2012 also
approved hybrid approaches to their state-sponsored pension plans (Pew, 2012).
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Besides the reform strategies highlighted in Figure 2, in 2010 and 2011, 14 states
lowered their investment return assumptions to reflect greater uncertainty in the stock
markets, because these states realized their previous return assumptions were unlikely
to be achieved in the short term and underestimated their true pension obligations (Pew,
2012).

1.3 Introduction to the Public Pension Systems in Florida

Sponsored by 249 local governments, Florida State currently has 492 DB
municipal and special district retirement plans. Besides the municipal plans, in Florida
there is a statewide DB plan for state and county employees (and local governments
may opt into) called the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The State retirement
systems in Florida, including the FRS, are the fourth largest public pension systems in
the nation. Since inception, FRS has been recognized as a well-run DB model (Munnell,
2012). It frequently appears in the top-four list, evaluated by many study and research
institutions (Pew, 2010a; Pew, 2012; The National Center for Policy Analysis [NCPA],
2010).

Although compared to other state sponsored pension plan, FRS fares better, yet
the Great Recession in 2008 struck the pension funds heavily and exposed the
nationwide problem of wicked unfunded pension liabilities. Even before the 2008
economic downturn, there was latent underfunding of pension plans due to that states
tend to underestimate its unfunded obligations by using unrealistically high return

6

assumptions. For instance, the State of Florida calculated that its pension systems were
100 percent funded, while according to NCPA (2010), actually it was about 10 percent
underfunded.

While the state’s plan is well funded, at the local level, there is long-existing
underfunding of Florida municipal pensions, and the recent stock market plunge
worsened the problem. The typical funding level of municipal pension plans have been
below the 80 percent benchmark since 2004 and have continually declined every year
since 2001 (Leroy Collins Institute [LCI], 2012). Increasing pension liabilities as a
larger portion of the municipal budget have imposed significant fiscal stress to local
governments.

The lagged impacts of 2008 economic downturn have put Florida public
pension plans under increased scrutiny. In recent years, the sustainability of public
pensions has become a prominent policy topic at both state and local level.
Governments targeted pension reforms to get a relief from the fiscal burden of
snowballing pension obligations. The most significant reform attempt is the new
pension law enacted after July 1st, 2011, aiming to create a public pension system that
is viable for years to come.

In 2011, mimicking the practice in the private sector, Florida State Governor
Rick Scott led a coalition of Republican legislators to replace the DB plan of the FRS
and other public-sectors plans in the state with DC plans for all new employees in order
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to reduce future obligations, which would free governments from paying
predetermined pension benefits, and would save significant pension entitlements
because the annual contributions would not be calculated as the required amount to
cover future pension payments.
Scott’s pension reform proposal ignited vehement opposition from various
stakeholders, such as rank-and-file employees, police and fire unions, and teacher
unions (Klas, 2011a; Resmovits, 2011; Ward, 2011). These groups asserted that publicsector employees became the victims of budget deficits and governments lay the fiscal
burden on the back of all public employees. After furious debates and concessions, the
pension reform law implemented after July 1st, 2011 is a much milder modification of
the previous pension law. The new law includes strategies to increase employee
contributions, reduce pension benefits, and establish a two-tier benefit system (see
Table 1.1).

At the local level, Florida cities experienced the similar painstaking process of
pension policy reform. Nevertheless, many municipalities have successfully adjusted
their pension systems in the form of either modifying their current DB plans to reduce
outlays or shifting to DC plans to transfer costs. For instance, Bradenton, Cape Coral,
and Vero Beach increased their required contribution from employees; Hollywood,
New Smyrna Beach and Temple Terrace eliminated or reduced their COLAs; Coral
Gables, Winter Springs, and Miami reformed their pension benefit formula to decrease
pension obligations; Lakeland, South Miami, Palm Beach Gardens and Fort Lauderdale
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switched from DB plans to DC plans (Florida League of Cities, 2012 & 2013; Florida
TaxWatch & LCI, 2013).

Table 1.1 Comparisons between Previous and Current Public Pension Law in
Florida
Item

Previous Pension Law

Changes After July 1, 2011

- No contribution from employees;
Contributions
- 100% paid by employers.
- Collect COLAs based on years of
service when retire

- Employees contribute 3% pre-tax salaries
- All FRS Members (either DB or DC plans)
contribute.
- During July 1, 2011 and July 1, 2016, no
years of service credits for COLAs

COLAs

DROP*

New hires —
vesting and
retirement age

- Members who retire before July 1,
2011, receive a 3% annual COLA.
- Members who enter DROP before
July 1, 2011, will earn 6.5 percent
interest on the money set aside under
the retirement program.
- Vesting period: 5 years;
- Regular class, senior management
class and elected officials class:
retire after 62 years of age or 30
years of service;
- Special-risk class: retire after 55
years of age or 25 years of service;
- The average final compensation
will be calculated on the best 5 years
of salary.

- Members who retire after July 1, 2011,
receive lower percent annual COLA
- Members who enter DROP after July 1, 2011
will earn 1.3 percent interest on the retirement
money set aside in the program.
- Vesting period: 8 years;
- Regular class, senior management class and
elected officials class: retire after 65 years of
age or 33 years of service;
- Special-risk: retire after 60 years of age or
30 years of service or, with 4 years in the U.S.
military: retire after 57 years of age and 30
years of service;
- The average final compensation will be
calculated on the best 8 years of salary.

Source: Edited from Breaking Down Florida’s Pension Reform Changes (Klas, 2011b)
1.4 Controversy over the Current DB plans in Florida Public Pension System

The reforms mentioned above intensified the discussion regarding
sustainability of the current public DB plans in Florida. There are two groups of
contradictory opinions towards the DB model. One espoused by reform advocators is
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that the existing DB plans are unsustainable and the pension model shift is necessary
to reduce the financial burden of promised pension obligations to governments. These
reforms are supported by conservative tax-watchers who incite voter anger by
promoting the idea that most public employees enjoy more generous pension benefits
and ought to join the ranks of private sector covered by DC plans. Facts from research
institutions also provide evidences supporting that such change is imperative
(Holcombe, 2011; LCI, 2012).

However, there is another fairly strong voice from scholars and research
institutions that DB plans should be preserved because there is compelling evidence
that the current DB plans in Florida public pension system have a clear cost advantage
over DC plans (NCPERS, 2008). In addition, the inadequacy of 401(k) accounts in
providing confidence in retirement reveals the inefficiency of DC plans to finance
employee retirement plans (Florida Public Pension Trustees Association [FPPTA],
2010). Furthermore, another stream of thought implies that unfunded pension liabilities
are misunderstood as a ticking time bomb by interest groups, because most retirement
systems have a plan to pay down the unfunded liabilities in 20 to 30 years, therefore
there is no immediate need for local governments to take drastic and instant actions to
reduce or pay off the plan’s unfunded liabilities (FPPTA, 2011).

The above discussion shows two distinct attitudes towards the reforms of DB
plans in Florida’s public pension systems. The contradictory standpoints pose a
paradox about the continued viability of current DB plans, which inspired the author
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with the research interest in the pension reforms in Florida Municipalities and the
sustainability of the public pension system. This conflict is one that is taking place in
many venues.

1.5 Research Objectives

The main purpose of this study is to offer a better understanding of public
pension systems in Florida local governments and to uncover the effective reform
strategies that maintain the sustainability, while attracting and retaining a competent
workforce. It investigates the effectiveness of incremental changes through examining
the financial solvency of current DB plans in Florida municipalities. Further it explores
the potential organizational impacts of pension model changes on the daily operations
of Florida local governments; and reveals the major drivers and impediments for local
governments to conduct the pension model switch from DB to DC plans in the public
sector. Objectives of the study include:



Providing a thorough analysis of the financial status of the current DB plans in
Florida cities;



Assessing the effectiveness of the incremental strategies to enhance the
financial solvency of the current DB plans by identifying the major
determinants of the fiscal health of DB plans;
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Evaluating the potential impact of pension paradigm switch to the government
operations and the public sector recruitment and retention in Florida
municipalities;



Exploring the readiness of Florida municipalities to conduct the pension model
switch from DB to DC plans by identifying the major impetus and impediments
to the transition.

1.6 Research Design Overview

The study employs a triangulated research design to carry out a full-scale
examination of the public pension plans in Florida local governments. First, the study
utilizes secondary data sources of Florida local retirement systems to conduct a
descriptive analysis to provide an overview of the fiscal standing of current DB plans
in Florida supplemented with a regression analysis that identifies the factors
determining the financial solvency of DB plans. The analysis lays the ground of the
arguments about the efficiency of the incremental reform strategies. Another leg of the
study is the survey methodology to local government officials to collect the primary
data regarding potential impacts of the pension model switch and their readiness to
conduct this transition. Survey results provide a direct illustration of organizational
impacts of implementing the pension paradigm shift. On the basis of principal
components derived from survey responses as well as city-level secondary data, a
regression model supplements the qualitative inquiry about the indicators of
government officials’ opinions on the issue of public pension reform. Third, to improve
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the validity of the survey results, the author conducted interviews of experts to crossverify the findings from survey responses and to gain in-depth and elaborate viewpoints
that cannot be wholly grasped through surveys.

1.7 Research Questions

The study is not going to test the DC diffusion regarding pension reform, which
would be premature given that only 10.5 percent of Florida’s 410 cities adopt the DC
plan as their default pension model for general employees (Florida Department of
Management Services [DMS], 2012). Instead, the study aims to answer the following
overview question in regard to the current public pension system for the general
employees in Florida local governments:


Whether the incremental changes exemplified in the 2011 pension law to
preserve the DB model really make it sustainable? If not, how ready are Florida
municipalities to adopt the alternative approach—the DB-to-DC transition?
This is broken into the following sub-questions:
o

Will the incremental changes such as enacted reform strategies in 2011
enhance the financial solvency of the current DB plans for the general
public employees in Florida local governments?

o

How would the public pension paradigm switch impact government
operations and the recruitment-retention of public employees?

o

Whether the interperiod equity issue created by rollout of the two-tier
pension reforms is perceived as an issue for Florida local governments?
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o

What are perceived impetuses and potential impediments to conducting
the pension model transition for Florida municipalities?

The impacts of public pension reform incorporate influences on financial
solvency of public pension plans, as well as the quality of public services via
recruitment and retention of qualified public employees. Possible morale impacts of
the two-tier benefit structure are another central concern. By examining the efficiency
of incremental changes to the fiscal status of pension plan, the author also investigates
the potential organizational impacts of pension model switch, and the pros and cons of
the DB-to-DC transition, this study seeks to reveal the current standing of the pension
systems in Florida cities and the inclination of local governments to conduct the
pension paradigm shift from DB to DC plans.

1.8 Significance of Study

The significance of the study is reflected by its original contribution to the
academic research, and its triangulated approach is designed to supplement and
augment prior studies that look solely at drivers of pension solvency. Although many
scholars and research institutes have argued that pension reforms are imperative and
introduced numerous reform strategies by altering the plan design feature of DB plans,
the effectiveness of the incremental changes have not been highlighted as an important
topic in previous academic discussion. The study fills an important knowledge gap in
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the scholarly literature by providing a thorough examination of Florida local pension
plans to identify the determinants of the financial solvency of public DB plans.

The study also addresses the readiness of Florida local governments in
conducting the pension paradigm switch, which has not been investigated on the basis
of empirical evidences in previous studies. The discussion of employee interperiod
equity derived from the public pension plan design is another original contribution of
this study because the issue has not drawn enough attention in previous literature.
Finally, the study utilizes the triangulated research methods with local level secondary
data, responses from self-administrated surveys and structured interviews, which
provide the primary empirical evidences absent in previous literature of public pension
reforms.

By investigating the potential drivers and impediments of pension paradigm
switch, as well as perceived organizational impacts, the study is intended to inform
pension policy discussion in Florida. It will provide decision-makers of pension
reforms with instructive references about the pros and cons of pension model changes
and the possible consequences of the transition. The implications from this study will
shed light on the current issues in the process of public sector pension reforms and the
perceptions from Florida local governments will offer inspirations to other state and
local governments since the public pension crisis is a nationwide epidemic.
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1.9 Justification of the Restricted Research Subject

The study concentrates on Florida’s pension reform for the following two
reasons. First, prior research has recognized Florida as a political and demographic
trendsetter for the nation (Naisbitt, 1982; Shrestha & Heiser, 2011; Watson, 2005).
Second, the Florida domicile ensures that our survey respondents are operating under
a uniform legal and administrative framework.

The research focus is restricted to general employee pension plans in Florida
local governments. The reasons for selecting the public pension plans at the local level
are as follows. First, compared to state government employees, more local government
employees participate in public pension systems (about 14 million compared with 5
million). While some local governments participate in state-administered pension plans,
generally local governments reserve responsibility for the required share to fund their
pension plans providing their employees with retirement benefits. Thus, local
governments have more fiscal burden than state governments in terms of annual
contributions (GAO, 2012). In Florida, the state pension plan, i.e., the FRS, although
experiences fiscal stress, has been and is still well funded. However, local pension plans
in Florida have grappled with underfunded pension plans even before the 2008
economic downturn. Therefore, targeting local pension plans may provide better
understanding of the pension reform imperatives. Second, research at the local level is
more suitable for this study because in Florida state and counties employees are
mandated to participate in the traditional DB model, i.e., FRS, while Florida cities have
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the freedom to opt into FRS or to retain its own type of pension plans with
modifications, which could be DB, DC or the hybrid approach. Hence it is more
feasible to analyze the possibility and readiness to conduct a pension paradigm shift at
the local level.

The study selects the pension plans for general public employees in Florida
local governments. Firstly, the research is restricted to the civilian, non-uniformed
public employees in order to avoid the sensitivity of pension reforms in the context of
contentious collective bargaining. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013),
local government employees had the highest union membership rate in the public sector,
41.7 percent, and furthermore, this cohort includes employees in heavily unionized
occupations, i.e., teachers and police officers, and firefighters. Secondly, the pension
plans for teachers and public safeties have different design characteristics from those
of general employees. For example, police officers and firefighters usually enjoy more
generous benefits with younger retirement age. The uniqueness of pension plan design
features for teachers and special risk employees cannot be fully enclosed by this study,
therefore, the research focus lies in the pension plans for general public employees.

Although this study avoids some sensitivities regarding unions by limiting the
focus on general employees’ pension plans, the impact of unions is inevitably
incorporated. Generally, public sector unions support the retention of DB model
(Ferlauto, 2002; NCPERS, 2007). Munnell, Golub-Sass, Haverstick, Soto and Wiles
(2008) found that a highly unionized pension plan is less likely to convert from the DB
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to DC model. The controversial issue of unions’ impacts will be implied by responses
to the anonymous surveys and interviews.

In addition, the study does not make an ideological statement about the public
pension model switch. The public pension crisis is a nationwide phenomenon and
reforms are likely nationwide regardless of whichever party is in power, although
Republicans advocate the advantage of DC plans and Munnell (2012) identified the
importance of Republican control of the legislature and governorship as a significant
driver of introducing the DC model to the public sector. The universality of
skyrocketing costs of public pension systems not only urged the Republican Governors
such as Rick Scott in Florida to endeavor to replace DB plans with DC plans, but also
forced the Democratic Governors, e.g., Jerry Brown in California, to propose a mandate
that new employees direct a substantial portion of their retirement money in 401(k)style accounts, which turned to faded efforts with amendments of DB design (York &
McGreevy, 2012). Furthermore, the sweeping influences of the pension model switch
make it difficult to reach an agreement even within the same Party. For instance, in
2013, the Republican House Speaker Will Weatherford could not even convince his
own party members in the Florida Senate that the DB model should be terminated for
new employees (Sickler, 2013). Thus, the study does not include partisanship as a
factor of pension paradigm shift.
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1.10 Dissertation Outline

This dissertation is comprised of seven chapters. Chapter One provides an
introduction of the public pension systems in state and local governments and in
Florida, the research topic, the purpose and objectives of the study, an overview of the
research design, the research questions, and the significance of the study. Chapter Two
delivers the theoretical framework of the research with a literature review of public
pension plan management and indicates the contribution of the current study to
previous studies. Chapter Three lays out the triangulated research design and associated
methodologies to carry out this study. Chapter Four presents the analysis of the fiscal
standing of public pension plans for general employees in Florida local governments
with trend analyses, and identifies the determinants of the financial solvency of public
DB plans to estimate the efficiency of the incremental reform strategies in improving
sustainability of public pension system. Chapter Five describes the survey results about
the perceptions of Florida local officials towards the alternative reform approach, i.e.,
the DB-to-DC transition, and indicates the potential impacts of switch and the major
drivers and impediments of pension paradigm shift. Chapter Six provides content
analysis of interview data to further explore the rationale behind the survey responses
and in-depth explanation of the viewpoints derived from survey participants. The last
chapter, Chapter Seven, provides the conclusion of this research and addresses
implications for policy makers and future studies.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
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2.1 Introduction

Public pensions not only provide for retirement benefits but also bring broader
impacts on financial and human resources system. On the one hand, pensions overcome
the “wage penalty” of public sector jobs. On the other hand, if poorly managed, they
threaten the long-term sustainability of government operations. Therefore, the literature
review revolves around the financial and organizational functions and impacts of public
pension systems on governments.

Chapter 2 consists of three sections. First, it lays out previous studies about the
financial solvency of public sector DB plans. Second, it shows the theoretical
framework in the scholarly literature regarding the pension paradigm switch from DB
to DC plans. The last part includes the omissions in the previous literature and the
contribution of the study.

2.2 The Theoretical Framework of the Financial Solvency of DB Plans

The underfunding of pension funds has long plagued the public sector DB
pension plans. Because the investment gains or losses of pension funds could bring
profound influences to the long-term fiscal health of state and local governments, the
continued underfunding of DB plans has posed great administrative concerns (Giertz
& Papke, 2007). Along with the looming public pension crisis, many scholars have
examined the financial standing of state pension plans, especially under the
circumstances of the recent economic downturn (Giertz, 2003; Novy-Marx & Rauh,
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2009; Peng, 2004; Rauh, 2010). The increasing unfunded pension liabilities due to
steep investment losses and consequent fiscal stress continue to appear as headlines in
recent years, which has forced a group of researchers to consider responding strategies
to improve the financial solvency of DB plans. In addition to the review of the previous
literature about the recommendations to amend the DB plans, this section also provides
a theoretical rationale that explains why public sector DB plans are mired in fiscal
stresses.

2.2.1 Measurement of the Financial Solvency of Public DB plans

Careful study of the financial status of DB plan requires selection of appropriate
financial measures. One of the most recognized techniques to determine the financial
status of a DB plan is the funded ratio. It indicates the proportion of the plan’s liabilities
covered by its assets (Steffen, 2001), which provides a snapshot of the plan’s health at
a given moment of time. Therefore, it has the advantage of incorporating prior funding
practices reflected by actuarial gains and losses, but it does not implicate the long-term
vision of whether the plan is experiencing growth or decline (DMS, 2012; McCue,
1994).

To account for the drawbacks of funded ratio, another proxy of the financial
solvency is often employed as an indicator of funding status, which is the unfunded
actuarial accrued liability (UAAL). UAAL represents the difference between the
actuarial accrued liability and the actuarial value of assets accumulated to finance that
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obligation at a particular point of time. Unlike the funded ratio, the magnitude and the
trend of UAAL could reveal whether the plan’s status is improving or declining (Berne
& Schramm, 1986), because it shows the variation between the projection and the
reality of a pension plan fund.

The funded ratios and UAAL are not really comparable across the pension plans
because they can be heavily influenced by each plan’s actuarial assumptions and
costing methods (McCue, 1994; Mitchell, McCarthy, Wisniewski, & Zorn, 2001;
Munnell, Aubry, & Haverstick, 2008). However, the standards for accounting and
financial reporting for state and local governments established by the Government
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) since the 1980s have greatly improved the
comparability of the funded ratio and UAAL. State and local governments must include
the actuarial methods and assumptions in the actuarial reports for public plans, which
help to standardize the rating of funded status about pension plans.

Many research institutes, such as the Pew Research Center, Wilshire
Consulting, Wisconsin Retirement Research Committee, etc., and researchers adopt the
funded ratio to illustrate the financial status of state and local pension plans (Munnell,
Aubry, & Haverstick, 2008; Munnell, Aubry, Hurwitz, Medenica, & Quinby, 2012;
Novy-Marx & Rauh, 2009). Some experts select the unfunded pension liabilities to
demonstrate the financial solvency of retirement system (Chaney, Copley, & Stone,
2002; Coggburn & Kearney, 2010). More frequently, agencies (e.g. GAO) and scholars
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incorporate both the funded ratio and unfunded liabilities in actuarial base to reflect the
fiscal stress of public pension plans (Giertz & Papke, 2007; McCue, 1994; Peng, 2004).

2.2.2 Determinants of the Financial Solvency of Public DB Plans

This section focuses on the contribution of the empirical literature on the
examination of the funding status of DB plans in the public sector. The reviewed studies
identify some determinants of the fiscal health of public DB plans, which are classified
into three categories: the individual features of each plan design, the financial
indicators, as well as the political factors of the financial solvency of DB plans.

Plan Characteristics

The unique characteristics associated with each DB plan have the most direct
and profound impacts on its financial health. Previous literature suggests three plan
features may affect the funding status of public sector DB plans: the generosity of
pension benefits, the payment of contributions, and the plan demographics.

Generosity of Benefits

In DB plans, the amount of retirement benefits is calculated by a formula that
involves a benefit multiplier, years of service, and the average final compensation
(AFC). AFC is the average salary of selected number of years of services. The shorter
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period is used to calculate the AFC, the more generous the plan becomes. The benefit
multiplier is the percentage of AFC earned with each year of service. The calculation
of years of services depends on the normal retirement age regulated by the organization
and the required vesting period to be eligible for the retirement benefits. In addition to
the benefit formula, two other factors can increase the generosity of public sector DB
plan: whether the organizations offer COLAs and the regulation of the minimum
required years of service for early retirement.

More generous plan design characteristics will affect pension costs and
consequentially influence the funding status of DB plans (Winklevoss, 1977). Liberal
plan benefits will lead to greater future liabilities, so the funded ratio will decline and/or
unfunded liabilities will increase (Munnel et. al., 2008). Ill-considered and unfunded
benefit increases have resulted in the drop of funded ratio and then a widening gap
between the states’ pension assets and their obligations (Pew, 2010a).

McCue (1994), using a Chowdhury’s incomplete covariance panel data analysis
of 173 local government pension plans in Florida from 1987 to 1992, found that
enhanced pension benefit packages led decreased funded ratio and increased unfunded
liabilities for local governments. Similarly, a increase in normal retirement age was
associated with higher funded ratios and lower unfunded liabilities, because they
provide “longer time horizons to amortize benefit obligations” (p. 116). Giertz and
Papke (2007) utilized the state-level data of 85 public pension plans from 2000, 2002,
and 2004 surveys of actuarial reports by the Wisconsin Retirement Research
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Committee, to build a pooled ordinary least square (OLS) and fixed effect regression
to model determinants of the funded ratio of public DB plans. They find that more
generous plans, indicated by higher formula multipliers, tend to have higher funded
ratios. Nevertheless, although the association is economically important, it does not
hold statistically significant in their complete model.

Fulfillments of Contributions

Actuaries in each public pension system calculate the annual required
contribution (ARC) that needs to be paid from the operating budget to keep the plan on
a steady path toward full funding. The ARC, as defined by GASB, includes the normal
cost, i.e., the present value of newly accrued pension liabilities in a given year, and
amortized payments to make up unfunded actuarial liabilities over a 30-year period
(Munnell et. al., 2012; Rauh, 2010). Therefore, increases in pension benefits will result
in additional yearly cost, and thus lead to higher ARC.

Typically, contributions are made as a percentage of participating employee
payroll by employer and employees. State and local government employees are
generally required to contribute annually a percentage of their salaries to their DB plans.
The percentage of contribution is determined in accordance with legislative
requirements. Because the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA) of
1974 does not apply to the public sector, there is a lower threshold of fiduciary
responsibility in public pension management. Governments are not required to fully
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fund their ARC. In the vast majority of states, the amount that is set to be paid by
legislatures may be considerably less than the actuarially required amount (Pew, 2010a).
During economic downturns, limited payments to ARC may be preferred by
legislatures because pension contributions do not possess the same priority and urgency
as other government expenditures (Peng, 2004).

On the other hand, the strong financial performance will make public employers
more prone to give themselves a funding holiday: Instead of putting extra funds aside
for rainy days, it seems more palatable for politicians to reduce contributions because
of the illusion that high investment returns are sufficient to fund the plans. McCue
(1994) found evidence that there is negative relationship between the funded ratio of
Florida local pension plans and their contributions from both employers and employees.
The results suggest that as the funding status improves, governments tend to reduce the
percentage of contributions from both sponsors and participants. By deferring the
required payments to contributions, the governments merely shift the pension benefit
costs to future generations (McCue, 1994; Peng, 2004).

Previous literature suggests the solvency of ARC is the key to maintain a sound
funding pension plan. Falling behind required payments to required contributions is a
significant factor of the declining funding status of public pension plans (Pew, 2010a).
With examination of the survey data for 84 large public plans from 38 states, Munnell
et al. (2008) conducted a linear regression to investigate the effect of fulfilling ARC to
the financial health of locally administrated pension plans. The authors find that plan
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sponsors fulfilling their ARC would have significantly better-funded plans than those
failing to make their ARC.

With a regression model using state-level data drawn from the Pew Center on
the States’ 2007 report Promises with a Price, Coggburn and Kearney (2010) found a
significant positive relationship between the employer contributions and the unfunded
pension liability, which is counterintuitive at the first glance. McCue’s study (1994)
also reveals the same association between contributions and UAAL. One of the
explanations may be that plans with liberal contribution requirements are likely to
accrue higher unfunded liabilities in the past than those less generous plans (Coggburn
& Kearney, 2010). Another reason is from the actuarial perspective: since the ARC is
actuarially calculated, a higher contribution percentage indicates a wider gap between
pension assets and liabilities (Eaton & Nofsinger, 2004; Peng, 2004). Therefore, plans
with more unfunded liabilities are required to assume higher contribution rates in order
to ameliorate the poor funding practices in the past.

Previous literature does not yield consistent evidence of the significance of plan
design features to the funding status of public pension plans. Munnell (2012) points out
this could be explained by the unique pension culture of each state. For example,
Florida and Delaware are clustered in the category of less generous pension benefits.
The former has been famous of well-funded pension plans while the latter suffered
from the unfunded pension liabilities. By contrast, some states like Kentucky and
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Illinois are located in the group of liberal pension benefits, but differ widely in funding
status of their pension plans.

Plan Demographics

The number of elderly in the United States increased from less than 5% in 1900
to about 12.4% in 2000. Beginning in 2010, the elderly population increased
dramatically, which is caused by the “graying” of baby boomers (Frankfort-Nachmias
& Leon-Guerrero, 2011). In every state, the elderly population grows faster than the
total population (ConagaRetna, 2004). The demographic change will exert greater
pressure on both public and private pension systems and impact their funding status.
Coggburn and Kearney’s study of state pensions (2010) shows that the growth of public
employee density, measured as the number of state government employees per 10,000
state population, will lead to the increase of state governments’ unfunded pension
liabilities.

The plan demographic information includes the numbers of active members and
beneficiaries of the pension plan. Previous studies have shown that the demographic
figures influence the financial solvency of public pension plans. Munnell et al. (2008)
find a significantly positive relationship between the number of plan participants and
the funding ratio of locally administered pension plans. The authors explain this finding
with the economies of scale in running plans and greater scrutiny to larger plans. Giertz
& Papke (2007) use the ratio of active members to beneficiaries to reflect the plan
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demographics and they find that “the ratio of actives to beneficiaries is statistically
significant and suggest that plans with a one unit higher ratio have a funding ratio that
is 4.5 percentage points higher” (p. 321).

Financial Factors

Both the external economic performance and the internal fiscal status of state
and local governments will endow great influences to the financial solvency of public
pension plans. The discussion below summarizes two financial elements affecting the
funding status of pension plans: the fiscal stress that governments experience and the
investment strategies of public pension assets.

Fiscal Stress of Governments

The fiscal condition of state and local governments will affect the funding of
public pension plans. During recessions, the lower-than-expected economic growth
rate will result in revenue shortfalls and cyclical budget pressures (Peng, 2004). These
fiscal stresses will force governments to balance their budget sheet by either increasing
tax revenues or reducing expenditures. Because of the theoretically prefunded nature
of pension funds, they can be viewed as a source of ready cash for legislatures (Giertz
& Papke, 2007). Therefore, when governments encounter a significant fiscal stress,
legislators may believe it is legitimate to reduce or postpone pension payments to shore
up their financial solvency. However, this provisional strategy will only increase the
ultimate costs when the pension bill is due in future, which hurts the funding status of
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pension plans and transfers the financial obligations to future taxpayers (Inman, 1982;
Mitchell & Smith, 1994; Peng, 2004; Peng, 2008; Romano, 1993).

In previous studies, researchers select numerous indicators of fiscal stress to
examine its impact on the funding status of public pension plans. The frequently used
empirical gauges of fiscal stress are the current year general fund surplus (or deficit)
and the year-end general fund balance (Reck, Wilson, Gotlob, & Lawrence, 2001;
Wilson, 1983; Wilson & Howard, 1984). Chaney, Copley, and Stone (2002) utilize
these two measures standardized by population to run an OLS model with the pension
data of 44 states. Their results show states with fiscal stress that have balanced budget
requirements at the same time fund their pensions at significantly lower level than
others. Pagano (1993) extends the measure of current year fund balance by creating an
imbalance index, which is the difference of current revenues and current expenditures
divided by total current expenditures. Adopting the imbalance index to examine the
funding status of Florida local pension plans, McCue (1994) finds that when cities face
fiscal stress, policymakers typically defer the funding for UAAL, which would worsen
the funding status of public pension plans.

Eaton and Nofsinger (2004) employ two different indicators of fiscal
constraints: one is a flow variable calculated with each state’s annual interest payments
divided by its total revenue; another is the amount of total public debt divided by total
revenue. Utilizing a panel data from five surveys of state and local government pension
systems conducted by the Public Pension Coordination Council (PPCC) for the years
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1990-1992, 1994, and 1996, the authors uncover that states with higher fiscal
constraints have significantly lower funding level than those states with less fiscal
constraints. Following the measurement of Eaton and Nofsinger (2004), Coggburn and
Kearney (2010) also select the flow variable of fiscal constraints. Their results indicate
“a significant positive relationship between a state’s level of fiscal constraint and
unfunded liabilities” (p. 103), because the pension payments become the easy victim
in the competition of expenditure allocations with other government programs.

Investment of Pension Assets

Since public pension plans rely heavily on the investment earnings to fund
benefit obligations, the market volatility of pension fund investment returns could
significantly affect the financial solvency of the plans. Severe investment losses of
public pension funds in the 2008 bear market is the most direct root for the current
public pension crisis (Pew, 2010a). Therefore, the strategies to sustain an adequate
investment return are imperative to improve the funding status of pension plans. One
of the important approaches is to ensure the pension asset allocation to different
investment instruments.

Back in the 1970s, because of the requirements associated with state law, state
pension systems generally relied on more conservative instruments that avoided
investment losses and delivered a low but stable rate of return, e.g., fixed income, cash
and equivalents, etc. Nevertheless, in the following decades, public pension systems
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loosened up their restrictions on investment in high-risk instruments such as equity,
real estate and private equity. According to the Pensions & Investments Annual Plan
Sponsor Survey, in 2007 equity investments accounted for 60% of public plan assets,
compared with that in 1990s, only 38% of public pension assets were placed in equities.
In bull markets, the aggressive investment strategies could generate considerable
returns and result in reducing contribution rate because of the over-funded pension
funds. But the downside is that the negative investment returns during the market
plunge, along with reduced revenue collections due to bad economy, would require
governments to contribute substantially more to their pension plans (Peng, 2004).

The review of literature suggests the importance of prudent pension assets
investment to the financial solvency of public pension plans. Peng (2004) conducts a
case study of three states (West Virginia, New York, and New Jersey) to illustrate the
best practice in handling pension investment and finds that diversified assets among a
broad array of pension assets allocation in both high and low risk instruments may
ensure the long-term healthy and steady investment returns. Novy-Marx and Rauh
(2009) refute the belief that the investment in equity is less risky in the long run than
in the short-term, because of its intrinsic fallacy of equity investment (Bodie, 1995;
Merton & Samuelson, 1974; Ross, 1999). Albrecht and Hingorani (2004) find that
investment in equities would negatively affect the risk adjusted financial performance
of public pension funds, although Nofsinger (1998), Abrecht, Shamsub, and

33

Giannatasio (2007), Weller and Wenger (2009) do not find it brings a statistical
significant impact.

Stalebrink, Kriz and Guo (2010) examine public pension asset allocation by
comparing it with an optimal portfolio, as defined by Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT),
which claims that diversification across asset classes will lower the investment risk at
a given level of expected return. With data from 94 pension plans from the 2007 Public
Fund Survey, the authors conduct the comparisons between the expected volatility of
the funds’ return and that of the optimal asset allocation at the target rate of return.
Their results indicate the plans in the sample “are taking on far more risk than the
optimal portfolio would incur given their target returns. The excessive risk taking is
driven by an unexplainable reliance on equity investments” (p. 42).

Political Factors

Since most state and local governments do not have prescribed actuarial
assumptions and funding methods to prepare actuarial reports for public pension funds,
the selection of these variables rests in the political preference of each plan board of
trustees. This section provides explanations about the influences of the political
selections of these two factors on the financial solvency of public pension plans.

Funding Methods
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Funding methods are the budgeting schemes or the payment plans in which the
pension benefits are to be financed. The choice of funding methods does not affect the
true over-all costs, but serve as “a controlling factor in determining how much of the
eventual cost is to be paid at any particular point of time” (Trowbridge, 1952, p. 17).
State and local governments primarily use one of the four funding methods to determine
their normal costs, which are: Entry age normal (EAN), frozen initial liability (FIL),
aggregate (AGG), and united credit (UC). AGG is the most conservative method used
by public employers. With the AGG method, the normal costs are calculated as the
amount of the difference between the present value of future obligations and the assets
needed to pay it down over time (Munnell et. al., 2008). The FIL method is grouped
with AGG cost plans. Under the FIL method, the unfunded obligations are amortized
over a fixed period. After calculating the initial unfunded liability, the AGG method is
employed (Munnell et. al., 2008). The EAN method is also relatively conservative
because the benefit costs are recognized early in a participant’s career at which the
pension funds allow for greater investment returns to fund the obligations (Trowbridge
& Farr, 1971). The UC method is the least conservative funding regime because the
pension liability is calculated later in the participant’s career when the investment
return is amortized over a shorter period (McCue, 1994).

The review of literature suggests mixed results about the impact of funding
method choice to the financial solvency of public pension plans. Munnell, et al. (2008)
find the employers that opt for the cheaper funding method, i.e., the projected UC, may
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be less committed to funding their obligations, which leads to lower funding ratios.
However, there are studies that do not find evidence that the plans using UC method
are worse funded than those using the more stringent methods (Giertz & Papke, 2007;
McCue 1994; Munnell et. al., 2008). One of the explanations for the latter could be that
although the political choice of funding method results in difference of required
contributions in the short term, in the long run every approach will generate sufficient
obligation payments. Hence in aggregate the adoption of funding method should have
no significant impact on the long-time financial soundness of public pension plans
(McCue, 1994).

Actuarial Assumptions

Another two key economic assumptions in public pension funding refer to the
interest assumption, also named as the earning assumption, and the assumption of the
wage inflation rate. The difference between the interest assumption and the wage
inflation assumption, which is often referred as the “economic spread”, is the assumed
real return on invested assets over the wage inflation rate (Giertz & Papke, 2007). The
economic spread is one of the most critical decisions made by policymakers regarding
ultimate pension costs (Tilove, 1977). When the assumption of interest rate is higher
than the projected wage inflation rate, the pension benefit obligations would be
reduced. On the contrary, when the salary growth rate is higher than the earning

36

assumption, the public pension plans would incur more benefit costs. Therefore, the
larger economic spread is assumed, the less pension costs governments would pay for
(Mitchell & Smith, 1992).

Since most state and local governments do not have mandatory actuarial
assumption rates, the assumed economic spread can serve as a useful tool for
policymakers to manipulate the pension costs. Especially when governments perceive
the fiscal pressure or recession, by raising the assumption of interest rate unrealistically,
the plan sponsors could reduce the required pension expenditure to balance the budget
sheet (Giertz & Papke 2007), thus making pension plans appear well funded. Munnell
(2012) argues that the investment return rate at eight percent, assumed by many
governments, is unrealistic and leads to the illusion of less pension costs. McCue (1994)
finds strong supporting evidence that the increase of the assumed economic spread is
associated with the increase in the funding ratio. However, since the UAAL is
calculated based on actual events not forecasting increased rates, the actual economic
spread, instead of the assumptions, positively affect the amount of UAAL.

2.3 The Public Pension Paradigm Switch from DB Plans to DC Plans

Some scholars appear committed to tinkering strategies that preserve the DB
model. Meanwhile, some researchers have started considering the imperative of
replacing the DB plans with DC plans. Other scholars not only criticize the
vulnerability and inefficiency of DB plans, but also advocate the DB-to-DC transition.
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Although just a few state and local governments have experience of DC plans, existing
literature details potential issues with implementing public pension paradigm switch
(Frank et al., 2012; Lechance and Mitchell, 2002; Munnel et al., 2008; Munnel et al.,
2010; Papke, 2004). The section will present previous studies about the drivers and
impediments to conduct the public pension model transition.

2.3.1 Drivers to Conduct Pension Model Transition

The steep fall of public pension assets resulting from the stock market plunge
in 2008 has incurred a widening gap between the public pension assets and liabilities.
At the same time, the relatively poor post-recession performance has tightened
revenues, and thus fewer resources for state and local governments to allocate to public
pension funds. The increasing unfunded pension liabilities in recent years have
shattered the long-held illusion that public sector enterprises are relatively more
immune to the market fluctuation than private entities (Hays, 1996; Giertz & Papke,
2007; Munnell, Haverstick, & Soto, 2007). The outstanding costs associated with DB
pension plans have forced governments to acknowledge the financial risk of sponsoring
them is unacceptable to taxpayers and elected officials. Under the DC model, the annual
contribution cost is stable, in contrast to the inconsistent ARC required by DB plans
based on their market performance. Therefore, the switch from the DB to DC model is
offered as a means of reducing the fiscal burden of snowballing pension costs from
governments. Thus, the basic affordability issue of the DB plans becomes the most
direct incentive for state and local governments to conduct the DB-to-DC transition.
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The changes in GASB’s accounting rule make the solvency issue of public
pension funds more visible. In 1999, GASB issued new accounting and financial
reporting standards that required government entities to provide more comprehensive
accrual-basis financial statement (Funkhouser, 2013). State and local governments are
required to report the amount of UAAL, which represents a funding liability rather than
the financial condition of individual plans (Frank et. al., 2012). Since then, GASB has
continued to set higher standards to improve the accounting and financial reporting of
public pension plans by state and local governments, which reflects a more accountable
representation of pension benefit obligations. The recently approved GASB Statement
68 requires governments with DB plans to report net pension liabilities, which provides
citizens with a clearer picture of the size and nature of the financial obligations for past
services rendered (Norwalk, 2012). These new accounting rules are likely to reveal an
increasingly weak financial position of pension funds, hence the perception of
unhealthy public pension system will force politicians to embrace pension policy
changes (Lambert & Byrnes, 2012).

Other than the financial and budgetary pressure from the pension costs and
GASB’s transparency initiatives, the Great Recession also imposes political pressures
on state and local governments to lean towards the pension paradigm switch (Boivie &
Weller, 2012). Under the DB regime, the only option available for state and local
governments to reduce the unfunded liabilities is to improve the funding level (Clark
& Sabelhaus, 2009; Munnell, Aubry, & Quinby, 2010). The resources to improve the
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funding would primarily come from the tax revenues rather than from increased
employee contributions, because usually there are legal constraints on changing the
benefit formula for current employees (Manahan, 2010). “The debate over increased
funding is likely to trigger a significant battle for resources between plan participants
and taxpayers” (Clark & Sabelhaus, 2009, p. 494). Thus, taxpayer sentiment may cause
policy-makers to make politically palatable decision about pension reform. The
increased popularity of anti-tax movements further fuels the oppositions to public DB
pension plans (Barstow, 2010).

The increasingly visible disparity between the

compensation level and DB coverage of public employees and that in the private sector
may incur the voter anger, which argues for elimination of DB plans in the public sector
(Reilly, Schoener, & Bolin, 2007).

2.3.2 Impediments to Conduct the Pension Paradigm Switch

Those advocating a DB-to-DC switch recognize serious issues in the transition.
This section identifies several potential financial and organizational impediments
during the transfer.

Transition Costs

One of the thorniest issues in dealing with a DB-to-DC transition is that
governments still need to deal with costs of existing DB pension plans in terms of
accrued liabilities (Boivie & Weller, 2012; Munnell, Golub-Sass et al., 2008). Because
many states have legal restrictions of changing benefits of current employees, the newly
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employed DC plans would only apply to the new-hired employees. Thus, the
governments still have to cover the accrued benefit obligations for past services. To
making matters worse: Although the new employees on DC plans will not accrue any
benefits, they also will not make contributions, which means the employer will solely
bear the fiscal burden without incoming new dollars to fund the old DB plan. Therefore,
the higher the previous unfunded liabilities the DB plan has (i.e., the lower the funding
ratio), the more substantial costs governments will encounter at the beginning of
pension model transition. However, in the long run, through paying down the unfunded
liabilities in the past without newly accrued obligations, governments would be able to
survive with gradually decreased fiscal stress after the painful liquidation for the first
several years.

Munnell and Golub-Sass et al. (2008) examine the factors that affect the
decision to introduce a DC plan for state governments with an ordered probit regression
using annual data of pension plans for state employees and teachers from 1992 to 2006.
Their findings do not reveal the actuarial funded ratio is a significant cue for the
introduction of a DC plan. However, with the financial data from 1998-2010, Thom
(2010) examines the effect of Michigan’s decision to close DB plans for new
employees and replace with DC plans. The results show the transition could reduce
both the long-term benefit obligations and state budget costs. Especially, when
comparing the contribution rate for both plans, the new DC plan has more stable annual
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contribution rate and is less expensive than DB plans, except for the first few years
after the introduction of DC plans.

Adequacy for Recruitment & Retention

One of the major deterrents relating to the public pension paradigm switch is
the concern that the DC model is less adequate as a recruitment-retention tool
(American Academic of Actuaries [AAA], 2006; Boivie & Weller, 2012). In part, this
based on the belief that DB makes up for the so-called “wage penalty”. The long-held
belief is that employees prefer the guaranteed retirement benefits of DB pensions to
higher salaries (Ippolito, 1997). Whether or not the employers offer DB plans is a
deciding factor that affects the applicant’s choice of organizations (Nyce, 2012).
However, the argument that DB pension is necessary to reward retirement benefits for
relatively lower wages is doubtful given today’s job market (Frank et al., 2012;
Fletcher, 2010). On the basis of the 2013 data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
hourly pay for public employees is on average about one-third higher than that for
private employees. In June 2013, the average total compensation cost per hour for
public sector employees is $42.09, compared with $29.11 for private sector workers.
Many researchers have revealed the similar trend that in the last three decades, public
employees at all levels have started enjoying higher salary than private sector workers
(Bender, 2003; Borjas, 2003; Krueger, 1988; Smith, 1977).
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Another advantage of the DB model from the human resources perspective is
reflected through public employee retention. There seems to be lower employee
turnover rate with DB plans than that under the DC regime. Munnell, Haverstick, and
Sanzenbacher (2006) find evidence of lower attrition with DB plans, which suggests
that better turnover rates starting from 1990s correlate with the reduced DB coverage
and increased DC adoption since then. Public employees, who have longer tenure than
private workers, prefer DB plans over alternative plans because the DB plan features
favor long-term service (Dulebohn, Murray, & Sun, 2000; Munnell et al,, 2007;
Olleman, 2009). Therefore, DB plans can enhance the probability to attract and retain
employees with long-term commitments to their employers (Ippolito, 1997; Nyce,
2007). By contrast, DC plans are less capable than DB plans of instilling employee
loyalty to younger employees (Nyce, 2007). They are more attractive to those who
focus more on current rewards rather than the deferred pension benefit with long tenure
offered by DB plans. Younger workers, particularly those with college degrees, prefer
the portability of DC pensions and are increasingly reluctant to commit in the long
service period required under the public sector DB model (Bowman & West, 2006;
Dolan, 2007).

Thus, it is possible that the public sector would attract a different labor force if
they conducted a DB-to-DC transition. Those higher-income, better-educated plan
enrollees will prefer the DC option, whereas the lower-income participants with shorter
life expectancies will stick to the safer DB model (Bodie, Marcus, & Merton, 1988;
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Clark & Pitts, 1999). The midcareer employees will suffer most from the pension
paradigm shift, while younger and mobile workers may favor the conversion and those
near-retiring are unaffected by the change (Munnnell, Golub-Sass et al., 2006). The
experience in the private sector suggests that closing DB plans has little adverse effects
on the capacity to recruit and retain qualified workers. Similarly, based on the
examination of academic researches, Frank et al. (2012) contend that the “adoption of
DC plans per se do not affect long-term human resources planning in government” (p.
11). Moreover, in both Florida and Michigan the introduction of DC model even
originated partly from governments’ concern for their ability to attract and retain
competent employees (Huntley, 2001; Rehfeld, 1998).

Financial Illiteracy of Public Employees

Another critical issue regarding the DB-to-DC transition rests in the transfer of
risks of investment, longevity, and inflation from employers to employees. Under the
DB model, state and local governments assume these risks and manage the assets for
employees, which has a clear cost advantage in the investment and administration over
DC plans (AAA, 2006; Bovie & Weller; 2012; Brainard, 2005). The guaranteed annuity
structure offered by traditional DB plans provide the retirement security to those who
lack the necessary knowledge of financial planning. By contrast, with a DC plan the
contributions to the individual accounts are invested by the own will of employees, so
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all the risks are shifted to the plan participants. Unfortunately, most Americans are not
financially literate enough to manage their savings or allocate assets across investment
classes (Frank, 2009; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2005; United States Congress, 2008).
According to the 2003 John Hancock Financial Services Retirement Survey of 800 DC
plan participants, nearly half have little or no investment knowledge and less than 20%
consider themselves relative knowledgeable (Carmichael, 2003). The survey concludes
that many respondents have a skewed opinion about the way that investment works
across-the-board, not to mention the advanced skill of financial planning of pension
assets. To make it worse, many employees have limited enthusiasm to learn about the
pension fund investment. One study of the Pension Research Council shows a large
proportion of workers lack the serious interest in maximizing their investment returns
and retirement security (McFarland, Marconi, & Utkus, 2003).

The damage to 401(k) accounts associated with the 2008 stock market crash
reinforces the impact of illiteracy. The poor performance of 401(k) accounts has raised
widespread concerns about their capacity to provide retirement security. In the private
sector, the average return rate of 401(k) assets is 1% less than that of DB assets during
1988-2004, even with a higher percentage of 401(k) assets invested in equities during
the bull market of 1990s (Munnell et al., 2006). In the public sector, concern with the
huge disparity between the investment returns of DB plans (11%) and DC plans (6.5%),
in 2002, Nebraska replaced the DC plans for state and county employees with a cash
balance plan, where employers took back the responsibility to management of pension
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assets (Munnell, Golub-Sass et. al., 2008). Experience in both the private and public
sectors reveal the same difficulty for individual participants to manage their pension
asset investments and generally they could not do a pleasing job.

Another factor contributing to the need for enhanced financial literacy is the
fact that unlike the private sector DC participants, the public employees are not covered
by the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, which addresses the financial illiteracy
and undersaving issues of 401(k) plans in the private sector (Frank et al., 2012). The
PPA offers the qualified default investment alternatives of asset allocations to private
DC participants in order to facilitate controls over their retirement income. Without the
protection of PPA, the public DC enrollees may suffer from poor decisions and make
reckless investment decisions that fail to secure adequate retirement benefits
(Yakoboski, 2011). The upshot is during the process of pension paradigm shift from
DB to DC plans, state and local governments cannot ignore the reality that most
employees lack the basic knowledge of investment concepts and practices. Thus, the
financial training is crucial in order to avoid the possible indigence of retired employees.

2.4 The Interperiod Equity Issue of Public Pension Reform

Another issue worthy of consideration is the intergeneration inequity. Many
researchers have raised their questions about this aspect of pension underfunding. By
delaying pension obligation payments, the governments simply shift the financial
burden from the current taxpayers to the future generations, which violates the
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interperiod equity principle (Clark & Sabelhaus, 2009; Creedy, Li, & Moslehi, 2010;
Peng, 2004; Peng, 2008). Interperiod equity is a term in the governmental accounting
literature, which has originated from Rawls’ (1971) conception known as “justice
between generations” (p. 284). As Frederickson (1994) advocates, public officials have
the obligations towards future generation to ensure the intergenerational fairness.
However, the current shortfalls of DB plan funding suggest an unfair transfer of wealth
from the future taxpayers to the current generation (Mahoney, 2000; Novy-Marx &
Rauh, 2008). This wealth transfer is revealed by the fact that the subsequent generations
not only need to pay extra taxes to finance the accrued pension promise for previous
public services, but also expect to receive lower returns in terms of reduction in public
services. (Mahoney, 2000; Mittelstaedt, 2004). Thus, a pension windfall awarded to the
previous generations is coming at the expense of future taxpayers. Furthermore, recent
poor investment returns suggest this issue is unlikely to be ameliorated by future bull
markets (El-Erian, 2008; Mittelstaedt, 2004).

Failing to assume the responsibility of interperiod equity may result in a moral
hazard issue of managing DB plans, that is, governments have less intention to fully
fund their DB pension benefits (Giertz & Papke, 2007; Yang and Mitchell, 2005; Peng,
2008). Promises of guaranteed pension benefits enforce plan participants’ belief that
their benefit are cast in stone regardless of the funding status. Since ERISA does not
apply to the public sector employees, politicians tend to be indifferent to the long-term
funding needs either because of the urgency to address immediate budget priorities, or
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because of their relatively short horizon of operation. Similarly, legislatures would give
themselves a funding holiday in good times by deferring pension contributions or
increase the benefit level ignoring the long-term effects. These practices echo the public
choice theory, which assumes that elected officials and public administrators act in
their self-interest, not in the public interest (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962).
Mismanagement due to the moral hazard issue exacerbates the underfunding of the DB
model. By design, DC plans minimize this moral hazard problem—the governments
are required to pay their constant proportions of pension contribution in a timely
manner. Switching from DB to DC not only could limit the moral hazard of
underfunding pension plans, but also could address the transfer of pension costs to all
stakeholders of DB plans.

Before the recent public pension reform, the transfer of pension costs among
different generations was just implicitly manifested within the DB system. However,
the two-tier benefit system created in the recent public pension reform makes the
interperiod equity issue more relevent. Hesitant to conduct the DB-to-DC transition in
totality, many state and local governments adopted the incremental strategy to improve
their pension funding status. New hired employees will face elongated retirement age
and vesting periods, reduced benefit multipliers and COLAs, and/or mixed pension
plan portfolios. Therefore, under the two-tier structure the new hires enjoy less
generous retirement benefits. State and local governments hope to reduce their future
pension costs by hiring new employees at lower pension costs than incumbent workers.
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Practice in the private sector suggests the two-tier benefit structure is more appealing
to companies with higher rates of turnover among new hires and with a large group of
rich-benefit, high-skilled senior employees due to retire soon (Harrison & Bluestone,
1990). A two-tier system also causes the problems of higher turnover rate of new hires
and a demoralized workforce (Bewley, 2007). But given enough time, this issue may
be self-solvent along the retirement of senior employees leaving only one tier with
lower benefits left in the entire industry (Harrison & Bluestone, 1990).

The issue has not drawn much attention in the literature of public pension
reform given its recency. The study investigates the impact of the two-tier benefit
structure from the perspective of ethics and equity, because when conducting political
reforms, elected officials should not just fix their attentions exclusively on methods but
also consider the ultimate goal of governments (Adams, 1902).

2.5 Summary

The literature review provides a theoretical framework of developing public
pension reform strategies to solve the current retirement crisis. If state and local
governments plan to improve the funding level of the DB model, it is necessary to
identify the significant factors that may affect the financial solvency of public DB plans.
The review of empirical studies showcases the rationale behind the underfunding of
public sector DB plans, which includes the plan design features, financial factors and
political influences. Previous studies fail to consistently address the impact of these
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determinants on the financial solvency in their totality and generate controversial
results about the significance of these indicators. There are also methodological issues
among the literature that need to be tackled. Previous studies provide partial
explanations of the financial solvency of the public DB model with different
measurements. The study incorporates more indicators in a comprehensive
examination of the financial status of local DB pension plans. In addition, most of the
reviewed studies relied heavily on the data of state sponsored plans or large local plans.
The study will delve into the DB plans at the local level, which are equally problematic.

The chapter also reviews the literature about the incentives for state and local
governments to conduct the pension paradigm switch from DB to DC model, as well
as the critical issues that need to be taken into consideration during the transition, which
consists of the potential transition costs, effects of DC plans on recruitment and
retention, and workforce literacy training. The interperiod equity issue also remains
during pension reform. The literature review reveals a dissonance among the
researchers’ attitudes towards the pension paradigm shift. The DB advocators praise
the advantages of DB plans and raise questions regarding the effectiveness of the DC
model from both financial and human resources perspectives, whereas another group
of scholars believe in the capacity of the DC model in attracting and retaining public
workforce and appreciate its lower costs in the long run. The bifurcation calls for
empirical evidence to circumstantiate either argument. The interperiod equity issue,
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especially with regard to the two-tier benefit structure, is emergent and also begs for
investigation.

On the basis of the discussion above, the contribution of the study to the
previous literature about the public pension reform strategies manifests as follows. First,
it addresses the methodological issue of the financial solvency of public DB plans by
incorporating more variables and measurements with available data of Florida DB
plans at the municipal level, which establishes an integrated model for identifying key
determinants of the financial solvency. Second, the study utilizes primary data needed
about the perceptions of the public pension paradigm switch through surveys and
interviews with Florida local government officials. In doing so, it will reveal the drivers
and potential obstacles of the pension model transition. Third, it examines the matter
of interperiod equity regarding the public pension reform with empirical data from
surveys and interviews, a topic that has not drawn enough attention in previous studies.
Finally, the study fills an important gap in previous literature by delivering a
comprehensive analysis of the efficiency of pension reform approaches in the public
sector. Its practical implications will facilitate policymakers to develop feasible reform
strategies in order to maintain the sustainability of the public pension system.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 overviews the research approaches utilized in this study, and it is
organized according to the research techniques driven by tests of hypotheses. The first
part outlines the research design for the examination of the financial solvency of Florida
local DB plans with a longitudinal research using the existing data. Second, it describes
the research design exploring public pension reform strategies and qualitative data
collection. This section provides the details of the survey data analysis approaches,
including the comparisons of means, principal component analysis, and a crosssectional regression model; and the interview research design and the data analysis
plan.

The study utilized a triangulated research approach to conduct investigations.
Triangulation is a “method of cross-checking data from multiple sources to search for
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regularities in the research data” (O’Donoghue & Punch, 2003). Given the complexity
of pension reform and the contrasting views of many stakeholders, triangulation is the
appropriate technique. Single research methodology is not sufficient to fully reveal the
panorama of the complex phenomenon and may incur intrinsic biases. To overcome
the shortcomings of single method and single data source, the incorporation of multiple
observations, methodologies, and empirical data sources is essential to facilitate the
validation of findings.

3.2 The Research Design for the Financial Solvency Issue

The first overarching research question for the study is to examine whether the
incremental reform strategies to preserve the DB model could really enhance the
financial solvency of public DB plans and thus ensure the sustainability of public
pensions in Florida local government. The incremental reform strategies are
exemplified by the pension laws enacted in Florida in 2011. The reforms included a
series of actions to improve the funding level of the DB regime by changing the plan
design features in terms of reducing benefits and increasing contributions. Therefore,
it is necessary to prove that the characteristics of DB plan design are the most
significant factors in determining the financial status of DB plans, thereby justifying
the effectiveness of the incremental reform approach. The literature suggests the
underfunding of public sector DB plans not only results from generous benefits or
insufficient contributions, but also results from the political pressure. With evidence
that changing plan design features may not be sufficient to remedy the public DB model,

53

it would make sense to further explore the alternative reform strategies such as the
pension paradigm switch from DB to DC plans.

This study utilizes existing data of 151 local DB plans for general public
employees collected from the Local Government Annual Reports of Retirement Plans
to assess financial solvency, which are prepared by the Florida State Department of
Management Services from 2005 to 2012. On the basis of the literature, the study
selects the combination of actuarial funded ratio and UAAL percentage of the
participating employee payroll as indicators of the financial solvency. The higher the
funded ratio is, or the smaller the UAAL percentage is, the better condition the DB plan
is in. The trend analyses of these two dependent variables will be provided in Chapter
4 to deliver a general idea of the financial status of Florida local pension plans.

Utilizing panel data, this study includes the elements discussed in the literature
review as explanatory variables for the financial solvency, which include the plan
design of benefits and contributions, financial factors, and political impacts. The plan
demographic information, measured as the ratio of retirees to active members, is
included as a control variable. A year dummy of 2012 is also added to separate the
effect of the pension reform after 2011. Table 3.1 shows the detailed measurements of
the explanatory variables.

A fixed-effect regression model will be tested with the data analysis and
statistical software Stata. Fixed-effect models are frequently applied to the panel data
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analysis when researchers are only interested in the impact of variables that vary over
time. The purpose of using fixed-effect models is to control the unobserved
heterogeneity (i.e., the unobserved individual differences across the entities being
studied) when the heterogeneity is time-invariant and correlated with other individual
characteristics (Wooldridge, 2013).
Table 3.1 Explanatory Variables for the Regression Model
Variables
Plan Design Characteristics
Benefit
Retirement Benefit Rate
AFC Period
Normal Retirement Age
Vesting
COLA
Early Out
Contribution
Member Percent
City Percent

Description

Percent of Average Final Compensation (AFC) earned with
each year of service
The number of years used in determining the AFC
Normal retirement age for full pension
Whether members have rights to benefit computed on years
of service prior to completion of normal retirement age and
credit
Whether the plan has an automatic cost-of-living provision
for retirees
The minimum required years of service for early retirement
The percent of participating employee payroll which is
paid by employees
The percent of participating employee payroll which is
paid by plan sponsor

Financial Factors
Balance of Revenue and Excess/Deficiency of revenue over/under expenditure
Expenditure
(total account at city level year end) per 1,000 population
Pension Asset Investment
The percentage of pension assets invested in equities and
fixed incomes
Political Factors
Funding Method
Assumed Economic Spread
Actual Economic Spread

The actuarial cost funding method used to calculate normal
contribution: EAN, FIL, AGG, UC
The difference between the interest rate assumption and the
salary growth rate assumption
The difference between the actual interest rate and the
actual salary growth rate

Control Variables
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Plan Demographics
Year Dummy of 2012

The ratio of number of retirees and/or beneficiaries to
number of active members in the plan
Measure the impact of the 2011 pension law

When using the fixed-effect model, researchers could remove the effect of any
time invariant components of the model thus greatly reduce the threat of omitted
variable bias (Kohler & Kreuter, 2012). This study focuses on the cause of changes in
the financial solvency within the individual public DB plans, not the effect of constant
features of each pension plan. Therefore, it’s appropriate to adopt the fixed-effect
models in the investigation. The regression results will be presented in Chapter 4 to
uncover the key determinants for the fiscal viability of public DB plans.

3.3 The Research Design for the Issue of Public Pension Paradigm Switch

3.3.1 The Survey Research Design

In addition to the quantitative analysis of the financial solvency of public DB
plans, this study also probes into the public pension reforms with the analysis of
primary data collected by survey questionnaires. Although the examination of the
secondary data lays the ground of arguments about the effectiveness of incremental
reform strategies, more evidence is needed to understand the alternative reform
approach—the DB-to DC transition. Through the survey results, this study endeavors
to uncover the potential impacts of the pension paradigm switch and the attitudes of
state and local governments towards this emerging trend. With the quantitative analyses
of the survey responses, this study aims to establish indexes of their perceptions to the
public pension reform to better understand the rationale behind their thoughts.
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The study collects primary data through a self-administered survey
questionnaire sent to the Finance and Human Resources (HR) directors of Florida
municipalities. The survey was sent out via e-mail and regular mail, followed by phone
and fax reminders. Multiple waves of surveys from August 1st to October 25th, 2012
were administered aiming to enhance the response rate. Given its exploratory nature,
the survey is the appropriate method to gather consistent primary data and to assess
thoughts, opinions, and feelings, since no prior studies have collected such kind of data
relating the public pension reform.

The survey research design is adopted because it enables descriptive
contentions about a population by analyzing a representative sample of respondents’
attitudes (Axinn & Pearce, 2006; Creswell, 2003; Shaughnessy, Zechmeister, &
Jeanne, 2011). This study employs a structured survey instrument to elicit consistent
measures of perceptions from public officials towards public pension reform. The
response format to the survey questions is a five-point Likert scale, ranging from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” with a neutral midpoint. Questions are framed
in the context of the DB system as the default pension model and restricted to civilian,
non-uniformed employees in local governments.

The target population for the survey consists of public officials from all the
municipalities in Florida that offer a public pension plan for general employees because
they are the focus of this study. The potential survey respondents were selected by the
technique of cluster sampling. First, the author selected all the municipalities that
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provide either a local plan for their public general employees or participated in the FRS,
since not all of the 410 municipalities in Florida offer pension plans for their general
employees (See Figure 3.1). This selection leaves 305 municipalities qualified for the
survey. Second, the municipalities with population less than 5,000 were filtered to
enhance the generalizability of the research finding, which ends up with the public
officials from 176 municipalities as the potential survey respondents.

Figure 3.1 Types of the Public Pension Plans for General Public Employees in
Florida Municipalities by 2011

N/A

3.41%

FRS/DB-closed

1.46%

DB-closed

1.46%

DC/DB-closed
DB & DC

1.95%
0.98%

No plan
Other

18.78%
3.66%

FRS & DC
FRS & DB

4.63%
0.98%

FRS
DC

29.51%
10.49%

DB

22.68%

Source: summarized from the 2011 Local Government Annual Reports of retirement
plans, Florida State Department of Management Services
The target audience of the survey instruments includes the Finance and HR
directors of the selected municipalities in Florida. Finance directors are targeted
because the status of pension funds has great impacts on finance and budgeting, hence
finance directors would have a direct interest in the issues of pension reform. Pension
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reform would also influence the recruitment and retention of public employees, thus
the human resources directors would provide the first-hand insights into the impact of
the pension paradigm switch and the newly established two-tier system. The current
literature about retirement is segmented between finance and HR management;
nonetheless, the research of public pensions should be holistic and integrative.
Confronting the current public pension crisis requires exploratory reform strategies that
integrate financial adjustments with HR planning considerations (Frank et al., 2012).
Thus, the inclusion of both Finance and HR directors from one municipality also serves
as a tactic to enhance the overall survey response rate.

The survey instrument is specifically developed for this study based on the
critical issues regarding public pension reform identified in the literature review. The
questionnaire for Finance directors is partially different from that for HR directors, but
the majority of the survey questions are common for the two groups. The 36 common
questions for both department heads ask about their perceptions to the public pension
model shift, the potential impacts of the public pension reform, and drivers and
impediments regarding the public pension paradigm switch. The version for finance
directors also asks about the financial sustainability of the public pension plans in order
to find out the reasons for underfunding of public pension plans. The extra questions
for HR directors inquire the importance of financial literacy training and recent changes
of individual pension plan. The survey instruments are attached as Appendix 1.
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Before sending out the survey questionnaire, the instrument was pilot tested
with six knowledgeable experts on the research subject, which improved the content
validity and format of the survey questions. The self-administered survey was sent out
online and via mail for multiple waves. The first two rounds include an on-line survey
launch thorough www.fiu.qualtrics.com with the author’s account on August 1, 2012.
The mailed version was sent out on September 10, 2012 with phone and fax reminder.
The last wave was also online through the FIU Qualtrics on October 25, 2012. When
administering both online and mailed survey questionnaires, the study follows the
guideline of Neuman (2004) to enhance the response rate by accompanying the
instrument with a cover letter, which explains the purpose and participants of the survey,
the statement of confidentiality and voluntary participation, a small amount of
monetary stimulus, and detailed contact information of the researchers. For the mailed
version, the cover letter was printed on paper with the letterhead of Department of
Public Administration at Florida International University. Along with the cover letter
and survey questionnaire, each mailed survey also includes a prepaid, self-addressed
envelope for mailing back the responses.

The survey findings are derived from 57 Finance Directors and 56 Human
Resources Directors, which comprises a response rate of 33%. Among the 176
surveyed cities, in 21 cities both the Finance and HR directors responded to the survey;
in 36 cities only Finance directors took the survey; in other 35 cities only HR directors
answered the questionnaire. In total, the survey yielded responses from 92 cities,
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representing 52.0% of all the surveyed cities. The response rate is realistic since these
days the average response rate in social science is 40 to 50%, especially when
considering the high refusal rates in the United States (Neuman, 2004).

Crosstablulations of responses by taxes levied in 2011 as well as city locations
indicate there is no significant difference between respondents and non-respondents by
tax revenue or region. However, the average population of respondent cities is about
20,000 lower than the non-respondent cities, which could be explained by the fact that
some of the largest cities fall into the non-respondent category (the standard deviation
of the population for non-respondents is 3 times of that for respondent cities). The
composition of pension plan types for general employees (DB, DC, and FRS) of the
respondent cities is almost the same as the distribution of pension plan type in all
Florida cities. For example, in Florida, 10.5% of all the 410 cities adopt the DC model
to provide retirement benefits, the same as the sample (10.9% of respondent cities
provide DC plans only.) The comparisons of means between the responses of Finance
and HR directors indicate the congruence between these two professions: only five out
of the thirty-six common questions have significant differences. Therefore, the survey
results can be viewed as a collective attitude towards pension reform.

The data analysis plan of the survey results includes a comparison of means
between the responses of Finance and HR directors, a descriptive summary of survey
results, a principal components analysis, and a multiple regression analysis with
supplementary secondary data. Since the survey questions are designed with five-point
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Likert scales, this study treats the survey responses as quantitative data. First, in order
to unveil the similarities and differences of the perceptions from the Finance and HR
directors in Florida local governments towards the public pension reform issues, the
study compares the means of the two groups through the independent-samples t-test. A
median score of responses will be provided as a fact-at-a-glance indicator of how
perceptions are distributed. By displaying of the frequency distributions of survey items,
the survey findings will be discussed question by question.

The second step of the analysis of survey results is a Principal Component
Analysis (PCA), which is a way to identify patterns in data by “…generating a reduced
set of variates that account for most of the variability in original data...” (Dillon &
Goldstein, 1984, p. 47). The congruence of Finance and HR directors’ perceptions
allows sufficient numbers of observations to undertake the PCA. Since there is no
theory of diffusion of DC plans in the public sector and the study does not test any
specific hypotheses regarding the public pension reform, the study conducts an
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the survey results in order to highlight any
underlying variates that affect the observed pattern of responses (Long, 1983). Some
issues regarding the DB-to-DC transition are still relatively new to state and local
governments, this procedure could facilitate to investigate whether respondents have
an internally valid manner in answering the survey questions or they simply check the
box.
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On the basis of the results of the EFA, five indexes reflecting the perceptions in
the public pension reform from local government officials are developed by calculating
the average of the factor scores of survey items comprising the five factors. The indexes
are employed as the dependent variables in a multiple regression analysis with the
individual characteristics of respondents and city-level data as explanatory variables.
The regression results will show which variables may impact the perceptions of survey
respondents towards the public pension reform issues.

3.3.2 The Interview Research Design

The survey results provide the evidence about the perceptions of Florida local
government officials towards public pension reform issues. However, solely relying on
the survey responses is not enough to explain the rationale behind the revealed attitude.
Since the survey process may not cover all aspects of pension transition, the validity of
the survey results needs to be verified by another method. Therefore, another
qualitative method, i.e., interview, is employed to gather in-depth thoughts about the
subject of public pension reform. This qualitative approach could take a non-linear
route to better comprehend the details of a particular context (Neuman, 2004).

The study develops and administrates ten structured phone interviews to inquire
further elaborations on the survey findings and to gather in-depth insights into the
issues from May to July 2013. The interviewees, who are drawn from the survey
respondents in purpose, split almost equally by department, gender, and plan coverage
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for general employees (DB, DC, and FRS). Table 3.2 shows the composition of
interviewees. The selection of interview participants provides valuable information
since the composition of interviewees cover almost all the stages in the process of
public pension reform, such as preserving DB by modifications, switching to the State
pension plan, and transitioning to the DC model. The non-random sampling is adequate
because it allows the researcher to select critical cases that are rich in information
pertaining to the research topic (Kuzel, 1999).

The structured interviews were conducted based on an interview schedule with
the same nine questions in the same order to each participant, which insures the
consistency and reliability of the aggregated answers (See Appendix 2). The structured
interviews are best suited for studies that need compare participants’ responses in order
to answer a research question (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). In order to uncover the reasons
behind the survey response and profound viewpoints about the public pension reform,
the interview questions contain the following topics: the sustainability of DB plans, the
major drivers and obstacles to conduct the DB-to-DC transition, the impacts of the
paradigm shift to the recruitment and retention in public sector, the necessity of
financial literacy training with the transition, the issue with newly established two-tier
benefit system; and the possible solutions to the current public pension crisis. The
interviews were recorded with consent of the participants and documented by
transcripts. The interview questions and findings of the interview data will be presented
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in Chapter 6. The results are reported collectively to keep confidentiality of individual
interviewees.

Table 3.2 The Composition of Interviewees
Current
Current Plan Type Funded Ratio of
General
for General
Employee DB
Employee
plan

ID

Dept.

Gender

1

Finance

Male

DB

97.40%

2

Finance

Female

DB

64.10%

3

Finance

Female

DB

90.40%

4

Finance

Male

DB (closed to
new hires) & FRS

66.20%

5

Finance

Male

DB (closed to
new hires) & DC

84.10%

6

HR

Male

72.00%

7

HR

Male

DB (closed to
new hires) & FRS
DB & DC

76.70%

8

HR

Female

DC & FRS

NA

9

HR

Female

DB

65.60%

10

HR

Male

DC & FRS

NA

Recent Pension Plan Changes

Adopted a second tier of benefits
for newly hired general employees
N/A
Moved from a DB plan to a hybrid
plan; reduced the benefits of
general employees in the DB plan
Increased retirement age; closed the
DB plan for general employees and
switched to FRS
All new hires switched to 401(a)
plan; reduced benefits of employees
in the DB plan
Closed the DB plan for general
employees and switched to FRS
Reduced benefits for general
employees in the DB plan
For general employees, switched
from FRS to a 401(a) plans
Adopted a second tier of benefits
into the police pension plan
For general employees, switched
from FRS to a DC plan

3.4 Summary

This study employs a triangulated research design to conduct a full-scale
examination of the public pension plans in Florida local governments. First, this study
provides an overview of the fiscal standing of current DB plans in Florida local
governments by analyzing the existing data of 151 local DB plans from 2005 to 2012.
A fixed-effect regression model is established with the panel data to identify the crucial
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indicators determining the financial solvency of DB plans, which paves the way for the
arguments about the efficiency of the incremental reform strategies. Second, the author
adopts a survey of local government officials designed to collect the primary data of
the potential impacts of the pension paradigm switch and their readiness to conduct the
model transition. A descriptive analysis of the survey results will be delivered to
illustrate the organizational impacts of public pension reform issues and the drivers and
impediments of conducting the pension paradigm shift. Quantitative analyses on the
basis of the indexes, derived from the principal components analysis of survey
responses, supplements the qualitative inquiry with numerical data, which enables
identification of the determinants impacting government officials’ opinions on pension
reform issues. Third, in order to improve the credibility and validity of the survey
results, interviews are conducted to cross-verify the survey findings and to gain indepth and elaborate viewpoints that cannot be wholly grasped through surveys.

CHAPTER 4
THE DETERMINANTS OF THE FINANCIAL SOLVENCY OF PUBLIC DB
PLANS

4.1 Introduction

The most direct incentive for state and local governments to reform the public
pension system is to improve the financial health of public pension plans and thus,
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relieve the fiscal burden of skyrocketing pension costs. In order to efficiently enhance
the funding status of public pension plans, reform strategies should be developed based
on the examination of the roots for the pension crisis. Therefore, it is necessary to
investigate the critical determinants of the financial solvency of public pension plans
to prescribe targeted therapies.

Recent history has shown that most state and local governments have tried to
reform their pension plans with incremental changes to the DB plan design. The new
pension law enacted in 2011 in Florida can serve as such an example. The reform
utilized strategies to increase the employee contribution rate and reduce benefits by
decreasing COLAs, lengthen the vesting period, extend the AFC period, and increase
retirement age and required years of service. However, the literature review suggests
that the financial solvency of public DB plans is not only determined by the plan design
characteristics, but also is greatly affected by shifting political, economic, and
demographical realities. Hence, Chapter 4 aims to identify the significant determinants
of the financial health of pubic DB plans. Furthermore, the results would provide
evidence to argue whether the incremental reform strategies for DB plans are effective
to sustain the current public pension system.

The following discussion is organized into four sections. The first part provides
a description of the financial solvency of Florida local DB plans with trend analyses
from the perspectives of the funded ratio, UAAL percent as employee payroll, and
annual contribution to local DB plans. Second, it introduces the research model of the
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financial solvency of public DB plans as well as the research hypotheses based on the
literature review. The third component is a regression with discussions. Finally, a
summary will be presented to contend the effectiveness of the incremental reform
strategies.

4.2 The Continuous Underfunding of Florida Municipalities DB Plans

The section utilizes the 2005 to 2012 Annual Reports of Florida Local
Government Retirement Systems, published by the Florida Department of Management
Services (DMS), to explore three important trends of the 151 local DB plans. The
analysis will provide insight on the health of DB plans in Florida with an eye to their
post-Great Recession prospects.

DB Plans’ Underfunding is Not New to Florida Municipalities

The funded ratio of pension plan assets to plan liabilities is the most frequently
used benchmark assessing the financial health of the DB plans in public sector. The
widely held threshold of 80 percent funding level is a useful yardstick to tell whether
the public DB plans are in trouble or not. Figure 4.1 displays the trend in funded ratios
of Florida local DB plans for public general employees from 2005 to 2012. Since the
funded ratios can be affected by the actuarial methods to calculate them, this figure
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only includes the local DB plans using the entry age normal cost method, which is the
most common cost method in Florida municipalities. Figure 4.1 shows that the typical
funding levels of Florida municipal DB plans for general employees started dropping
even before the 2008 stock market strike.

In 2004, the typical municipal DB plan for public general employees was over
80 percent (meaning more than half of the plans were more than 80 percent funded).
After 2004, the funded ratio began to drop in almost every year and the funding level
in almost each following year was below 80%, except for 2007 as a consequence of the
relatively strong market returns. The plunge in funding status after 2007 reflects the
fiscal crisis associated with the 2008 stock market downturn. By 2011, almost three
quarters of Florida municipal DB plans for general employees were below the 80
percent threshold, and the typical DB plans approached the 70 percent funding level.
This trend line indicates that the funding crisis predated the recent stock market
downturn. The nearly decade-long trend suggests that there were structural issues in
the public DB pension system that required analysis and remediation.

Figure 4.1 Funded Ratios of Florida Local DB Plans for Public General
Employees (Entry Age Normal Funding Method Only)
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Increasing Liabilities of DB Pension Plans for Florida Municipalities

Unlike the funded ratio, which adopts a ratio to reflect the extent to which the
pension obligations are funded, the UAAL gives a direct view of the accrued unfunded
pension liabilities at the actuarial base. Figure 4.2 shows the change of UAAL
percentages as the participating employee payroll in Florida municipal DB plans for
general employees, which shows a steady growth of the UAAL percent since 2004. The
drastic increase after 2007 demonstrates the severe impacts of 2008 depression.

The growing UAAL percent indicates the funding status of the 151 public DB
plans for general employees in Florida municipalities has declined since the start of
stock market downturn, which resulted from the decrease in the actuarial values of
assets accumulated to finance the accrued actuarial liability. Figure 4.2 further suggests
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reduced investment returns from stock market and fewer revenues collected during the
economic recession. The upshot is that most Florida municipalities experienced
financial challenges of funding pension liabilities even before the 2008 stock market
plunge. The Great Recession exacerbated this situation.
Figure 4.2 UAAL Percentages of Employee Payroll in Florida Local DB Plans
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Florida Municipalities are Paying More to Fund their DB Plans

If the UAAL percent is considered as the future obligation to be amortized in
the next 20 to 30 years, the annual contributions from DB plans sponsors reveal the
annual responsibility of governments for municipal pension plans. Figure 4.3 displays
the trend of the allocations of payment of Florida municipalities for their general
employee DB plans between employee and municipalities. It demonstrates that the
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employee contributions to DB plans from 2004 to 2011 remains consistent. So did the
city’s portion from 2004 to 2007.

However, after the Great Recession, municipal contributions as a percentage of
employee payroll for the typical general employee DB plans climbed significantly—
from 15% in 2007 to 23% in 2011. The analysis illustrates Florida local governments
are picking up the increase in annual pension costs and bear more responsibility in
funding the DB plans in the public sector. The fiscal stress of the growing pension
contribution percentage to municipalities is intensified by the curtailed revenues and
increasing demand for services during the tough economic times. Therefore, the
urgency to relieve soring pension costs currently plays an important role in the decision
making process of public pension reform.

Figure 4.3 Annual Contributions to Florida Municipal DB Plans
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4.3 The Research Model and Hypotheses

Figure 4.4 sets forth the conceptual model of the financial solvency of public
DB plans. It is based on the literature provided in Chapter 2. The study employs the
Funded ratio and UAAL percent of payroll as the dependent variables to indicate the
financial status of Florida local pension plans. The funded ratio is calculated in a similar
manner as the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement 25
calculation, that is, the actuarial value of assets divided by actuarial liabilities. Instead
of using market values of asset and liabilities, this formula provides a relative longterm view about the financial solvency of public DB plans. Factors that may affect the
fiscal health of public pension plans are grouped into four categories, which are
exhibited in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4 Research Model for the Determinants of the Financial Solvency of the
Public DB Plans for General Employees
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Plan Design Characteristics
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The major focus of this chapter is to explore whether incremental changes
exemplified by the 2011 reform could improve the financial solvency of Florida local
pension plans. Therefore the design characteristics of individual pension plan are
critical components of the independent variables. Previous studies provide inconclusive
evidence about the relationship between plan designs and fiscal health of public
pension system (Coggburn and Kearney, 2010; Giertz and Papke, 2007; McCue, 1994;
Munnel et. al., 2008). Therefore, in this study the hypotheses of plan design
characteristics and the financial solvency of public pension plans are stated as below:

Hypothesis 1: Reducing pension benefits will not improve the financial solvency of the
local DB plans.

Hypothesis 2: Increasing pension contributions will not improve the financial solvency
of the local DB plans.

The improvement of the financial solvency of the local pension plans are indicated by
increased funded ratio and decreased UAAL percent. The strategies to reduce pension
benefits include the direct changes to the benefit formula such as reducing retirement
benefit rate, elongating the AFC period to calculate the final average salary, and
increasing the normal retirement age; and the decrease of indirect benefits, such as
lengthening vesting period to be eligible for retirement benefits, limiting the provision
of COLAs, and strengthening the requirement of early retirement.

Financial Factors
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The study also examines the internal fiscal stress of governments and the
external economic development that may impact the financial solvency of public
pension plans. Based on the literature review, the governments that are under higher
fiscal pressure tend to fund their pension plans at lower levels, which would worsen
the financial status of public pension systems (Chaney, Copley, & Stone, 2002;
Coggburn & Kearney, 2010; Eaton & Nofsinger, 2004; McCue, 1994). Followed the
previous practices (Reck, Wilson, Gotlob, & Lawrence, 2001; Wilson, 1983; Wilson
& Howard, 1984), the indicator selected in this study for the fiscal stress is the
excess/deficiency of revenue over/under expenditure (total account at city level year
end) per 1,000 populations. The gauge is standardized by population in order to control
the impact of city size differences.

In addition to the fiscal status of governments, the market performance of
pension fund investments also plays an important role in determining the funding status
of public pension plans. Pension assets could be allocated into investment instruments
with low but stable rate of return, e.g. fixed income, and high-risk instruments such as
equities, which may bring considerable investment returns in bull markets and may also
incur severe losses during the market plunge. Previous studies suggest the necessity of
a prudent investment strategy of pension assets to maintain the financial solvency of
public pension plans (Albrecht and Hingorani, 2004; Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009;
Peng, 2004; Stalebrink, Kriz and Guo, 2010). The higher risk of investment in equities
must be taken into consideration when measuring the financial solvency of public
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pension plan funds. The study selects the percentages of pension assets allocated in
fixed income and equity, which are the two major investment instruments in Florida
cities, to examine the impact of investment portfolio to the funding status of public
pension plans.

Hypothesis 3: Higher fiscal stress will decrease the financial solvency of public DB
plans.

Hypothesis 4: Riskier investment of pension assets will decrease the financial solvency
of public DB plans.

Political Factors

The research model also includes the political factors that could affect the
financial solvency of public pension plans. The political preference of funding methods
would determine the amount of normal cost of public pension plans. The more
conservative budgeting schemes is chosen, the more estimated cost would be calculated.
Therefore, the choice of funding methods would affect the funding status of public
pension plans. The primary four funding methods adopted by governments, from the
most to the least conservative, are AGG, FIL, EAN, and UC. Although the literature
review does not provide consistent evidence that whether the cheaper funding method
will lead to the decline of funding status (Giertz & Papke, 2007; McCue 1994; Munnell
et. al., 2008; Munnell, Haverstick, & Aubry, 2008), this study examines the hypothesis
that the pension plans using the less conservative funding methods will be associated
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with declined financial solvency because cheaper funding regimes may make plan
sponsors less committed to funding their pension plans.

Another political factor utilized by the plan board of trustees to determine the
ultimate pension costs is the actuarial assumptions in public pension funding. State and
local governments often rely on the economic spread, the difference between the
interest assumption and the wage inflation assumption, to control the actuarial amount
of pension costs. Preceding research demonstrates that by increasing the assumed
economic spread, the governments could effectively reduce their pension costs, thus
create the actuarial illusion that their pension plans are better funded, whereas the actual
economic spread may tell a different story (Giertz & Papke 2007; McCue, 1994;
Mitchell & Smith, 1992).

Hypothesis 5: Choosing a less conservative funding method choice will reduce the
financial solvency of public DB plans.

Hypothesis 6: Larger assumed economic spread will actuarially improve the financial
solvency of public DB plans.

Control Variables

The study employs key demographics as control variables in assessing financial,
which is expressed in the ratio of retirees and/or beneficiaries to the active member in

78

the plan. The literature contends that the dramatic increase in elderly population and
growth in public employees will impose heavier fiscal pressure on pension systems
(Coggburn and Kearney, 2010; ConagaRetna, 2004). According to the statistics of U.S.
Census Bureau (2011), Florida had the greatest share of population that was 65 years
and over in both 2000 and 2010 (17.6 percent and 17.3 percent, respectively). It is
reasonable to assume that this population composition would bring additional fiscal
burden on local pension systems. Previous studies also reveal the positive relationship
of active plan participants and the funding status of public pension systems (Giertz and
Papke, 2007; Munnell et al., 2008). Therefore, higher ratio of retirees to active
members implies more pension liabilities, which may result in declined funding status
of pension plans.

The study aims to investigate the effectiveness of the incremental reform
strategies such as the 2011 pension law. Therefore, the year dummy of 2012 is included
in the model to see whether provisions could improve the financial solvency of the
public pension system at the local level. Although the target of the 2011 pension law is
FRS, yet in essence FRS is a DB system. Given that 60% of Florida local governments
use the FRS as their primary scheme to provide pension benefits, by examining the DB
pension systems at the local level, this study will explore the preliminary outcome of
the incremental reform strategies and try to provide evidence that the tinkering measure
to preserve the current DB plans may not be sufficient to solve the public pension crisis.
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Hypothesis 7: The higher ratio of retirees to active members will decrease the financial
solvency of public DB plans.

Hypothesis 8: The 2011 pension reform strategies did not improve the financial
solvency of public DB plans at the local level.

4.4 Results of Data Analysis

Information used for this portion of the study were gathered from data issued
from Local Government Annual Reports of Retirement Plans launched by Florida State
Department of Management Services from 2005 to 2012. This study gathered the data
from 151 DB plans in Florida municipalities and prepared the panel dataset for the
research. Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the included variables. Most of
the key variables are measured at interval-ratio level except for the funding method and
vesting requirements. The summary statistics suggest currently Florida municipalities
use the entry age normal method most often, followed by the aggregate cost method,
the frozen initial liability method, and finally the unit credit method. The vesting
requirements are assigned values to quantify the magnitude of the strictness of
regulations about the vesting period, hence indicating the generosity of retirement
benefits. According to the annual report, from high to low, a “yes” signifies that prior
to completing of required normal retirement age and credits, plan members have rights
to benefit computed on years of service; “partial” indicates a vesting schedule (e.g.
20% of benefit with 3 years of service); “no” implies plan members must complete

80

requirements (e.g. 30 years of services) otherwise they would lose all rights to any
benefits.
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Obs.
FundedRatio
1001
UAALPercent
1185
MemberPercent
1189
CityPercent
1185
RetireActiveRatio
1168
BenefitRate
676
AFCYear
1097
NormalRetireAge
1049
Vesting
1176
1027
YearsEarlyOut
Equities
1182
FixIncome
1182
AssumedSpread
1157
ActualSpread
1123
BalancePer1000
1069
Dummy Variables
Fund Method
Frequency
AGG
241
EAN
694
FIL
230
UC
23

Mean
81.19
7.19
4.86
21.66
60.59
2.68
4.06
59.46
2.78
11.04
54.51
31.91
2.13
-0.98
105.66
Percent
20.29
58.42
19.36
1.94

Std. Dev.
Min
17.72
0
13.20
-31
3.52
0
24.28
-23
90.71
0
2.16
1
1.14
1
4.35
50
0.42
1
5.71
2
21.37
0
15.90
0
1.22
-4.9
5.79
-30.54
464.16
-9694.48
Ordinal Variable
Vesting
Label/Value Frequency
No/1
4
Partial/2
247
Yes/3
925

Max
211.1
150.1
19.7
269
914.29
30
5
65
3
30
107.75
99.56
8
26.1
1000

Percent
0.34
21.00
78.66

Because of the missing data for retirement benefit rate, this variable is dropped
in the data analysis because its inclusion will severely reduce the total number of
observation for the regression model. Table 4.2 provides the fixed-effect OLS
regression results with standard errors. Before running the regression, the author
diagnosed whether there is multicollinearity issue among the variables to avoid its
negative impact to size of R, the importance of the predictor, and the variance of
regression coefficients (Stevens, 1996). By examining the simple correlation among
variables from the correlation matrix, one variable, the AFC period, is omitted due to
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its intercorrelation is higher than the general accepted level of 0.80 (Stevens, 1996, p.
77).

The OLS model assumes that the variance of error terms is constant. If there
are error terms that do not have constant variance, it is called heteroskedasticity. The
possible existence of heteroskedasticity could result in non-BLUE OLS estimates and
biased standard errors (Wooldridge, 2013). In order to avoid these negative impacts of
heteroskedasticity, this study use robust standard errors to correct the problem. The
regression results and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.

The Hypotheses of Plan Design Characteristics

Amid the hypotheses of plan design characteristics, the benefit hypothesis just
gets partial support, whereas the contribution hypothesis achieves strong statistical
significances. Only one of the benefit indicators, the normal retirement age, in the
UAAL model is statistically significant. As an important component to count the years
of services when calculating the retirement benefit, increased normal retirement age
implies less generosity of the pension plans. However, the positive relationship
indicated by the results between the normal retirement age and UAAL percent of
payroll support the hypothesis that the reduced retirement benefits are not associated
with the improvement in the financial solvency of local public DB plans.
Table 4.2 Regression Results
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Funded Ratio
Standard
Coefficient
Error
Plan Design Characteristics
Benefit
AFC Period
Normal Retirement Age
Vesting
COLA
Early Out
Contribution
Member Percent
City Percent
Financial Factors
Balance of Revenue and
Expenditure
Investment in Equities
Investment
in
Fixed
Incomes
Political Factors
Funding Method
EAN
FIL
UC
Assumed Economic Spread
Actual Economic Spread
Control Variables
Plan Demographics
Year Dummy
Constant
No. of Obs.
No. of Groups
R-sq: Within
F Value
Prob > F

UAAL % of Payroll
Standard
Coefficient
Error

0.19
4.64
-1.57
0.25

0.42
6.73
1.90
0.18

-5.40
0.60**
-0.87
0.57
-0.03

6.00
0.25
4.33
1.14
0.11

-0.84**
-0.33***

0.42
0.06

0.77***
0.45***

0.25
0.03

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.06**

0.03

-0.03

0.02

0.08**

0.04

-0.03

0.02

1.34
1.04
12.12*
0.75
0.00

1.93
2.79
7.29
0.54
0.07

7.40***
3.58**
10.96**
-0.78**
0.06

1.13
1.63
4.68
0.32
0.04

0.03**
-3.26**
55.22

0.01
1.20
32.00

-0.04***
2.04***
-15.69

0.01
0.71
32.07

Omitted

672
110
0.1617
F (16, 546)=6.58
0.0000

771
112
0.4458
F (17, 642)=30.38
0.0000

Note: Bold characters indicate that variables are significant at .005(***), .05(**), or .10 (*).
AFC Period is omitted due to multicollinearity.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Although the increase in normal retirement age provides “longer time horizons
to amortize benefit obligations” (McCue, 1994, p. 116), at the same time there are
probably more chances to confront latent risks from the investment loss or inflation,
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which would inversely incur greater pension liabilities to the DB plans. The results
could be explained that along with the fluctuation of stock markets, the DB system may
not be immune to the market downturn, even if the pension liabilities are supposed to
be paid down in longer time period.

The contribution hypotheses are supported by significant and consistent
empirical results in both models. The negative sign of both the member percent and
city percent suggests that the increase of funded ratio of DB plans is associated with
decline in the contributions by both employers and employees. This implies that during
good economic times, the illusion that high investment returns are enough to fund the
pension plans will make governments less keen to fulfill their contributions and it is
more popular for politicians to reduce the share of employee contribution, indicated by
the magnitude differences of the two coefficients.

In the UAAL model, the results are consistent with previous study about the
contribution hypothesis (McCue, 1994; Coggburn & Kearney, 2010). With the increase
of contributions by both plan sponsors and participants, there is an associated increase
in UAAL percent of employee payroll. This lends support to the argument that plans
with liberal contribution requirements are likely to accrue higher unfunded liabilities,
that is, a wider gap between pension assets and liabilities.

The author admits that there is a potential endogenous issue with the key
explanatory variable in the models. On the one hand, the plan design characteristics
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may cause the changes of the fiscal solvency of pension plans. On the other hand,
governments could also alter the plan design features in response to the shifting
financial status of public DB plans. Therefore, the results could also be interpreted the
other way around: Plans with more pressure of UAAL would require higher rates of
contribution to amortize the pension costs accrued in the past. The positive coefficients
confirm what is expected: Employer contributions shift the risk and funding from
employers to employees.

The Hypotheses of Financial Factors

The fiscal stress hypothesis does not yield any significant results in either
model. In the model of funded ratio, the investment variables holds significant with
results consistent with the hypothesis. The positive signs of the percentage of pension
assets invested in both equities and fixed incomes imply that as the assets allocations
in both instruments increase there is an associated increase in the funded ratio of
pension plans. Whereas when local governments increase one percent of their pension
assets in both instruments, the low risk one (i.e., the fixed incomes) will increase the
funded ratio more than the riskier equities by 0.02 percent. Although the difference is
small, the results suggest the investment in less risky instrument is somewhat more
efficient than high risk ones in improving the financial solvency of local public pension
plans, consistent with prior findings (Albrecht & Hingorani, 2004; Novey-Marx &
Rauh, 2009; Stalebrink, Kriz, & Guo, 2010).
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However, the considerable investment return with the high-risk instruments in
bull markets is attractive to governments and the percentage of pension asset
allocations into equities has greatly increased since 1990s. The results also demonstrate
the positive relationship between the investment in equities and funded ratios of Florida
local pension plans. Being aware of the drawbacks of the high risk of investment loss
during market downturns, local governments should follow the advice suggested by
Peng (2004) to diversify the investment portfolios with both high and low risk
instruments.

The Hypotheses of Political Factors

By definition, pension plans adopting the most conservative funding method,
i.e., the aggregate cost method, are 100 percent fully funded. Therefore, following the
practice of Munnell, Aubry and Haverstick (2008), this study does not include those
plans using AGG funding method. There is substantial evidence that the funding
method hypothesis is supported by the findings, especially in the UAAL model. In the
funded ratio model, only the UC method is significant with an expected positive sign,
which can be explained that using the less stringent cost method, the pension costs will
be cheaper with less benefit obligations, which leads to higher funded ratio.

In the UAAL model, it is evident that along with implementing less
conservative funding method, the UAAL percent of payroll increases significantly
(from FIL, EAN, to UC). This result is contradictory to the previous studies that suggest
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funding method choices have no impact of the funding status of pension plans (Giertz
& Papke, 2007; McCue 1994; Munnell, Aubry, & Haverstick, 2008). As Munnell,
Haverstick, and Aubry (2008) point out, the selection of cost method does not matter
only if plans strictly follow their funding schedule, the funded ratio of assets to
liabilities would achieve fully funded. However, the results in this study prove that
when adopting the less stringent cost method, local governments will be misled by the
illusion of cheaper costs with pension plans, and will be less committed to on a regular
basis. Over time, the underfunded contributions to their pension plans would
accumulate into huge fiscal burden of unfunded liabilities to local budgets and wither
the financial solvency of DB pension plans.

The assumed economic spread hypothesis is supported in the UAAL model
only. The negative sign of the coefficient indicates that with the increase of assumed
economic spread, that is, a higher interest rate assumption than the projected wage
inflation rate leads to an associated decline of the UAAL percent as employee payroll.
This result is consistent with previous literature (Giertz & Papke 2007; Mitchell &
Smith, 1992). As one of the crucial decisions made by elected officials, the assumed
economic spread can be used to control the amount of future benefit obligations. The
larger the assumed economic spread, the less pension costs for governments. Hence
governments can leverage the assumed economic spread to reduce pension expenditure
especially when they perceive the fiscal pressure to balance their budget sheets.

The Hypotheses of Control Variables
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Plan demographic variables are significant. The improved financial solvency of
pension plans is associated with the increase in ratios of retirees to active plan members.
With higher ratio of beneficiaries to participants, the funded ratio of pension plans
increases and the UAAL percent of payroll declines. This result contradicts the
discussions about plan demographics in previous literature (Coggburn & Kearney,
2010; Giertz & Papke, 2007; Munnell et al, 2008). By taking a glance at the descriptive
statistics, one could find that in Florida municipalities, the ratio of retirees to active is
fairly high (average 60.6 percent with standard deviation of 90.7 percent). This suggests
that as a state with significant numbers of elder public employees, Florida
municipalities are ready to deal with this issue. The fact that Florida retirement has
been ranked among top well-funded pension systems implies that Florida cities have
been doing well to cope with the demographic changes of the pension plans along with
the graying of baby boomers.

The year dummy of 2012 is included to examine the effect of the 2011 pension
reform law to Florida local public plans. Although the 2011 reform targeted the state
retirement system, it had significant spillover the local level since over 60% of Florida
municipalities adopt FRS/DB plans as their primary way to provide retirement benefit.
The statistically significant results imply that after the 2011 pension reform, the
financial solvency of Florida local pension plans did not improve, which is consistent
with the hypothesis. On the contrary, in 2012 the funded ratio of Florida local DB plans
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declined and the UAAL percent increased. While one year is perhaps a short-test, it
suggests that the 2011 reforms may be insufficient to address long-term funding trends.

4.5 Summary

Findings from the regression presented in this chapter provide a snapshot of
eight years of data. The model examined four categories of explanatory variables: the
plan design characteristics, the financial factors, the political impacts, and the selected
control variables. Through the examination, this study aims to identify the critical
determinants of the financial solvency of public DB plans, in order to further conduct
investigations of the appropriate reform strategies to sustain the public pension
systems.

The regression results suggest most of the factors affect the financial solvency
of DB plans as expected and are consistent with the literature. Although most of the
benefit variables are insignificant in either model, the normal retirement age is evident
in the UAAL model, which implies the strategy to reduce the generosity of pension
benefits, such as extending the normal retirement age, may not help to improve the
funding status of public DB plans. The contribution hypotheses are strongly supported
by the results. The increase in contributions, either from employer or from employee,
will not be able to improve the financial solvency of DB plans. The findings about the
plan design characteristics are the strongest argument that this chapter endeavors to
state. The results suggest the conclusion that the incremental reform strategies to alter
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the plan design features, such as reducing benefits and increasing contributions, may
not be effective tools in improving the financial solvency of the DB model. Incremental
reforms may be insufficient to alleviate the fiscal pressures to state and local
governments in the short-term and may not provide a viable public pension system.

Amid the financial factors, the way that pension assets are invested is proven to
be critical to the funded ratio of the DB plans. Although both low- and high-risk
allocations are to boost the funded ratio of the pension plan, more fixed income tend to
be a bit more efficient to increase the funding status. This implies that state and local
governments may need to take a balanced approach between equities and fixed income.

Both political factors get substantial supporting evidence from the results. The
funding method choice will affect the financial solvency in different ways. The illusion
created by the most liberal approach will reduce the pension costs and make the funded
ratio of DB plans appear to climb. But the UAAL model tells the real story: over time
the underestimated unfunded liabilities will be highlighted by avoiding conservative
assumptions. The less conservative funding method governments select, the DB plan
will incur higher pension obligations, which deteriorate the financial solvency of the
pension system. Similarly, the assumed economic spread is also a useful leverage for
political official to manipulate the pension costs. By overstating the differences
between the interest rate and wage inflation rate, the assumed pension costs decline, as
does the fiscal pressure to maintain funding. But the UAAL percent of payroll, the
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actuarial-based measurement of the financial solvency, will increase over time, thus
governments will not be able to maintain a funding illusion eventually.

The results of control variables reveal the unique features of the Florida pension
system. The plan demographics variables do not act in the expected direction to affect
the financial solvency of DB plans. The municipalities with more retirees than active
members are better at funding status. This could be explained by Florida’s long history
of an aging population in the country and the general high ratio of retirees to
participants in the sample municipalities.

Florida municipalities have started dealing with the heavier pension obligations
a long time ago and have been doing reasonably well with their retirement system. The
state retirement system is always considered one of the healthiest systems compared
with others. But Florida also suffered from the 2008 stock market plunge and political
decision makers reduced the pension costs through reform strategies, in particular those
put forward in 2011. Nonetheless, the year dummy variable shows that after the
enactment of the 2011 pension law, in 2012 the financial solvency still went south with
reduced funded ratios and increased UAAL. At the local level, Florida public DB plans
are still struggling with the pension issues accrued from previous management
decisions aggregated by the 2008 Great Recession, which requires governments to
implement tactics to survive the perils of current public pension systems.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PERCEIVED ISSUES OF PUBLIC PENSION PARADIGM SWITCH
FROM FLORIDA MUNCIPALITIES

5.1 Introduction

The dramatically increased costs of public pension plans after the 2008
economic downturn forced many state and local governments to reexamine the
sustainability of the current DB model and to explore reform strategies. As noted
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earlier, generally the reforms can be classified into two categories: the incremental
changes trying to preserve the status quo of the DB model and the paradigm shift from
DB to DC. In Florida, the state retirement system adopted the former tactic in 2011 and
effectively established a two-tiered benefit structure aiming at bolstering the DB plans
via reduced pension costs. Florida municipalities also took actions to relieve fiscal
burden of pension plans through a mix of both strategies. Through the analysis of
research findings based on a survey of Florida local finance and human resource
directors, this chapter attempts to investigate their perceptions of public pension reform
approaches, and to discern their readiness to conduct the pension paradigm shift. This
is addressed by two sub questions: What are the drivers for them to switch pension
models and what are the potential impediments to implementing the transition?

The chapter is organized into three sections. It begins with a descriptive analysis
of the survey results to reveal the perceptions of Finance and HR professionals towards
the causes and potential impacts of public pension reform strategies. The second section
presents the results of principal components analysis and descriptions of the five factors
generated, which serve as indexes to reflect the attitude to public pension reforms. The
third section focuses on regression models with the indexes and individual
characteristics of respondents and municipalities. The analysis will reveal the elements
that may affect the perceptions of public officials to view pension reform issues.
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5.2 Descriptive Analysis of Survey Results

5.2.1 The Congruence of Finance and HR Respondents

As stated in Chapter 3, the target audience of the survey questionnaire included
both the Finance and HR directors of the selected municipalities in Florida. Therefore
it’s necessary to first identify significant differences in responses between Finance and
HR professionals prior to presenting the survey results, because it would determine the
way to report and explain the survey findings. Besides the difference of departments,
the survey participants are also differentiated by several individual characteristics,
which include gender, age, professional designation, the pension model they are
currently contributing to, and that provides the majority of their retirement income.
Table 5.1 depicts the summary of the distributions for all the individual features. Since
the survey participants split equally into the two departments, it also shows a decent
comparison between Finance and HR directors.
Table 5.1 Individual Characteristics of Survey Respondents
Variables

Finance (%)

Gender
Male
Female
Age
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
66+
Plan currently contributing to
DB
DC
Hybrid

N

HR (%)

53
54.7
45.3
53

106

53

106
3.8
17.0
26.4
40.6
12.3

52
55.8
11.5
28.8

N

41.5
58.5

5.7
17.0
26.4
41.5
9.4
52
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Total (%)

53
28.3
71.7

1.9
17.0
26.4
39.6
15.1
32.7
28.9
30.8

N

104
44.2
20.2
29.8

Others
7.7
Plan providing major retirement income
DB
52.8
DC
35.8
Hybrid
3.8
Others
7.5
Professional Designation
Yes
52.8
No
47.2

3.8
53

5.8
53

69.8
15.1
3.8
11.3
53

106
61.3
25.5
3.8
9.4

53
17.0
83.0

106
34.9
65.1

The gender composition of the directors suggests a significant difference
between the two groups of professionals: 71.7% of the HR Directors are women, versus
45.3% of the Finance Directors, which suggests that women gravitate to the HR
department. Similarly, the professional designation also indicates an evident disparity
between the two departments: 83% of the HR Directors do not possess a professional
certification, compared with only 47.2% of the Finance Directors. This implies a lower
requirement of profession designation in HR than Finance domain.

The responses to age and plan types do not suggest significant differences
between Finance and HR Directors. Survey respondents fall into different age
categories with the pluralities of both groups are between 56 and 65. Averagely, the
participants have 25 years of working experience; therefore, they know well about the
pension system to answer the related questions. Overall, the DB model is their
predominant personal public pension option that they are currently contributing to
(44.2%), while HR directors are more inclined to DB plans than Finance people (55.8%
versus 32.7%). So does the pension choice that provides the majority of their retirement
income. Most respondents rely on the default DB to provide their retirement security
(61.3%), whereas the Finance staff shows greater “hybridization” in their retirement
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savings than HR directors, who are more likely to be in DB only retirements: 35.8% of
the Finance stuff opt for DC plans, versus only 15.1% of HR people.

Except for exploring the individual characteristics of survey participants, the
differences in the perceptions between Finance and HR directors are also of interest to
the author. The original expectation was that Finance and HR staff would consider the
public pension reform issue through different prisms. The former would interpret
pension issues with greater sensitivity to financial sustainability, while the latter would
view the pension issues with insights leaning towards impact on public recruitment and
retention. However, the expected differences in perceptions between the two
professionals are not sighted in the results of comparing means of survey responses.
As indicated in Table 5.2, they differ on only five of thirty-six common questions.

Table 5.2 Comparison of Means of Survey Questions (t-test): Five Questions with
Significant Difference among Finance and HR Directors

Survey
Questions
with
Significant Difference
Organizational
Impacts:
Adoption of recent reforms
will…
1 Reduce pension outlays
as percentage of total
outlays
2 Make outsourcing easier
due to lower future
pension costs
Drivers of Change in Public
Pension “Crisis”
3 Low returns of fixed
income securities
4 Lower than historical
returns on stocks

Finance Director N=57
Mean Median SD

HR Director
Mean Median

N=56
SD

t

Sig.

3.88

4

0.764

3.50

4

0.831

2.485

0.014

2.79

3

1.022

3.27

3

1.104

2.399

0.018

4.22

4

0.815

3.72

4

0.968

2.843

0.005

4.38

4.5

0.753

3.91

4

1.005

2.698

0.008
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5

Terms
of
collective
bargaining agreements

3.92

4

0.778

3.58

4

0.887

2.034

0.045

Table 5.2 lists the five questions highlighted with significant differences
between Finance and HR directors. Two of them are in the section inquiring about the
potential organizational impacts of the recent public pension reforms in Florida.
Responses to Question 1 suggest that both groups acknowledge pension cuts will
reduce “pension outlays as percentage of total outlays”, while Finance directors are
more mindful of this issue than HR staff. Question 2 is the only one that shows the
opposite stances between the two groups. But both scores are close to the neutral point
in either direction, which shows that participants do not see an association between
pension costs and outsourcing. Finance directors are even less aware of this connection
than their HR colleagues. For most of respondents, this aspect of pension reform may
still be tangential.

The other three questions with statistically significant differences focus on the
drivers of changes in public pension system. The scores suggest both groups of
professionals see markets influencing reforms, but Finance directors view these drivers
as more important than their HR counterparts, especially for the perceived impacts of
shortfalls in fixed income and stock market return. The evident significances of the two
drivers indicate these directors apprehend the nexus between investment returns and
the long-term financial solvency of public DB plans.
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The last question deals with the impact of collective bargaining on public
pensions. Responses to question 5 confirm that collective bargaining is observed to be
a significant driver of public pension changes. Still, Finance directors are more
sensitive to this issue than HR people. Through the negotiations with multiple
stakeholders from the financial and political perspectives, the public pension systems
get altered within a real world. Therefore, the relatively high mean and median score
are to be expected.

The fact of only five out of thirty-six questions are significant different makes
the author to speculate that the perceptions of the two professional groups towards the
public pension issue may be similar. Except for the demographical differences between
the two groups, the survey respondents averagely have 25 years’ professional
experience under the primary DB model. The findings imply that the professional
domains have marginal impact on their opinions regarding public pension reforms.
Hence, in the following sections the respondents will be treated as a collective group
of senior directors rather than representatives of two professions with distinctive
stances. The integrative survey findings will be reported to reflect the overall trend of
perceptions to public pension reforms.

5.2.3 Summary Report of Survey Items

The main body of the survey questionnaire consists of thirty-six common items
to both Finance and HR directors. The survey items are classified into four sections,
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which include the general questions of pension model, the organizational impacts of
public pension reforms, the potential impacts of the two-tier benefit structure, and the
drivers of the public pension crisis. The following parts will provide the survey findings
for these themes in sequence by describing the percentage frequencies for each survey
item, along with the analyses and discussions of the results.

Overview Questions on Pension Model

This section includes the questions serving as a “warm-up” to the subsequent
more detailed questions about public pension reform. Following the practice of
effective survey construction (Hoddinott & Bass, 1986; Rea & Parker, 2005), this study
adopts the intellectual funneling from broad to specific perspectives of the issue for the
purpose of establishing a common frame of reference, cueing participants to the
substance ahead, diminishing non-response and maximizing their memory
recollections. Table 5.3 sets forth the seven questions covered in this section.

Table 5.3 General Questions Related to Pension Model

Pension Model Questions
1

2
3

Shifting to defined contribution for new
employees is difficult because of
unfunded pension liabilities under the
current defined benefit model
A younger workforce prefers defined
contribution plans to defined benefit
plans
Adoption of defined contribution plans
would foster greater employee mobility
between the public and private sectors

Disagree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

11.6

19.6

19.6

32.1

17.0

5.4

23.4

39.6

27.0

4.5

3.6

8.0

25.9

47.3

15.2

Strongly
Disagree
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4
5

6

7

Adoption of defined contribution plans
would foster greater employee mobility
within the public sector
The steady erosion of defined benefit
pension coverage in the private sector
puts pressure on elected officials to
reduce defined benefit coverage in the
public sector
Political and social forces will
eventually lead to the elimination of
pensions for public sector employees,
mirroring long-term trends in the private
sector.
Taxpayer sentiment will eventually lead
to the adoption of defined contribution
plans as the default model in the public
sector

5.4

13.5

32.4

40.5

8.1

1.8

13.4

10.7

45.5

28.6

7.1

29.5

16.1

39.3

8.0

4.5

15.2

18.8

50.0

11.6

The responses to Question 1 suggest only half of the participants recognize the
unfunded pension liabilities as a disincentive to the public pension paradigm shift. One
of the major concerns raised by local governments to the original 2011 reform proposal
of switching all new public employees covered by FRC to DC plans is that this strategy
would obligate local governments to immediately pay off their unfunded pension
liabilities when they opt to the FRS. Thus the results of Question 1 reflect an
underestimation of the transition costs of the DB-to-DC switch. Question 2 yields the
lowest response in this section, which suggests that participants may not be aware of
the preference that younger workers have for DC plans (Bowman & West, 2006; Dolan,
2007; Nyce, 2007). This could be explained that the respondents may believe the
pension type is not a cue for prospective hiring especially under the current economy
environment, or they simply infer this conclusion from their own previous experiences.

On the other hand, responses to question 3 and 4 indicate that adoption of DC
plans would foster greater employee mobility either between the public and private
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sectors or within the public sector. It is of note that 62.5% of respondents agree or
strongly agree that a DC model would foster greater mobility between the public and
private sectors, which implies their potential recognition that the motivation to serve in
the public sector is waning (Rose, 2013) and that portability of DC plans may enhance
workforce development. Question 5, 6 and 7 probe into the drivers of pension changes
in the public sector. The respondents admit that “the steady erosion of defined benefit
pension coverage in the private sector” and “taxpayer sentiment” will exert pressure on
elected officials to reduce the coverage of DB plans and even to adopt DC plans as the
default pension model.

Overall, responses suggest a DC model that fosters greater employee mobility
may enhance the overall organizational productivity. They also realizes that pension
practices and trends in the private sector, as well as taxpayer sentiment, may lead to
substantive pension changes in the public sector.

Organizational Impacts of Pension Reforms
Under most circumstances, “reform” in the context of recent public pension
system has become a euphemism for benefit reductions. This section of the survey
items investigates the perceptions of the directors to the possible impacts of pension
“reforms” in Florida local governments. The results are displayed in Table 5.4.

Responses to Question 1 and 2 indicate that public pension reforms may make
it more difficult to recruit new employees and will have less impact on the retention of
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senior employees. The results are reasonable since the incremental reform strategies
such as elongating vesting period or normal retirement age only affect new hires. Thus
the answers reflect the new reality of a two-tiered workforce. These facts make
directors realize that the enacted reforms may increase turnover of junior personnel
(Question 3), and they clearly understand that recent pension changes may make the
public sector less attractive to prospective employees: in Question 4 nearly 60% of
respondents agree or strongly agree that the reforms will “ decrease competitiveness of
compensation with comparative private sector jobs”. This is consistent with the notion
that generous public pension benefits compensate for lower salaries for comparable
private sector positions (Bender, 2003; Borjas, 2003; Fletcher, 2010; Krueger, 1988).

Table 5.4 Organizational Impacts of DB Reform

Adoption of recent reforms will…
1
2
3
4
5

Make it more difficult to retain senior
personnel
Make it more difficult to attract wellqualified applicants
Increase turnover of junior personnel
Decrease
competiveness
of
compensation
with
comparable
private sector jobs
Make it more difficult to attract and
retain a diverse workforce

6

Ultimately reduce efficiency and
effectiveness of municipal operations

7

Obligate jurisdictions to educate
employees on the basics of asset
allocation throughout their lifetimes
Encourage jurisdictions to provide
access to low-or no-cost independent
financial planning
Encourage increased savings through
deferred compensation or other
voluntary Plans

8
9

Disagree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

3.6

26.8

23.2

37.5

8.9

2.7

25.0

20.5

43.8

8.0

3.6

25.9

22.3

42.9

5.4

3.6

24.3

12.6

38.7

20.7

3.6

29.5

26.8

34.8

5.4

9.8

30.4

31.3

24.1

4.5

1.8

17.0

25.9

42.0

13.4

1.8

15.2

25.0

48.2

9.8

6.8

18.6

18.6

47.5

8.5

Strongly
Disagree
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However, respondents are less aware of the impacts of reforms on their
jurisdictions’ ability to “attract and retain a diverse workforce” in Question 5. This
could be explained by limited awareness among managers of the relative appeal of
pensions to women and minorities (Lewis & Frank, 2002). In Question 6 barely onefourth of participants agree or strongly agree that these changes will adversely affect
the efficiency and effectiveness of municipal operations. Our respondents may not see
how pension benefit cuts or improved mobility may impact productivity.

Responses to Question 7 and 8 suggest respondents agree upon the necessity
for their jurisdictions to assume their responsibilities to educate employees in regard to
the basics of financial planning and asset allocations along with the advent of the DBto-DC transition. This recognition echoes the private sector organizational trends in the
post-Pension Protection Act era, in which firms are increasingly offering workers lowor no-cost financial planning from independent financial planners. The efforts of
independent workplace-based financial literacy programs could significantly improve
public employees’ knowledge of saving and investment (Holland, Goodman, & Stich,
2008).

One of the changes enacted after July 1, 2011 is that FRS participants are
required to contribute 3.0 to 10.41 percent of their salaries to their pension plans, which
resulted in an effective reduction in earnings. Responses to Question 9 suggest over
half of the respondents admit the change will stimulate saving elsewhere through
deferred compensation or other voluntary plans to make up for this salary cut.
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In short, this section’s results suggest respondents acknowledge the negative
impacts of pension reforms are heavier on recruitment and retention of junior rather
than senior employees and pension reforms necessitate financial literacy training or
low- or no-cost financial planning to public employees.

Potential Impacts of the Two-tier Pension Structure

The recent pension reforms undertaken in Florida were applied in a manner that
effectively tiers employees by date of hire. For instance, the normal retirement age for
employees hired after July 1, 2011 is 65; previously it was 62. Similarly, other changes
such as vesting periods, benefit multipliers and COLAs are also tied to date of hire,
which results in a two-tier benefit structure. This section inquires how Finance and HR
directors perceive the potential impacts of the two-tier pension system to the
organizational operations.
Table 5.5 Potential Impacts of a “Two-Tier” Pension Structure on Operations

Establishment of
retirement plan…

a

two-tier

1 Fosters antagonism between younger
and older workers given differential
impacts of benefit cuts
2 Creates different levels of morale and
commitment between new hires and
existing employees

Disagree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1.8

26.1

21.6

43.2

7.2

0.9

22.5

14.4

51.4

10.8

Strongly
Disagree
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3 Makes hiring of the most talented
prospects more difficult due to longer
vesting
4 Makes hiring of the most talented
prospects more difficult due to
Increased retirement age
5 Will increase participation in
supplemental retirement plans such as
457 plans among younger workers
6 Represents an issue that straddles
traditional boundaries between human
resources and finance
7 Receives little attention given the high
unemployment rate
8 Becomes less problematic over time
given the “graying” workforce and
retirement of older workers

2.7

28.8

18.0

39.6

10.8

2.7

29.7

20.7

37.8

9.0

4.5

23.4

26.1

39.6

6.3

2.7

11.7

38.7

41.4

5.4

5.4

19.8

36.0

35.1

3.6

2.8

19.3

18.3

55.0

4.6

Responses to Question 1 and 2 suggest a significant agreement upon the
probability that the establishment of a two-tier pension structure “fosters antagonism
between younger and older workers” and “creates different levels of morale and
commitment between new hires and existing employees”. This suggests that
respondents acknowledge that the two-tier system may result in tensions in the work
climate and that public sector should learn from the experiences of private sector in
mitigating these negative impacts (Munnell, Golub-Sass, Soto, & Vitaglinao, 2006).

Questions 3 and 4 deal respectively with the perceived impacts of increased
time required for vesting and retirement on the public recruitment. Responses imply
moderate agreement with the probability that lengthened vesting period and older
retirement age could become deterrents to hiring the most talented employees.
Question 5 tries to tap respondents’ opinions on the saving habits of younger
employees. Answers suggest that less than half of the respondents perceive the two-tier
compensation structure would stimulate participation in supplemental plans such as the
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457. This may reflect the generally weak propensity of Americans to save, or it may
reveal that the directors have not yet to digest the potential linkage between the cuts in
employer’s pension contribution and the sufficiency of post-retirement earnings.

Question 6 examines whether the issue related to date of hire is one that
“straddles traditional boundaries between human resources and finance”. Nearly 50%
of respondents agree or strongly agree with this assertion. The two-tier issue clearly
involves dollars and cents, with spillovers to workplace morale and recruitment and
retention. Given the emergent nature of this issue, the connection between the two
professional groups may yield new intellectual hints for respondents and researchers.

Questions 7 and 8 test the potential negatives of the two-tier benefit structure.
One could argue that with high unemployment rates, prospective job seekers would be
less care about the two-tier issue and feel fortunate enough to be hired. Likewise, one
could argue that the potential undesirable impacts related to date-of-hire will effectively
fade away as senior employees retire. Responses show little support for the former
contention, but substantial agreements with the latter. Although participants recognize
the negative impacts of the two-tier issue would exist even under high unemployment
rate, they believe this issue is a self-correcting ailment that will be healed by time.

In summary, the survey respondents appear to admit that a two-tier benefit
structure may negatively affect the workplace morale and hurt recruitment and
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retention. The answers imply that the retirement of older cohorts may mitigate the
potential negatives related to date-of-hire.

Drivers of Change in Public Pension Crisis

This section assesses perceived drivers of change in the public pension system.
Understanding the rationale behind responses may provide insights regarding the role
of these drivers in a complex operating environment. Table 5.6 sets forth the answers
to this subject. The findings suggest that all drivers get at least somewhat supported,
whereas these factors carry different weights.
Table 5.6 Perceived Drivers in the Public Pension Crisis

Drivers of Public Pension
"Crisis"
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Changes in governmental
accounting rules
Decreasing defined benefit
pension coverage of the private
sector workforce
Decreasing overall pension
coverage of private sector
workforce
Statutory
Property
Tax
Limitations
Changes in State Pension
Systems
Cuts in intergovernmental
revenue
Pension benefit changes in
neighboring communities

Disagree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

5.0

26.7

28.7

36.6

3.0

3.9

13.7

19.6

54.9

7.8

3.9

14.7

22.5

50.0

8.8

2.9

14.6

30.1

36.9

15.5

2.9

14.6

36.9

40.8

4.9

2.9

9.7

16.5

49.5

21.4

1.0

12.6

41.7

39.8

4.9

Strongly
Disagree

The relative low rate of agreement in Question 1 suggests respondents may
view accounting rule changes as shedding light on an ongoing public pension crisis,
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rather than triggering it, since governments have had to deal with the operational
impacts of Governmental Accounting Standards Board’s accrual accounting model for
over a decade. Drivers such as the stock market performance and collective bargaining
attract higher scores in terms of impacts on public pension reforms, as introduced at
the beginning of this chapter. Similar to the statement about stock market performance,
questions 4 and 6 examine the impacts of scarce revenues to the public pension crisis.
Responses confirm that both the property tax limitations and cuts in intergovernmental
revenue are influential drivers of pension reforms. The economic downturn has fostered
negative growth in these sources of revenues for many communities, which spurred
plenty of reform reactions.

The high ratios of agreement in Questions 2 and 3 confirm the respondents’
awareness of the impacts of changing pension realities in the private sector. These
directors acknowledge that the decreased coverage of DB plans, as well as the overall
decrease in pension coverage nationwide in the private sector, has precipitated policy
changes in public pension plans. Overall, respondents recognize that the financial
solvency of public pension plans is not immune to macroeconomic conditions or
changes in American’s retirement finance.

Responses to questions 5 and 7 indicate pension policies of the state or
neighboring communities are not significant drivers of perceived impact. The former
could be explained with the fact that only 27.2% of respondent cities participate in FRS,
insulating them from direct impacts. Another possibility is that state’s salary and
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benefit package is relatively low compared with many large local governments. The
low rate of agreement in question 7 suggests respondents are more concerned with
overcoming their own pension difficulties than benchmarking their pension practices
to other jurisdictions. Thus, peer input on the organizational impacts of DB reforms
may be limited.

In sum, there is no surprise in respondents’ assessment of drivers for public
pension changes. Respondents, who have average nearly 25 years of experience and
whose primary retirement model is DB, realize that market performances cannot be
separated from the long-term fiscal sustainability of public pension plans. They imply
that the DB model may not work as well now as in prior years if domestic economic
growth remains subdued in the future.

5.3 Attitude Structure of Survey Responses: A Principal Component
Interpretation

The second major section of reporting survey results involves a principal
component analysis and generating indexes for the attitude structures with survey
responses. This study utilizes exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to examine the
significance of including selected items into the indexes. In addition to the purpose of
reducing the number of variables, indexes tend to possess higher reliability and validity
than individual variables (Babbie, 1990; Neuman, 2004). Based on the derived indexes,
this study incorporates the individual characteristics of respondents and city-level
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information to establish regression models, which reveal elements that may affect the
perceptions to public pension reform issues.

5.3.1 Principal Component Analysis

The similarity of the Finance and HR directors’ perceptions facilitates the
principal component extraction process to conduct the EFA of the survey results. Since
the survey respondents can be viewed as an integrative group, it allows sufficient
sample size to undertake the analysis. Out of the 36 common questions, 20 items with
communalities of 0.40 or higher are preserved for extraction. The extraction employs
a varimax rotation method. The assumption of varimax, one of the orthogonal rotation
methods, is that the factors are uncorrelated (Gorsuch, 1983), which assumes no
overlapping of the loadings among items and provides a clearer structure of attitudes.
Findings were verified with the direct oblimin approach, an oblique rotation method
that assumes factors are correlated. Results were virtually identical to those obtained
with the varimax rotation.

The analysis generates a four-factor solution that explains 60.6% of the overall
variation. These four factors exceed the traditional “Eigenvalues Greater than One”
criterion for inclusion (Ficker, Kulzy, & Appleget, 2012; Stevens, 1996).

By

examining the loadings of each variate, the four factors are labeled as follows to
summarize survey findings: Shortcomings of reform, social drivers of reform, diffusion
of private sector model, and financial literacy. For further analysis, the first factor is
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split into two subsidiary components, which results in five scales as displayed in Table
5.7. The Cronbach’s Alphas for all the five scales are greater than the generally
accepted 0.70 level, which suggest the internal consistency of each extracted factor.
Overall, the results indicate these five factors are representative of the survey responses
and the items about public pension reform issues.

The factors encapsulate survey results into a handful of identifiable concepts.
The six items in the first factor, general shortcomings, relate to downsides of the
introduction of the DC model. Respondents note the adoption of DC plans may bring
challenges to public recruitment and retention, as well as turnover of junior personnel
and municipal operations. The second factor deals with the negative organizational
impacts related to the two-tier benefit structure that may cause antagonism between
younger and older workers and make the hiring of prospective employee more difficult.
The four items in the third factor, social drivers of reform, speak to the impacts of
decreased pension coverage nationwide and lower stock market returns to the pension
changes in public sector. The fourth factor, diffusion of the private sector model, speaks
to the greater employee mobility fostered by the DC model and reform trends in the
public sector tempted by the practices in the private sector. The two items in the last
factor, financial literacy, address the necessity of educating employees about the basics
of asset allocation and financial planning in order to prepare for the DB-to-DC
transition. In short, these extracted factors show that survey findings demonstrate a
fairly structured worldview.
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Table 5.7 Scales Derived from Principal Component Analysis

Factors (Item Number)

General
Shortcomings
(6)

Shortcomings
of Reform
(10)

Shortcomings
Related to
Date of Hire
(4)

Social Drivers of Reform
(4)

Diffusion of Private Sector
Model
(4)

Survey Items (Respective Loadings)
Make it more difficult to retain senior
personnel (0.73)
Make it more difficult to attract wellqualified applicants (0.80)
Increase turnover of junior personnel (0.74)
Decrease competiveness of compensation
with comparable private sector jobs (0.73)
Make it more difficult to attract and retain a
diverse workforce (0.78)
Ultimately
reduce
efficiency
and
effectiveness of municipal operations
(0.75)
Fosters antagonism between younger and
older workers given differential impacts of
benefit cuts (0.60)
Creates different levels of morale and
commitment between new hires and
existing employees (0.60)
Makes hiring of the most talented prospects
more difficult due to longer vesting (0.70)
Makes hiring of the most talented prospects
more difficult due to Increased retirement
age (0.67)
Decreasing defined benefit pension
coverage of the private sector workforce
(0.81)
Decreasing overall pension coverage of
private sector workforce (0.84)
Low returns of fixed income securities
(0.56)
Lower than historical returns on stocks
(0.67)
Adoption of defined contribution plans
would foster greater employee mobility
between the public and private sectors
(0.56)
Adoption of defined contribution plans
would foster greater employee mobility
within the public sector (0.56)
Political and social forces will eventually
lead to the elimination of pensions for
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Eigenvalue
(Cumulative
%)

Cronbach’s
Alpha

0.87

5.20
(26.01%)
0.89

0.82

2.75
(39.76%)

2.20
(50.7%)

0.79

0.71

public sector employees, mirroring longterm trends in the private sector (0.77)

Financial Literacy
(2)

Taxpayer sentiment will eventually lead to
the adoption of defined contribution plans
as the default model in the public sector
(0.86)
Obligate jurisdictions to educate employees
on the basics of asset allocation throughout
their lifetimes (0.81)
Encourage jurisdictions to provide access to
low-or no-cost independent financial
planning (0.86)

1.98
(60.6%)

0.82

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

5.3.2 Indexes Creation and Regression Results

The next step of the analysis is to construct composite measures for the attitude
structure of public pension reforms. Based on the results of EFA, five indexes were
developed. Along with the PCA process, the factor scores for each survey items are
generated simultaneously. The composite measures are created by calculating the
average of the factor scores of the survey items comprising each of the five factors,
giving equal weights to each survey item within each index (Neuman, 2004). The value
of the indexes ranged from 1 to 5, where 1 means respondents strongly disagree with
the theme of the factor and 5 means they strongly agree. Descriptive statistics for the
five indexes are showcased in Table 5.8. The glance at the statistics reveals that
respondents are more aware of the impacts of social drivers and the necessity of
financial literacy training than the other three measures.

In addition to the individual characteristics, this study also utilized the city-level
data of respondents as independent variables. The tax levied per capita is included to
indicate the financial status of the municipality, which may affect the perceptions of
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the local officials to public pension reform. The pension plan type for general
employees in each municipality is introduced to reflect the impact of the default
pension model to respondents’ attitude. Among the participants, the DB model retains
the predominant pension type for general public employees, followed by FRS, Hybrid,
and DC plans. The information of location is selected in order to examine the regional
disparity. Over 40 percent of respondents cluster in the Southeast Florida. The East
Central and Tampa Bay areas are the second and third major venues of respondents.
Due to the low ratio of the other regions, this study only selects these three areas as
indicators of location.

Table 5.8 Descriptive Statistics of Indexes and City Level Characteristics

Variables

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Indexes
General Shortcomings
Shortcomings _ Date of Hire
Social Drivers of Reform
Diffusion of Private Sector Model
Financial Literacy

112
112
112
111
103

3.19
3.21
3.71
3.39
3.51

.82
.83
.75
.78
.87

1
1.25
1.5
1
1.5

5
5
5
5
5

Tax Per Capita

113

440.27

485.42

12.26

4534.4

Frequency

Percent

N
112

52
11
20
29

46.4
9.8
17.9
25.9

Plan Type for General Employees
DB
DC
Hybrid
FRS
Region
East Central
North Central
North East
North West
South Central
South East

113
26
1
8
8
1
46
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23.0
0.9
7.1
7.1
0.9
40.7

South West
Tampa Bay

2
21

1.8
18.6

At this exploratory stage of research, the regression model does not intend to
test any specific hypotheses, but to uncover the potential factors that may influence
Florida local government officials’ attitude towards the public pension reform issues.
Table 5.9 provides the regression results and highlights the significant individual and
local features that affect their recognition of the five factors extracted from survey
responses. The first finding of interest is that being male and becoming older,
respondents will be less aware of the diffusion of private sector model. This could be
explained that in the public sector male employees usually earn higher salary than
female, and earn higher benefit under the status quo (GAO, 2011 & 2012). As reaching
to retirement, the generous retirement income is nearly at hand, so these respondents
are more resistant to or less cognizant of the mobility of DC plans, and they may be
less aware of the changes in the pension coverage in the private sector. The male and
senior respondents may be more reluctant to forgo the earned retirement benefits for
the sake of greater mobility.

The results for the variable of department suggest that HR directors see a greater
need than Finance people to enhance the financial literacy of employees in terms of
asset allocation over a lifetime, as well as to provide low- or no-cost financial planning
for employees. This result is as expected since HR staff might be more sensitive to this
perspective. However, the HR variables is not significant in any of other indexes, in
particular not evident in the attitude to the shortcomings related to date of hire, which
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is also an issue should have triggered their professional sensitivity. This may reflect the
two-tier issue is relatively new so its impact has not showed yet.

Table 5.9 Regression Results

Explanatory Variables

General
Shortcomings

Shortcomings
Date of Hire

Social
Drivers

Diffusion
of Private
Sector
Model

Financial
Literacy

Individual Characteristics
Male
Age
HR
Currently Contribute to
DC
Currently Contribute to
Hybrid
DC_Retirement Income
Hybrid_Retirement
Income
Professional Designation

-0.228

0.086

-0.154

-0.343**

-0.126

(0.201)

(0.200)

(0.170)

(0.176)

(0.186)

-0.548

-0.135

-0.008

-0.154*

-0.052

(0.077)

(0.092)

(0.086)

(0.082)

(0.088)

0.090

0.036

-0.264

-0.154

0.487**

(0.202)

(0.215)

(0.196)

(0.183)

(0.212)

0.416*

0.090

0.042

0.368*

0.667**

(0.237)

(0.286)

(0.226)

(0.190)

(0.298)

0.024

-0.161

-0.037

-0.224

-0.130

(0.193)

(0.198)

(0.178)

(0.169)

(0.220)

-0.050

-0.256

0.124

-0.100

0.094

(0.213)

(0.277)

(0.234)

(0.227)

(0.287)

-0.868**

-0.168

0.220

0.640**

0.366

(0.394)

(0.595)

(0.521)

(0.236)

(0.490)

0.464**

-0.011

0.132

0.084

0.124

(0.227)

(0.232)

(0.175)

(0.177)

(0.219)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000*

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.635**

-0.244

-0.089

-0.496

(0.318)

(0.395)

(0.000)
0.709**
(0.258)

(0.278)

(0.382)

City Level Characteristics
Tax Per Capita
DC for General
Employees
FRS for General
Employees
Hybrid for General
Employees
East Central

-0.187

-0.179

-0.229

-0.273

-0.048

(0.229)

(0.216)

(0.187)

(0.187)

(0.198)

0.144

-0.251

0.104

-0.149

-0.079

(0.266)

(0.259)

(0.232)

(0.221)

(0.230)

-0.354

0.001

-0.154

-0.242

0.195
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(0.263)
South East
Tampa Bay
Constant

(0.263)

(0.236)

(0.199)

(0.291)

-0.156

-0.379

-0.252

-0.446**

0.147

(0.255)

(0.256)

(0.217)

(0.209)

(0.268)

-0.237*

0.010

0.001

-0.219

0.161

(0.275)

(0.290)

(0.227)

(0.238)

(0.278)

3.547

4.157

4.142

4.686

3.207

(0.475)

(0.534)

(0.486)

(0.477)

(0.549)

No. of Obs.

105

105

105

105

103

R-squared

0.1524

0.0914

0.1439

0.2254

0.1990

Note: Bold characters indicate that variables are significant at 05(**), or .10 (*).

The results of variables about the individual pension model indicate that the
respondents who are currently contributing to DC plan only will have greater
recognition of the general shortcomings of reform, the diffusion of the private sector
model and the need of financial literacy training, perhaps based on their own
experiences dealing with the DC model. However, participants who rely on hybrid
plans to provide their retirement income, although still more aware of the pension
changes in the private sector, are less attentive to the general shortcomings of pension
reform. This may reflect they have learned lessons from pension reform practices in
the private sector and have well-prepared for all kinds of risks that may jeopardize their
retirement security by allocating their pension savings into hybrid plans. The variable
of professional designation is only significant for the general shortcomings of reform
and the sign is as expected. With more professional knowledge, respondents will better
comprehend the potential negative impacts related to public pension reform.

The analysis of the city-level data does not reveal many significant factors that
may affect the attitude structure. Although the tax levied per capita shows significance
for the financial literacy, the substantial influence is too small to detect. For respondents
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from the cities that offer DC plans to their general employees, the results suggest lower
recognition of the general shortcomings and social drivers of the reform. This could be
explained that these cities do not face the challenges of the recent pension reform since
they have already designated the DC model.

Results of the location variables suggest the Southeast region, where this study
draws most survey responses, has a substantial negative impact to the recognition of
diffusion of private sector model, indicating perhaps the unwillingness of these city
officials to face the reality and pressure from the pension changes in the private sector.
Respondents from Tampa Bay may be less aware of the general shortcomings of reform,
perhaps because respondents in this region are not as conversant.

It is worth noting that none of the factors generate significance in the model of
shortcomings related to date of hire. This may imply the novelty nature of this theme
for Florida municipalities and reveal the necessity to further investigate this issue
through other research techniques such as interviews, which will be introduced in the
next chapter.

5.4 Summary

The analysis of survey responses furthers our understanding of the readiness of
Florida municipalities to conduct the DB-to-DC transition and broader issues regarding
retirement policy. The descriptive analysis of the survey items provides several
important findings. First, there is no expected significant difference between
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perceptions of Finance and HR directors towards the pension reform issues: the two
groups only differ on five of thirty-six common questions. Their different professional
domains do not bring distinctive outlooks over the issues, thus this study can treat them
as a collective of senior managers, which facilitates the descriptive summary of survey
results and the principal components analysis. The general overview of the pension
issues suggests that respondents admit the DC model that fosters employee mobility
may enhance the overall productivity. They are also aware that pension policies and
the trend in the private sector and the taxpayer sentiment may lead up to substantive
pension reforms in the public sector.

Second, regarding the organizational impacts of the pension reform changes,
respondents acknowledge the potential adverse impact on recruitment and retention for
junior rather than senior employees. They also agree on the remedies to the pension
reform, such as enhancing financial literacy training to employees and retirement
savings through alternative voluntary plans. Respondents recognize that a two-tier
benefit structure will negatively affect the workplace morale and recruitment, but this
issue is perceived to be remediated along with the retirement of senior cohorts.

Third, the revenue cuts due to the stock market downturn are perceived as the
most important drivers of pension changes during the public pension crisis. However,
responses suggest that peer input on the organizational impacts of DB reforms may be
limited. Pension policy changes of the state or neighboring jurisdictions are not
perceived as a significant driver for public pension reform.
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The results of the principal component analysis reveal that respondents
perceived the public pension reform issues based on five common scales: the general
shortcomings of reform, the shortcomings related to date of hire, the social drivers of
reform, the diffusion of the private sector model, and financial literacy. The five
extracted factors are utilized to create indexes of the attitude structure, which implies a
fairly organized worldview. Findings confirm previous descriptive statistics that
respondents are aware of the negative organizational impacts of the incremental reform
changes. They also recognize that the two-tier benefit structure may decrease
workplace morale and hurt recruitment of prospective employees. The fluctuation of
the market performance of pension assets is perceived as an important social driver of
pension changes. The reality of the decrease in DB ubiquity and the overall pension
coverage in the private sector is also recognized as a driver for the spillover of DC plans
to the public sector. With the advent of DC model adoptions, respondents perceive it’s
critical to enhance financial literacy of the workforce to better prepare for the
forthcoming pension model transition in the public sector.

The regression models examine the influences of individual and municipal
characteristics on the extracted attitude structure. The results uncover several
significant factors. As for the individual characteristics, male and senior directors show
less attention to the diffusion of private sector practices in pension plans. HR directors
are more aware of the necessity of financial literacy training in the workplace. Holding
a professional designation will promote the understanding of the general shortcomings
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of the incremental pension reform. Contribution to DC plans will prompt respondents
to better comprehend the general shortcomings of incremental reform changes, the
lessons from the private sector, and the necessity of financial literacy training. Similarly,
relying on hybrid plans to provide retirement income appears to make directors more
aware of the pension changes in the private sector in order to overcome the undesirable
impacts of public pension reforms.

The city-level features do not suggest significant findings. The municipalities,
which have already adopted the DC model for their general employees, show less
attention to the general shortcomings of the recent pension reform and social drivers of
pension changes since they have already done a paradigm shift. The regional disparity
suggests that respondents from Southeast Florida are less aware of the diffusion of the
private sector model, while the general shortcomings of pension reform are new to
directors from Tampa Bay.

In sum, the analysis of survey responses provides rich intellectual food for
thought at this exploratory stage of research. Respondents perceive the imperative of
pension reform, at the same time they are hesitant to know about the shortcomings
along with the recent pension reform. The attitude structures suggest their vacillation
between preserving the status quo and conducting a paradigm switch. Meanwhile, this
study also leaves further space for exploration. For example, respondents are not aware
of younger employees’ preference for DC plans, and they are not acquainted with the
recruitment and retention issues related to the two-tier benefit structure. These puzzles
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call for in-depth examinations through interviews. The following chapter will target
these specific perspectives by analyzing the interview results.
CHAPTER 6
PUBLIC PENSION REFORM: MORE THAN FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY

6.1 Introduction

Survey results provide empirical evidence of the attitudes to public pension
reform in Florida municipalities. However, the survey responses may not reveal the
rationale behind these perceptions. This requires for supplementary interviews as one
part of the larger triangulated effort to verify and illuminate the key findings from
survey results. This chapter employs ten structured phone interviews with selected
respondents. The interviewees split almost equally by department, gender, and plan
coverage (DB, DC, and FRS), for the purpose of reducing the sample selection bias.

The interview questions were developed based on the analysis of survey results
to provide further elaborations and in-depth insight into the issues, including the
sustainability of the DB model, the major drivers and impediments of conducting the
pension paradigm switch, the impacts of the transition to public recruitment and
retention, the imperative of the financial literacy training, the issue of the two-tier
benefit structure, and the ultimate solution to the public pension crisis. The congruence
of the worldview of Finance and HR directors is also included as one question to gain
justifications for the shared mindset.
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Therefore, this chapter focuses on the description and recapitulation of the
interviews. The following sections are organized according to the themes of interview
questions to interpret the interview transcripts with important quotations. In doing so,
this study aims to capture the missing pieces in the cognitive construct of public
pension reform.

6.2 Quote Analyses of Interview Questions

In order to summarize the interview findings, the interview questions are
classified into four themes in the following analyses: the financial perspective of public
pension reform, the human resources impacts of public pension reform, the pros and
cons of the DB-to-DC transition, and the congruence of Finance and HR perceptions.

6.2.1 The Financial Viability of Public Pension System

This study argues that the public pension issues straddle the professional
boundary of finance and human resources. Therefore, it is myopic to consider this
subject solely through the fiscal prism. However, most frequently, the public pension
crisis is viewed as a fiscal sustainability or affordability concern. The financial viability
of the public pension system becomes the top priority when state and local governments
initiate pension reform strategies. The first question introduced explores whether the
Finance and HR directors deem that current predominant DB model as sustainable and
how they define the sustainability. Their inclinations will be closely associated with
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their answers to the second question: what is the long-term solution to the public
pension “crisis”.

The Sustainability of Public DB Model

Table 6.1 presents the responses to the questions asking how the officials define
a sustainable public pension system and whether they think the current DB model is
sustainable. The definitions of a sustainable public pension system given by the
interviewees confirm the expectation that the financial viability is the major concern
regarding public pension reforms. The majority of the interviewees emphasize fiscal
solvency in terms of sustainability. Only two finance directors (interviewee #1 & #2)
mention the HR perspective. Except for asserting that the current DB model is
sustainable, they also praise the superiority of DB pensions to recruit and retain
qualified public employees: “…[I]n a selfish world, defined contribution is more
advantageous to the employer, except for the fact that in attracting employees and
retaining employees, defined benefit plans have a real advantage. They are much more
attractive, especially in the public safety realm” (interviewee #1). Other interviewees,
no matter they regard the DB plans are sustainable or not, the common focus of
sustainability is the affordability of the pension costs, clearly put by one HR specialist:
“To me sustainable is affordable to the people we have to pay for. …[W]e made some
modifications [benefits reductions] in the last year, our DB plans are sustainable at their
current benefit level” (interviewee #7).
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As for the responses to whether the current DB model is sustainable, half of the
interviewees contend the current DB model is, or will be sustainable in an idealistic
world (interviewee #1, #2, #4, #5, & #7), if governments could improve the
management of pension funds by adopting realistic assumptions of investment return
and setting reasonable benefit level. This point is particularly shared by the finance
directors: “The DB model is sustainable based on the efficiency of having the pension
fund professionally managed to provide the optimal return on investment” (interviewee
#1).

By contrast, another half of the interviewees believe the DB model is not
sustainable, due to its vulnerability to the market performance and increasing unfunded
pension liabilities associated with the plan features. This view is particularly held by
the HR staff from cities offering DC plans: “I think the most sustainable kind is the
defined contribution. Defined benefit plan of course is subject to unfunded liabilities,
and the ability for the employer to pay the normal cost of the plan every year, whereas
on the defined contribution plan, the employer will set the contribution rate based on
its financial recourses every year, or could change it every year”(interviewee #10).
Along with the acknowledgement that DB plans are not sustainable, they also point out
the difficulties of changing the status quo and negotiating benefit reductions with
unions. One of the HR directors expresses it clearly: “...[W]ith regards to the general
employees, the DB plan is currently not a sustainable model. In order to be sustainable,
there has to be tiers built into it, which would have to be negotiated with the Union.
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But those tiers would outline a model of lessening benefits and two-tier system”
(interviewee #9). The same concerns are echoed by one of the financial directors in the
sample: “With the DB plan, you are kind of stuck unless you can change benefits.
Changing benefits is not an easy thing to get through unions…. and a DB portion needs
to be fairly stable with the benefit level” (interviewee #3).

Nevertheless, the interviewees widely admit that the DB pension system is
abused even though they have contrary opinions of its sustainability: “I would describe
[a sustainable system] as a system that has realistic expectations of returns, with a
proper board that chooses the right investment managers, and does not increase the
benefits to retirees, which in turn makes the expected rate of returns unfeasible. The
[DB] plan beneficiaries actually push for such modifications for their own interests, so
that when they retire they will get this great retirement [benefit]. But what they are
doing is crushing [the system] for the individuals later in the future to continue to
maintain the pension” (interviewee #5).

The unfeasible benefit enhancement during the good times, especially for the
police and fire pension plans, is mentioned frequently as the major cause for the
unsustainability of the DB model nowadays. One of the finance directors is pretty
straightforward about this practice: “There were a lot of benefit enhancements over the
last 10 years and it wasn’t an issue at the time because the economy developments were
so strong. It was not an issue and it didn’t flash out until the great recession”
(interviewee #4).
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Table 6.1 The Sustainability of Current Public Pension Model

ID

Dept.

1

Finance

2

Finance

3

Finance

4

Finance

5

Finance

Q: In your own words, how would you define a sustainable public pension
system? In general, do you think the current public pension model (DB) is
sustainable?
"DB model is sustainable based on the efficiency of having the pension fund
professionally managed to provide the optimal return on investment. There is a lot of
political pressure to award additional pension benefits, particularly in public safety
employees. That has led to many plans currently being unsustainable. Simply their
plans are too rich in benefits. …[I]n a selfish world, defined contribution is more
advantageous to the employer, except for the fact that in attracting employees and
retaining employees, defined benefit plans have a real advantage. They are much more
attractive, especially in the public safety realm."
"For general employees, I think DB model is sustainable. ...I [F]inancially it’s not as
bad as everybody believes to be. You get what you pay for. So if they don’t want to pay
their employees then they are not gonna get very good employees."
"I do think the combination of a small DB and a DC that can be changed during
economic good times and bad make that sustainable. With the DB plan, you are kind
of stuck unless you can change benefits. Changing benefits is not an easy thing to get
through unions… and get a DB portion needs to be fairly stable with the benefit level."
"I think the traditional defined benefit program is sustainable. To have a sustainable
DB plan, you need have reasonable assumptions and reasonable benefit levels...there
were a lot of benefit enhancements over the last 10 years and it wasn’t an issue at the
time because the economy developments were so strong. It was not an issue and it
didn’t flash out until the great recession."
"I would describe it as a system which has realistic expectations with returns, with a
proper board that choose the right investment managers, to properly give the returns
that are not beyond the reasonable, and not increasing the benefits to retirees which
puts the expected rate of returns unfeasible. The [DB] plan benefactors actually push
for these modifications for their interests so that when they retire they will get this
great retirement [benefit]. But what they are doing is crushing for the individuals later
in the future to continue to maintain the pension. "
"Sustainable means affordable. ...[W]e actually closed our general employees pension
plan, which is a defined benefit plan, and transition to the Florida retirement system.
The contribution rates of the old plan were about 28 percent of the payroll. The new
contribution for the Florida Retirement System is about 8 percent of the payroll, so
that it is easily sustainable."
"To me sustainable is affordable to the people we have to pay for. …[W]e made some
modifications [benefits reductions] in the last year, our DB plans are sustainable at
their current benefit level. And I believe it’s a good model for a pension benefit."

6

HR

7

HR

8

HR

"Yes the 401a will always be sustainable because we just give a percentage and then
that’s it."

9

HR

"...[W]ith regards to the general employees the DB plan is currently not a sustainable
model. In order to be a sustainable model, there has to be tiers built into it, which
would have to be negotiated with the Union. But those tiers would outline a model of
lessening benefits and new tier system."

HR

"I think the most sustainable kind is the defined contribution. Defined benefit plan of
course is subject to unfunded liabilities, and the ability for the employer to pay the
normal cost of the plan every year, whereas on the defined contribution plan, the
employer will set the contribution rate based on its financial recourses every year, or
could change it every year."

10

The Ultimate Solution for Public Pension “Crisis”
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The unfunded pension liabilities emerging in the American public sector are
staggering and pose a so-called public pension “crisis” in some state and local
governments. These concerns have forced public agencies to take actions to ensure
their financial solvency by either incremental modifications to current DB plans or
transitions to the DC model. This study attempts to elicit the preference of the two
reform strategies from Florida local officials by inquiring what is the long-term solution
for the current public pension tensions. The quote summary is provided in Table 6.2.

Similarly to the question about whether the DB model is sustainable or not, the
interviewees equally bifurcate in their preference for the two streams of reform
strategies. Half of the interviewees, especially those from cities offering DB plan only,
advocate that the public DB model still can be sustainable if only state and local
governments could prudently invest the pension funds and set appropriate benefit level:
“I think if we are prudent in managing the benefits, managing adequate reserves to be
able to deal with the volatility, DB plans are very sustainable and they are best interests
for both those employees and employer in the long-term”(interviewee #1). The officials
frequently mention the necessity to maintain a reasonable benefit level as the prior
tactic for the DB model to survive: “For communities got involved in the spiraling
benefits, the structure of benefits have to be changed because the citizenry isn’t going
to stand for benefits that are way over what they’re receiving”(interviewee #3).

Some interviewees even think that referring to the widespread pension
problems as a crisis is hyperbole because they believe the issues exist only in
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governments misbehaving in their pension funding: “I don’t think there is a crisis. I
think the crisis is contrived. I think some local governments have been irresponsible in
increasing the benefits without looking into the long-term impact. ... Once you get
irresponsible you have to pay that bill” (interviewee #6). One HR director argues that
the DB model itself is not the origin of the pension tension, but the irresponsible
funding practice: “I believe there are places in crises, but it’s not a broad-brush every
pension plan is in a crisis. For those who chose not to fund theirs using the actuarially
required contributions, they have a different issue than the model” (interviewee #7).
This view is echoed by one of the Finance specialists regarding the lack of enough tax
revenues to fund the benefits, especially for police and fire, is the real cause of pension
issues: “I don’t really know that there is a pension crisis. If there is a pension crisis
anywhere it’s with the police and fire pension plans. DB pension becomes a critical
issue, which is not because it’s a bad design or they don’t work, but because taxpayers
don’t want to pay employees that provide the services to the city” (interviewee #2).
Another finance director also expresses the difficulty to curb the benefit level for rich
police and fire plans: “I know it’s a tough battle dealing with the police and fire and
union lobbies and that definitely is putting pressure on politicians to not make drastic
changes. I don’t know where the balance is but there has be given up on both sides”
(interviewee #3).

On the other hand, half of interviewees are inclined to the DB-to-DC transition
as the ultimate solution, with the belief that public DB plans will not be sustainable.
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This view is widely implied by officials from cities that have conducted the transition
for the feasible pension costs with DC plans: “It gives the employer flexibility to fund
the way they are able to fund it and in the way that they think is reasonable. The future
of it, I think, really, it’s very clear, it’s to the DC plan (interviewee #10). One HR
director from the city offering both DB and DC plans suggests that the DC model is the
ultimate solution with the reluctance to admit that DB is not sustainable: “ I think
ultimately that [DC] is where public sector will go, I don’t think it’s the ultimately best
idea, but that’s neither here or there. ... Now we have private industry pay scales or
close to them and public pension benefit, that is not a sustainable model”(interviewee
#7).

Nevertheless, although this group of interviewees advocate the pension model
transition, they are not promoting the drastic fix overnight but a interim hybrid plan as
a start: “ I think a hybrid plan of both DB and DC would solve all those problems. Both
employees and employers have equal responsibility to the risk (interviewee #5). Due
to the concern of the insecurity that the DC model may bring, one of the HR specialists
indicates it’s more palatable for retirees to get benefits from both DB and DC plans:
“So you know no matter how bad the market goes, you’re gonna get something as
retirement security. ... You cannot have management cutting everything. You have to
meet in the middle”(interviewee #8). Another HR staff raises the same concern about
the transition and contends the governments have to take that into consideration when
conducing the transition: “when they do get to the point where they have no choice but
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to transition to a DC model, there has to be some commitment from senior management
to make that transition in order to resolve any crisis that may loom ahead for public
sector agency” (interviewee #9).
Table 6.2 The Ultimate Solution to the Public Pension “Crisis”

ID

Dept.

1

Finance

2

Finance

3

Finance

4

Finance

5

Finance

6

HR

7

HR

Q: What would you recommend is the long-term solution to the current public
pension "crisis"?
"I think the long-term solution is the continuing monitoring and reduction of benefit
levels as appropriate, in order to make our DB plan sustainable. ... I think if we are
prudent in managing the benefits, managing adequate reserves to be able to deal with
the volatility, DB plans are very sustainable and they are best interests for both those
employees and employer in the long-term.
"I don’t really know that there is a pension crisis. If there is a pension crisis anywhere
it’s with the police and fire pension plans. DB pension becomes a critical issue, which
is not because it’s a bad design or they don’t work, but because taxpayers don’t want
to pay employees that provide the services to the city. That would solve the crisis if
people would pay for their taxes like they should."
"For communities got involved in the spiraling benefits, the structure of benefits have
to be changed because the citizenry isn’t going to stand for benefits that are way over
what they’re receiving. I know it’s a tough battle dealing with the police and fire and
union lobbies and that definitely is putting pressure on politicians to not make drastic
changes. I don’t know where the balance is but there has be given up on both sides."
Well I think "long-term" hits the nail on the head. You can’t go and fix a pension plan
overnight. It should be a long-term approach of making changes, maybe not whole field
changes over night but maybe incrementally over time, to assumptions that are being
used, levels of benefits, etc. ... So number one people shouldn’t rush to try to fix
something that isn’t really broke, and number two don’t try to fix something overnight,
and last just take a realistic long-term approach, not try to do anything drastic.
"I think a hybrid plan of both DB and DC would solve all those problems. Both
employees and employers have equal responsibility to the risk. ... Other than that, if
United States was doing what we did, which is to go straight for us to the DC plan, that
is feasible. Obviously it’s easy to budget, you are not at the mercy of the market, you’re
determined on a certain percentage, of which you and employees must agree and live
by. So be it."
"I don’t think there is a crisis. I think the crisis is contrived. I think some local
governments have been irresponsible in increasing the benefits without looking into the
long-term impact. ... Once you get irresponsible you have to pay that bill. So,
unfortunately, but I don’t consider that is crisis for all local governments. ... It is
management of prioritization of where people want to spend their money on."
"I believe there are places in crises, but it’s not a broad-brush every pension plan is in
a crisis. For those who chose not to fund theirs using the actuarially required
contributions, they have a different issue than the model. ... I do think to the extent more
and more of local governments annual operating budget goes to pay for annual legacy
cost, less and less likely they will maintain the DB plan. So some folks are gone, they
are just too far down the road. I think ultimately that [DC] is where public sector will
go, I don’t think it’s the ultimately best idea, but that’s neither here or there. ... Now we
have private industry pay scales or close to them and public pension benefit, that is not
a sustainable model.”
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8

HR

9

HR

10

HR

" I suggest a hybrid plan. Either the State or organizations that have DB helps sustain
people retirement or they end up going to the welfare program. But let's say 50,000 is
the most that’s gonna be a defined benefit. So you know no matter how bad the market
goes, you’re gonna get something as retirement security. ... You cannot have
management cutting everything. You have to meet in the middle. You know someone is
sick, you don’t go there and kill them but you’re trying to make them better."
"I believe that the long-term solution is that pension models will exist only if they are
willing to add additional tiers of lesser benefit and lesser cost for employers and the
public sector role. And along with that, when they do get to the point where they have
no choice but to transition to a DC model, there has to be some commitment from senior
management to make that transition in order to resolve any crisis that may loom ahead
for public sector agency. … So first is to establish a two-tier system and in the end will
conduct the switch if necessary."
I think there are ways for those employers in those states that have DB plans to shore
them up financially if they’re willing to do it, and to keep them from being financially
insolvent. ... [I]f you don’t cheat on the funding, have reasonable benefits, and include
employee funding, I think those [DB] plans are viable. On the other hand, I think the
same for DC plans. It gives the employer flexibility to fund the way they are able to fund
it and in the way that they think is reasonable. The future of it, I think, really, it’s very
clear, it’s to the DC plan.”

6.2.2 The Human Resources Perspective of Public Pension Reform

Unlike their financial counterparts who view pension issues as a matter of
actuarial soundness, the HR professionals may perceive from different angles: How
does the pension paradigm switch impact the ability to recruit and retain the qualified
public employees with potential intergenerational consequences? This section of
analysis explores the human resources perspectives of public pension changes.

The Impact of Pension Paradigm Switch to Public Recruitment

The relative paucity of DC plans in the public sector may allow decision-makers
to ignore cues from pension type, despite what we know from prior work. The
underlying assumption is that the public sector will remain attractive to younger
employees, regardless of pension type. Thus the public officials may not fully
understand the link between pension type and recruitment. However, the impending
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DB-to-DC transition may alter this HR perspective and raise the concern that the
sufficiency of DC plans to recruit qualified public sector employees. Table 6.3
summarizes the quotes dealing with the impact of pension type preferences.

As expected, a few of interviewees still see the traditional DB plan as an
attractive tool for recruitment in the public sector compared to the DC model: “I think
that the defined benefit pension is more attractive to the applicant as far as the benefit
package than defined contribution. I know that there are other people that feel like they
need to have more control over their retirement and they are more comfortable with a
defined contribution plan, so that they can manage their own retirement money within
the stock market. But I think overall most people are looking for a DB plan, and find
these employers more attractive” (interviewee #10). Another HR director from the
sample links the importance of pension type to economic performance and the rate of
unemployment: “In a period like now, with high unemployment, I don’t think it [a
switch to a DC plan] is a problem. In the future, when you get low unemployment and
you have to compete for people, then governments will to have to do one of the two
things, either to continue with the defined benefit programs, or to raise their salaries to
be more competitive with the private sector” (interviewee #6).

Nevertheless, the majority of the interviewees do not think the transition to DC
will have significant impact to the public recruitment, at least for general employees.
There is a consensus among officials from cities offering DB plans only that the
transition may bring adverse impact to the recruitment of public safety due to the
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difficulty to change their benefit level and political pressure: “I think it definitely would
have an adverse impact, particularly in the area of public safety, because in those highrisk areas they become accustomed to the protection of DB plans” (interviewee # 4).
Offering DC in the environment of most neighboring communities providing DB
benefits may result in challenges to hire qualified police and fire: “Overtime, as other
cities change their plans, it may equal out, but for the time being, if we offer lower
benefits than others, it may be tougher for us to hire police and fire” (interviewee #3).

For the recruitment of general employees, these officials from the sample do
not think that the transition will be an issue because professionals from the private
sector can fill these positions. Since most private organizations do not offer DB plans,
they believe the salary with DC plans of public employment could be sufficient to
recruit qualified employees: I don’t think it would be a significant issue for general
employees because to a large part we are competing with private businesses for clerical
help and management. … We could make the defined contribution plan along with the
pay plan, attractive enough to easily compensate for the losses of defined benefit plan”
(interviewee #1).

Several interviewees may not be aware of how pension makes up for salary,
thus the pension plan change is not believed to affect the recruitment process: “DC
versus DB wouldn’t make the break of anybody’s decision whether to work for the city
or not” (interviewee #2). This view is particularly shared by officials from cities
offering DC plans: “A lot of places [like us] have done that [the switch to DC plans]
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against the private sector. We’ve never had anyone says that I’m not coming because
of your pension” (interviewee #8).

Interestingly, one of our interviewees clearly suggests that pension type affects
the sector choice, with older workers selecting government as a preferred employment
option. In the words of one HR director: “The majority of people who take government
jobs with the goal of collecting a pension are those near retiring. Because of that I truly
believe that there will be a significant impact [of a switch to a 401(k) type of plan] on
people deciding whether or not to go into the public sector” (interviewee #9). By
contrast, another HR staff claims that a DC plan will essentially make government
employment more attractive to younger professionals: “It will help recruitment on a lot
of professional type positions. Younger potential employees like the mobility that a
defined contribution plan offers. And this generation is not looking for a place to work
for 30 years. … I think they are less committed to spending a career in any one
employer whether it’s public or private” (interviewee #7).

Table 6.3 The Impact of Pension Paradigm Shift to Public Recruitment

ID

1

Dept.

Q: How might the implementation of 401(k) style pensions change recruitment?
Will the pension type preference impact people’s selection of employer?

Finance

"I think the most significant impact for us would be on public safety employees, that
is police and fire employees, because that is the norm in that industry. Because the
other governments in the area are continuing to offer defined benefit plans, if we
were to go to the defined contribution, we would not be able to hire the good cops
and the good firefighters. … I don’t think it would be a significant issue for general
employees because to a large part we are competing with private businesses for
clerical help and management. … We could make the defined contribution plan along
with the pay plan, attractive enough to easily compensate for the losses of defined
benefit plan."
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2

Finance

3

Finance

4

Finance

5

Finance

6

HR

7

HR

8

HR

9

HR

10

HR

" I don’t think it would change the quality of people that we could hire, as long as
it’s clear from the beginning what they are starting with. The conversion is the
problem. … DC versus DB wouldn’t make the break of anybody’s decision whether
to work for the city or not."
"It probably will have an impact, especially on police and fire, because their plans
are more rich… Overtime, as other cities change their plans, it may equal out, but
for the time being, if we offer lower benefits than others, it may be tougher for us to
hire police and fire. … General employees are totally different because you can hire
a clerical staff from businesses that don’t have pension plans. … And the salaries I
believe in government are as attractive, if not more, for general employees."
"I think it definitely would have an adverse impact, particularly in the area of public
safety, because in those high-risk areas they become accustomed to the protection of
DB plans. ...[G]eneral employees don’t seem to have as much cloud with
legislatures...if everybody eventually converted over to the DC plan it wouldn’t have
much impact."
"The answer is that it depends [on the plan the city offers]. … My gut’s
saying...people don’t come here for a job because of the retirement system. … That
may be more of the case in an organization where they have FRS [not DC]."
"In a period right now with high unemployment, I don’t think it’s a problem. In the
future, when you get low unemployment and you have to compete, then governments
are gonna have to do one of the two things, either continue with the defined benefit
programs, or they gonna have to raise their salaries to be more competitive with the
private sector. "
"I think it depends on the job classification. It will help recruitment on a lot of
professional type positions. Younger potential employees like the mobility that a
defined contribution plan offers. And this generation is not looking for a place to
work for 30 years. … I think they are less committed to spending a career in any one
employer whether it’s public or private. I just think it’s a different mindset now."
"A lot of places [like us] have done that [the switch to DC plans] against the private
sector. We’ve never had anyone says that I’m not coming because of your pension."
"The majority of people who take government jobs with the goal of collecting a
pension are those near retiring. Because of that I truly believe that there will be a
significant impact on people deciding whether or not to go into the public sector."
"I think that the defined benefit pension is more attractive to the applicant as far as
the benefit package than defined contribution. … But I know that there are other
people that feel like they need to have more control over their retirement and they
are more comfortable with a defined contribution plan, so that they can manage their
own retirement money within the stock market. But I think overall most people are
looking for a DB plan, and find these employers more attractive."

The Impact of Pension Paradigm Switch to Public Retention

Lacking the vesting requirements, DC plans offer employees greater mobility
between public agencies within public sector or between the public and private sector.
This may result in another HR perspective concern of the DB-to-DC transition: whether
the DC plans are capable to retain the talented public employees. This question is
particularly important with the millennials, whose attachment to a particular workplace
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is best thought in terms of days and months, rather than years and decades (Pew,
2010b). According the survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, millennials are
twice as likely to work part-time as the representatives of the Generation X. In fact,
these new realities have been recognized in the Public Administration research
(Klingner & Lynn, 2005; Thompson & Mastracci, 2005). From a moral-ethical
standpoint, obligating members of this generation to join a traditional DB plan with
five or more years of vesting would put them at risk of losing contributions. From the
broader design perspective, the question becomes whether DB is suitable for the
Generation Y? Table 6.4 lists the perceptions of Florida local officials towards the
impact of pension model transition to public retention.

Except for one Finance director who holds the neutral position and believes the
pension model change would not affect the retention (interviewee #2), all the other
officials agree that the switch to DC plans will increase mobility either within the public
sector or across sectors since there is no differences in terms of the pension type
between sectors: “I don’t think that is a hinder to somebody moving from one sector to
another sector. Because you are going from one DC plan to another DC plan, where
differences are not big really” (interviewee #10).

Nevertheless, they hold opposite opinions about the impact of the mobility
brought by DC plans to public retention. Some DB advocates express concern that DC
will not be enough to retain valuable employees since it does not have the limitation of
a vesting period. A finance director from the sample points out the mobility with DC
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plans could bring both good and bad consequences for governments: “Obviously you
don’t want people sticking around that are dead wood, that aren’t happy in their jobs,
simply because they feel tied down by a pension plan. But at the same time, it does
help retain good long-term productive employees because they have a vested interest
in pension that is growing with the term of their employment. So overall I’ll say a DB
plan is definitely preferred over a DC plan for retention of productive valuable longterm employees” (interviewee #1).

At the same time, our interviewees acknowledge the necessity of a certain
degree of turnover, which could give organizations the opportunity to hire new talents
and avoid stagnancy. This point is especially emphasized by one HR director in the
sample: “I think people should have the ability to leave and not be forced to stay in the
organization because they are married to the particular pension situation. …So the
defined contribution is going to give more flexibility but I don’t see that as a negative
thing. I have a better opportunity to attract talents instead of people staying here and
not leaving. Obviously you don’t want a lot of turnover but you need some turnover,
so you can bring in new people and new ideas. Right now we have very low turnover
and I’m stuck with all the people we have” (interviewee #6).

However, all the officials from cities that have conducted the transition suggest
that the introduction of DC model hasn’t affected the retention of their employees,
although they admit that DC plans can foster mobility. One reason pointed by one
Finance director is the more affordable contribution for employees under the DC

138

regime: “As we switched from DB to DC, we haven’t lost any employees. And the
employees are not complaining. They love it because they are not required to contribute
7 [percent], they are allowed to go up to 7. Some employees are contributing 3[percent]
because that’s what they can afford at this time” (interviewee #5). Another reason could
be that pension is not as crucial as salary when changing jobs; furthermore, the public
DC model is still superior to the private one: "We’ve done that [the switch to DC] and
our turnover has been extremely low. And usually when they are moving, pension is
only one of their concerns. They are looking at salaries. … We are actually more
generous than the private sector, we do 6 percent you [employees] don’t have to match
that"(interviewee #8).

Several interviewees acknowledge the intergenerational differences among the
workforce, especially the officials from cities offering DB plans only. They clearly
realize that younger generations are less committed to public sector jobs and prefer the
portability of DC plans, although they prefer the DB model themselves as a senior
manager with vested pension benefit: “So the DC plan might be attractive when you’re
younger, or mobile, but [when] you get to the end of your career, the DB plan is really
the best plan out there for employees” (interviewee #4). One HR professional in the
sample also describes this contrast between generations: “There is definitely going to
be people that are going to weigh whether or not the public agency that they are with
only offers a DC plan as opposed to another public sector agency that may still offer a
[DB] pension plan. They may definitely be moved to the other public agency to be
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eligible for a pension. … A millennial have said to me, I really think that I don’t want
to get involved with any organization that offers a defined benefit plan. It’s so much as
the commitment that I would have to make to it. And they have even refrained from
joining a DB plan because of it, which I found quite interesting”(interviewee #9).
Another Finance director also realizes the different mindset of the younger generation:
“Some people 20 years ago may have preferred to stay with one place like their fathers
did but maybe it’s not the case anymore” (interviewee #3).

Table 6.4 The Impact of Pension Paradigm Shift to Public Retention
ID

Dept.

1

Finance

2

Finance

3

Finance

4

Finance

5

Finance

6

HR

Q: How might the adoption of 401k style pensions affect retention? Will switch
to 401 (k) foster greater mobility between public agencies within public sector;
and between the public and private sector?
"Defined contribution plan makes employees more mobile. It’s good and bad.
Obviously you don’t want people sticking around that are dead wood, that aren’t
happy in their jobs, simply because they feel tied down by a pension plan. But at the
same time, it does help retain good long-term productive employees because they have
a vested interest in pension that is growing with the term of their employment. … So
overall I’ll say a DB plan is definitely preferred over a DC plan for retention of
productive valuable long-term employees."
" No, I don’t really think it’s going to have a huge effect on mobility. I don’t see that
as positive or negative. I think it’s just a neutral thing. I don’t really think it’s gonna
increase or decrease mobility. "
"Yeah, it definitely can [foster greater mobility], especially if employees can take the
money with them instead of being restricted to staying with one municipality for a
long period of time. …The DC type model allows employees to move around faster at
their own desire. And it’s possible the younger generation would prefer that… Some
people 20 years ago may have preferred to stay with one place like their fathers did
but maybe it’s not the case anymore."
"...[Y]ounger employees may like that idea of portability and being able to switch
[from] job to job, private to government or vice versa. So the DC plan might be
attractive when you’re younger, or mobile, but [when] you get to the end of your
career, the DB plan is really the best plan out there for employees."
"Yes, because they are able to take it with them and we don’t have any minimum
requirements. As we switched from DB to DC, we haven’t lost any employees. And the
employees are not complaining. They love it because they are not required to
contribute 7 [percent], they are allowed to go up to 7. Some employees are
contributing 3[percent] because that’s what they can afford at this time."
“I think people should have the ability to leave and not be forced to stay in the
organization because they are married to the particular pension situation. …So the
defined contribution is gonna give more flexibility but I don’t see that as a negative
thing. I have a better opportunity to attract talents instead of people staying here and
not leaving. ...[O]bviously you don’t want a lot of turnover but you need some
turnover so you can bring in new people and new ideas. Right now we have very low
turnover and I’m stuck with all the people we have."
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7

HR

8

HR

9

HR

10

HR

"It would absolutely increase mobility between the public and private sector where
equivalent jobs exist. I think in some cases there are some areas where it would impact
retention and those are typically the areas where the skillsets are limited out there to
begin with, and it is highly competitive bringing people in ... Yes, I think retention will
be tougher… [but] sometimes the organization needs turnover to ensure that it’s not
stagnating."
"We’ve done that [the switch to DC] and our turnover has been extremely low. And
usually when they are moving, pension is only one of their concerns. They are looking
at salaries. … We are actually more generous than the private sector, we do 6 percent
you [employees] don’t have to match that."
"I really believe that would affect retention. There is definitely going to be people that
are going to weigh whether or not the public agency that they are with only offers a
DC plan as opposed to another public sector agency that may still offer a [DB]
pension plan. They may definitely be moved to the other public agency to be eligible
for a pension. … A millennial have said to me, I really think that I don’t want to get
involved with any organization that offers a defined benefit plan. It’s so much as the
commitment that I would have to make to it. And they have even refrained from joining
a DB plan because of it, which I found quite interesting."
" Yeah I think it’s true. I’m on a DC plan. Because all the private sector employees
have is defined contribution. I don’t think that is a hinder to somebody moving from
one sector to another sector. Because you are going from one DC plan to another DC
plan, where differences are not big really. You go there you don’t lose anything. "

The Impact of the Two-tier Benefit Structure

While public sector pension reforms are not likely to be dramatic in their scope
or visibility, there is no doubt that pension reforms undertaken in many state and local
governments have created a two-tier structure of pension benefits. Having two tiers of
employee benefits for the workforce under one roof may reduce the morale of newhired employees who enjoy lower benefits. However, evidences from Florida local
governments, which have experienced significant pension system reforms, reveal that
senior finance and human resource professionals may not view this as a serious issue.
Furthermore, they believe the problem with a two-tier structure can be solved with full
disclosure at the time of recruitment. As long as the applicants are aware of what plan
they will get (DC not DB), they are responsible for their own decisions to work in the
organization or not, so there should be no animosity issue brought up.
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The view of one finance director is representative: “It was definitely a concern
when we went to the two tiers, but our thought was that when new employees apply for
work here, they learn at that point what their benefit plan is. It’s their choice whether
to come to work here. So they come into with their eyes wide open. There is a potential
morale issue… but I think it’s just more of a jealousy issue that’s relatively minor”
(interviewee #1). Similarly, another finance official describes it as a jealously issue: “I
don’t think that there is a great deal of animosity with the two-tier system, as long as
you know what you’re getting when you start out. People are always going to be jealous
about what other people have; you’re not going to eliminate that...”(interviewee #2).
HR officers generally share the same position, though their views are a bit more
nuanced than those of finance directors: “I do think the difference in the model, the
defined contribution versus the defined benefit, probably would have some ill effects
on the workforce, but that being said, you know the rules, you know what your plan is
when you are hired” (interviewee #7).

Interviewees also ponder the effects of the two-tier situation in the short versus
long term. The cities that just installed the two-tier system may not be able to observe
the effect: “[O]ur police department has gone ahead and adopted the switch [to DC].
There does not seem to be animosity between those that are collecting a higher level of
pension benefit and those collecting a lesser benefit. Now keep in mind that the addition
of the new tier is recent, so we have not been able to determine any long-term effect”
(interviewee #9). One finance director assumes “over time that [two-tier system] may
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cause problems”(interviewee #3). However, several officials argue that although at the
beginning the two-tier structure may cause frictions between different generations of
employees, eventually it would fade away when there is only one-tier left in the
workplace: “In the short term, there might be some resentment, but in the long term,
once the first tier leaves the organization and we are back to one tier, then that won’t
be a problem”(interviewee #6). The common ideology is the acknowledgement that the
good old days have gone and this is the harsh fact and tough luck. One HR specialist
describes the situation: “Even though people will talk about the good old days when
they used to get much better pension benefits, I believe that will die out over time with
the retirement of the senior employees”(interviewee #9).

The officials from cities that have established the two-tier benefit structure for
a long time have not observed any animosity among different groups of employees.
One reason could the full disclosure of the benefit change: “It has already been a year
or a year and half that we implemented this [the switch to a DC plan], but I don’t hear
any rumblings and discussions out on the street or between employees. I think they all
learned the fact that some are already in [DB], some are not and it won’t be offered
again. And we’ve got a good number of new employees” (interviewee #8). Another
point raised by HR professionals is that as long as the second tier of benefit is applied
only to new-hired and it will keep stable, there should be no problem: “We don’t have
any issues with the two-tier system. There’s no animosity. People just want the defined
benefit because it’s more stable for them not because somebody else has it. People who
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are already in FRS, we have to keep them in there. As they go away, they will not be
replaced. It will make a lot of difference if some people could go into it [FRS] and
some cannot. But that’s not the case” (interviewee #8).
Table 6.5 The Impact of the Two-tier Benefit Structure

ID

Dept.

1

Finance

2

Finance

3

Finance

4

Finance

5

Finance

6

HR

7

HR

8

HR

9

HR

10

HR

Q: How will public organizations deal with "two-tier" workforce issues? Do two
tiers of benefits "under the same roof" cause animosity among different generation
of employees and reduce morale? Or this issue will "die out" over time along with
the retirement of senior employees?
"It was definitely a concern when we went to the two tiers, but our thought was that
when new employees apply for work here, they learn at that point what their benefit plan
is. It’s their choice whether to come to work here. So they come into with their eyes wide
open. There is a potential morale issue… but I think it’s just more of a jealousy issue
that’s relatively minor.
"I don’t think that there is a great deal of animosity with the two-tier system, as long as
you know what you’re getting when you start out. People are always gonna be jealous
about what other people have, you’re not gonna eliminate that..."
"...[O]ver time that [two-tier system] may cause problems. But still I don’t believe just
applying something to new hires is really much of cost-savings, especially if you are not
hiring a lot of people currently."
"Not sure. My first thought is yeah it could cause some type of morale issues… but I
think eventually overtime it would fade away. I think it could cause a little bit friction
between different classes and groups of employees."
"It has already been a year or a year and half that we implemented this [the switch to a
DC plan], but I don’t hear any rumblings and discussions out on the street or between
employees. I think they all learned the fact that some are already in [DB], some are not
and it won’t be offered again. And we’ve got a good number of new employees."
“In the short term there maybe some resentment [because of the two-tier situation], but
in the long term, once the first tier leaves the organization, and we are back to one tier,
then that won’t be a problem."
"I do think the difference in the model, the defined contribution versus the defined
benefit, probably would have some ill effects on the workforce, but that being said, you
know the rules, you know what’s your plan when you are hired."
"We don’t have any issues with the two-tier system. There’s no animosity. People just
want the defined benefit because it’s more stable for them not because somebody else
has it. People who are already in FRS, we have to keep them in there. As they go away,
they will not be replaced. It will make a lot of difference if some people could go into it
[FRS] and some cannot. But that’s not the case."
"...[O]ur police department has gone ahead and adopted the switch. There does not
seem to be animosity between those that are collecting a higher level of pension benefit
and those collecting a lesser benefit. Now keep in mind that the addition of the new tier
is recent, so we have not been able to determine any long-term effect. Even though
people will talk about the good old days when they used to get much better pension
benefits, I believe that will die out over time with the retirement of the senior employees."
"...[W]e switched over in 1996, so actually the majority of our employees are on the DC
plan anyway. It’s just us, the old-timers, who are still on the DB plan. There’s not any
kind of animosity. Nobody even thinks about it."
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6.2.3 The Pros and Cons of the Public Pension Model Shift

The striking contrast between the frequency of the initiative to conduct the DBto-DC transition and the few cases of implementation in state and local governments
demonstrates that the public pension paradigm switch entails both advantages that
attract governments to consider the action and negatives that prevent them from making
the actual move. This section will analyze the answers to the two interview questions
regarding the drivers and impediments of the public pension model shift and one
question dealing with the concern of financial literacy training with the advent of the
transition.

The Drivers to Conduct the Public Pension Model Shift

The investment losses in public pension funds due to the stock market plunge
in 2008 imposed heavy contribution burden to state and local governments, which
directly triggered the initiative to reduce the pension costs by switching to the more
cost-efficient DC model. Other than the financial incentive, survey results also indicate
there are political motivation and social pressure to promote the public pension model
shift. The investigation of the major drivers to conduct the DB-to-DC transition through
survey is limited to the five scales. Therefore, the interview question is adopted to
gather more profound illustrations of the imperatives to do so.

As expected, the primary motive for switching the public pension model
perceived by almost all interviewees focuses on the financial perspective. Both Finance
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and HR directors acknowledge that the snowballing benefit obligations with DB model
is the prevailing reason to call for the transition to DC model, which has the feature of
foreseeable and manageable costs and transfers the investment risk from employers to
employees: “I think it’s more of the fact that the city can budget properly and confident,
because they know the annual contribution rating is gonna be set by the organization.
There’s no outside element such as rate of investment return. ... So the burden of
investment is no longer held by the organization, it’s now the responsibility of the
actual pension person, beneficiary” (interviewee #5). One HR specialist puts this point
in a more forthright manner: “Most definitely, it’s cost. That’s the bottom line between
a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan” (interviewee #9). A group of
interviewees point out that the skyrocketing benefit costs are rooted in the rich benefits
granted previously, especially for the police and fire (interviewee # 3 & 8), the stock
market recession just exposed the severity of the issue: “The 2008 disaster was just the
final straw, but it is an accumulation of a number of events that have been occurred”
(interviewee #1). The unpopularity of raising taxes to fund the benefits during
economic depressions facilitates the inclination to DC model because “when times
were worse, taxpayers weren't receptive to increasing property tax to pay for these extra
benefits granted in good times” (interviewee #3).

However, some interviewees call attention to the political impetus for the
pension model shift. This point is particularly held by interviewees who contend the
public DB model is still sustainable: “I think the legislature desires to control what they
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think are unsustainable DB plans, which is not the case because the state plan is one of
the best funded in the country” (interviewee # 4). One HR director point out the
exceptional pension abuse, primarily in the police and fire pension plans “will just
create obviously a perception that pension plans are very rich plans for everybody and
it’s gonna create a huge future liabilities, which in some cases is true. However, if you
would look at the general employees, that’s not the case. However everybody looks at
the exceptions only. So you get this big backlash that needs reaction to reducing
benefits of public employees”(interviewee #6). Another argument emerged in the
sample is that some interviewees believe that elected officials try to impress the
constituencies by this move and they are doubtful about whether the transition could
ensure the financial solvency: “I think it’s very political motivated. They think they can
gain some recognition if they changed the pension plan under the guide of saving
money, which is debatable whether they are really gonna save money or
not”(interviewee #2). The similar point is stated by one HR staff: “And that’s
something that is easy to attack for not just the legislators, also for the people that elect
them: You have something that I don’t have. So I think it’s more politics than whether
one model is more efficient than the other"(Interviewee #7).

It’s noteworthy that quite a few interviewees mention the impact of the pension
coverage change in the private sector, which may generate spillover effects to the
public agencies (interviewee #2, #4, #7, & #10). Besides the cost-saving feature of DC
plans, interviewees claim that it’s advocated because the DC model is more common
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in the private sector, and the transition is “reflective of what’s available in private
industry” (interviewee # 7). The taxpayer sentiment of the generous benefit in the
public sector fuels this argument, as stated by an HR director: “The other part of it,
with the State of Florida, looking to close the defined benefit plan, is because it’s not
in line with the private sector employees. Private sector employers are getting rid of
the DB plans and most of them are DC plan. ... And taxpayers don't like that
government employees get more that private sector employees get"(interviewee #10).
In addition, the similar experience of accounting rule changes undergone in both private
and public sector may also trigger the transition to DC plans, as suggested by a Finance
director: “When the private sector has started recording liability they overwhelmingly
moved to DC. I think that's the trend now because the governmental accounting
standard

board

is

requiring

government

to

put

the

liabilities

on

the

book"(interviewee#2).
Table 6.6 The Drivers of Public Pension Paradigm Switch

ID

Dept.

1

Finance

2

Finance

Q: As you know, The original intention of the 2011 pension reform was to replace
the current DB plan with DC plan for new hired employees, but it did not go that
far in the end. What do you think are the drivers behind this initiative of pension
model switch?
"I think the primary part of the issue is that the defined benefit plans grew too rich in
benefits, end up expensive and unsustainable. Also the volatility of the required
contribution has always been a concern ... because all of the market risks are on the
shoulders of the employer. ... The 2008 disaster was just the final straw, but it is an
accumulation of a number of events that have been occurred."
"I think it’s very political motivated. They think they can gain some recognition if they
changed the pension plan under the guide of saving money, which is debatable whether
they are really gonna save money or not. … When the private sector has started
recording liability they overwhelmingly moved to DC. I think that's the trend now
because the governmental accounting standard board is requiring government to put
the liabilities on the book."
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3

Finance

4

Finance

5

Finance

6

HR

7

HR

8

HR

9

HR

10

HR

"The cost to sustain those benefits. FRS is not as generous as some local plans, but for
police and fire it is. ... [T]ax values declined so dramatically there is no residual to fund
these benefits. And the actuarially determined pension cost was skyrocketing ... that’s
definitely why cities and State had to do something different than what they currently
have. ... [W]hen times were worse, taxpayers weren't receptive to increasing property
tax to pay for these extra benefits granted in good times."
"I think that we have a very conservative control-of-budget legislature in Tallahassee.
They truly believe that the defined contribution is the way to go, because first, it is more
common in the private sector and second, because of the much lower costs [of DC
plans]...basically it's shifting the risk from the employer to the employee. ... I think the
legislature desires to control what they think are unsustainable DB plans, which is not
the case because the state plan is one of the best funded in the country."
"I think it’s more of the fact that the city can budget properly and confident, because
they know the annual contribution rating is gonna be set by the organization. There’s
no outside element such as rate of investment return. That’s the key to my understanding.
... So the burden of investment is no longer held by the organization, it’s now the
responsibility of the actual pension person, beneficiary."
"I think it’s political motivated. Unfortunately, in the State of Florida, elsewhere in the
country as well, there are some examples of abuse by pensioners and huge payouts,
primarily in the police and fire pension plans. Over time the approval of elected officials
to increase benefits will just create obviously a perception that pension plans are very
rich plans for everybody and it’s gonna create a huge future liabilities, which in some
cases is true. However, if you would look at the general employees, that’s not the case.
However everybody looks at the exceptions only. So you get this big backlash that needs
reaction to reducing benefits of public employees."
"The absolute certainty of cost of DC is one of its benefits [of pension model switch]. ...
I think it’s reflective of what’s available in private industry. And that’s something that
is easy to attack for not just the legislators, also for the people that elect them: You have
something that I don’t have. So I think it’s more politics than whether one model is more
efficient than the other."
"I think it’s just the financial sustainability when they look out to the future. Based on
market, you are not gonna be able to keep going and that’s why there needs to be some
changes, especially for police and fire. ... Isn’t that really what is everything about—
cost?
"Most definitely, it’s cost. That’s the bottom line between a defined benefit plan and a
defined contribution plan."
"I think there’s a couple of different reasons. One reason, of course is the cost. The state
employer is subjected to the cost for the pension and the up and down of stock market.
And they're always having difficulties meeting their budget and the cost of pension
figures into it. ... The other part of it, with the State of Florida, looking to close the
defined benefit plan, is because it’s not in line with the private sector employees. Private
sector employers are getting rid of the DB plans and most of them are DC plan. ... And
taxpayers don't like that government employees get more that private sector employees
get."

The Impediments to Conduct the Pension Model Shift

One major purpose of this study is to find the readiness of Florida municipalities
to conduct the public pension model transition. In the survey section of general
questions related to pension model, this study tries to investigate whether respondents
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perceive that the unfunded pension liabilities under the current DB model is a big
obstacle to implement the pension paradigm switch. Although the new employees with
DC plans will not add future cost burdens, the government still need continue the
funding the accrued benefit obligations of those staying in the DB system due to legal
restrictions, with fewer dollars available since new employees will not make
contributions to the old plan anymore.

However, the survey results suggest

underestimation of the deterrence of the transition costs. The possible explanation is
that respondents may be more concerned with other obstacles such as political pressure,
or probably they believe the painful therapy is worth taking for the ultimate
sustainability. Therefore in the interview, the question about transition costs is included
to probe into the rationale behind this recognition.

The interview results support both of the hypotheses. Although all of the
interviewees acknowledge that the transition cost could be an issue, they regard its
deterrence to pension model transition in various degrees. Interestingly, the three
interviewees who straightforwardly regard the transition costs as the biggest obstacle
to the DB-to-DC transition are all HR specialists (interviewee #7, #9, & #10), which
suggests HR people are fully aware of the financial perspective like their finance
counterparts: “I think that if you focused on the contribution rate, it could be a barrier
to the transition, because you get the smaller payroll which to contribute the percentage
of payroll adds-up. ... Yes, the perception that it's gonna be more expensive could be
the biggest obstacle to switch to DC” (interviewee #7).
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On the other hand, the finance directors, although they are fully aware of the
detrimental transition costs, show greater anxieties concerning the political
perspectives of the pension model shift (interviewee #1, #3, & #4), especially for the
union negotiation of the special risks: “[T]here’s always the political consideration too
because the public safety unions still have a great deal of power, and they would’ve
been putting a lot of pressure on our elected officials to not go down that road [of
switching to DC]” (interviewee #1). One finance director even considers the union
issues as the biggest impediments to the transition: “The biggest obstacle that comes to
mind would be union issues, collective bargaining, just resistant from those groups,
especially PBA and IAFF” (interviewee #4). Even for the general employees, the
retirement insecurity caused by the deprivation of guaranteed benefits is a big issue,
according to one interviewee: “[T]he biggest detriment to the transition is the
uncertainty employees are facing because they know what they came in with and now
they don’t know what they’re gonna leave with” (Interviewee #2).

It’s worth noting that political concerns are raised from the municipalities that
keep the dominant DB model for their general employees. For the municipalities that
have closed their DB plans, the interviewees hold more objective opinions about the
impact of transition costs (interviewee #5, #6, &#8). They are well informed of the
short-term cost increase after the transition, but they emphasize more on the long-term
cost reductions of the DC model: “Even though it will increase costs in the short term,
but in the long run it still reduce costs, because with the DC plans you decide how much
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you are gonna to give the employees instead that the plan telling you how much you
are gonna pay to sustain it”(interviewee #6). Municipalities have to deliberate on the
tradeoff in the transition as mentioned by HR: “There’s going to be a financial burden
but you have to look and see the end result: do you suffer for ten years and you are
good for a hundred, or do you suffer for fifty and only good for fifty (interviewee #8)?”
Since the transition is conducted just recently, the uncertainty about the ultimate result
of the transition in future is also reflected frankly by one Finance director: “We think
it’s only gonna get worse so we were trying to cut the bleeding now, kicking the pain
off the roof for another several years. And then at that moment, making the
determinations that would be self-sustainable or we’re gonna choke out and self-end
the employees and make higher contribution to the plan” (interviewee #5).

Unfortunately, when the municipalities are already mired in tough fiscal
challenges, the skyrocketing costs with the pension model shift make it difficult for the
elected officials to make the move: “Once management and elected officials see that
really moving to a DC plan provide long-term costs reduction, but in the short-term it’s
gonna increase your cost significantly, many have been chased away and said no, we
can’t go down that road”(interviewee #1). Due to the short horizon of their operation,
elected officials might be indifferent to the long-term effect of transition: “And it’s
tough to get elected officials to focus on what happens over 10, 20 or 30 years once
you get out. ... And that’s a tough thing to communicate” (interviewee #7). Hence
municipalities may flinch from the exorbitant transition costs and instead take
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alternative strategies to reduce their fiscal pressure such as benefit reductions, indicated
by one Finance director: “So that’s why we went with the hybrid system and kept the
DB plan opened but just reduced the benefits, because that resulted in significant
savings to us. So to close a plan entirely and just start a DC was cost-prohibitive”
(interviewee #3).

Table 6.7 The Impediments to Public Pension Paradigm Switch
ID

Dept.

1

Finance

2

Finance

3

Finance

4

Finance

Q: Do you think the need to continue the funding of those "in the system" is the
biggest deterrent to a DC transition?
"Yes, that has been very significant in discouraging governments from making that
transition currently, because the pressure has been that we got to find something to
relieve the burden on balancing the budget. Once management and elected officials
see that really moving to a DC plan provide long-term costs reduction, but in the
short-term it’s gonna increase your cost significantly, many have been chased away
and said no, we can’t go down that road, what can we do to decrease benefits instead
... [T]here’s always the political consideration too because the public safety unions
still have a great deal of power, and they would’ve been putting a lot of pressure on
our elected officials to not go down that road.”
"That is a huge obstacle but I don’t think that is the primary obstacle. … [T]he biggest
detriment to the transition is the uncertainty the employees are facing because they
know what they came in with and now they don’t know what they’re gonna leave with.
… The cost should be the secondary factor because eventually the DB plan will be
funded and you cost will go down with the defined contribution."
"Yeah. When we run numbers on that to just close our old plan and pop up to a brand
new plan, we found those numbers were huge. Because you have to reduce the
amortization, you have to fund a lot more all at once. So that’s why we went with the
hybrid system and kept the DB plan opened but just reduced the benefits, because that
resulted in significant savings to us. So to close a plan entirely and just start a DC
was cost-prohibitive. … [U]nion negotiation is also a big issue. You have to changing
benefits."
"Oh yes it definitely can be an obstacle, even though for healthy fund like FRS. But if
they close the plans off, you not only lose the dollars that employees would be
contributing but also the ending unfunded liability then has to be amortized over a
shorter period of time, which in the near term future increases the annual contribution
by the employer pretty significantly. … The biggest obstacle that comes to mind would
be union issues, collective bargaining, just resistant from those groups, especially
PBA1 and IAFF2.
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5

Finance

6

HR

7

HR

8

HR

9

HR

10

HR

"Absolutely. And we know there’s gonna be, I think the next 10 years, our contribution
is going up. ...But at the end of the day, it’s a move for the future. We think it’s only
gonna get worse so we were trying to cut the bleeding now, kicking the pain off the
roof for another several years. And then at that moment, making the determinations
that would be self-sustainable or we’re gonna choke out and self-end the employees
and make higher contribution to the plan. I mean it was a way it’s gonna suck, no
matter which way you went. So you choose your poison."
"Yes and no. ...Even though it will increase costs in the short term, but in the long run
it still reduce costs, because with the DC plans you decide how much you are gonna
to give the employees instead that the plan telling you how much you are gonna pay
to sustain it."
"I think that if you focused on the contribution rate, it could be a barrier to the
transition. Because you get the smaller payroll which to contribute the percentage of
payroll adds-up. And it’s tough to get elected officials to focus on what happens over
10, 20 or 30 years once you get out. ... And that’s a tough thing to communicate. ...Yes,
the perception that it's gonna be more expensive could be the biggest obstacle to
switch to DC."
"That is one issue we look out even with our police and fire. I have heard that it can
cause a problem because you don’t have anyone coming in now to sustain that.
There’s going to be a financial burden but you have to look and see the end result: do
you suffer for ten years and you are good for a hundred, or do you suffer for fifty and
only good for fifty?"
"I would say a resounding yes, definitely, most definitely. Funding is going to be the
biggest challenge for public agencies with regard to the DB system or the dying out
of DB system if you will. The challenge of the future cost burden is going to have to
be met with innovative ways to fund it."
Yeah I think that is a problem. ...[Y]ou don’t have new employees coming into the
plan. You have to pay benefits to those retiring people. Especially if it’s in public
safety, DB plans in police and fire, they have a higher number of disability
retirements. That’s gonna cost more. That’s gonna be the biggest issue with transition.
You don’t have new money coming into the plan and you have no control over what
the costs are gonna be in the future.

1. PBA: Police Benevolent Association.
2. IAFF: International Association of Fire Fighters.

The Necessity of Financial Literacy Training in the Transition

Financial illiteracy is a widespread American epidemic. Most Americans
cannot balance their checkbooks, calculate their net worth, obtain competitive bids for
insurance or loans, or allocate assets across investment classes. In the context of
retirement planning, traditional government DB plans imply a paternalistic outlook.
Adequacy aside, an employee under the traditional DB model is relieved of investment
decision-making and guaranteed a given return. As some scholars note, for an
investment-illiterate clientele, this “paternalism” may be something of a godsend in
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light of the damage done to 401(k) accounts during the recent fiscal crisis. While such
paternalism may be viewed as necessary, the fact remains that in the event of a pension
paradigm shift, the sovereign can no longer remain indifferent to addressing the
widespread financial illiteracy.

All the interviewees recognize this sad reality of financial illiteracy and believe
this will pose a risk to the employees under the DC regime. A finance director in the
sample describes this situation: “We have a lot of folks who don’t have any idea of how
to invest money prudently, and diversify their portfolios. So it would be very dangerous
for them… And it would be difficult getting people committed enough to learn what
they need to learn to manage their own investments. It’s not an ideal situation for much
of our labor force” (interviewee #1). They all strongly agree on the necessity for
employer to offer financial training to employees after the pension model transition to
avoid potential negative impacts to employees’ retirement security, although some
directors doubt the willingness of politicians to give the financial education: "I don’t
think that’s something [financial training] that the politicians are considering. ... [Y]ou
have been holding these employees’ hands for their entire life, and now you switch
them over to defined contribution, you’re gonna have to provide some kind of
assistance with education training. You have the fiduciary duty to oversee. Otherwise
we'll have another Great Depression with a hundred millions eighty-year-old homeless
people" (interviewee #2). Similar concern is raised by one HR specialist: “There are
people that are not financially literate enough to invest their own money. Employers
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should do more financial training, but whether they will, I kind of doubt it. If the
downside now is having an aging workforce, wait till nobody can afford their
retire"(interviewee #7).

Therefore, interviewees suggest that the implementation of the transition should
not be the end of the efforts for public agencies to solve their financial problems.
Employers should be alert to the financial illiteracy of employees in the DC model and
be prepared to take necessary actions for a long period after the pension model switch:
“If employees are gonna be responsible for their own financial security in future, they
need to be well-educated, and on the on-going basis… It’s not fair to employees just to
implement a plan and say now you are responsible, and let them up to their own
device... I think the employer does have the responsibility for training and on-going
education for the employees”(interviewee #4). One finance director expects the
employer to take the responsibility of investment even under the DC model: “[T]here
are some hybrid plans out there where they’re technically defined contribution plans
but the employer manages the investments rather than each employee being responsible
for managing the investments. That actually appeals to me”(interviewee #1).

Several interviewees from cities that have adopted the DC model point out that
in the pubic DC plans, there are some protective investment products that offer default
investment choices similar to the qualified default investment alternatives (QDIA) in
the private sector through working with ICMA (International City/County
Management Association), which assists the financially illiterate employees to better
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manager their retirement funds: “We partnered with ICMA and they are on call at any
time for any employee. It’s one of the benefits provided to our employees. We made
that a priority because we knew that moving to a DC plan requires a little bit more on
the employee’s part and they are managing their own future. ICMA has different plans
that do not require much thinking, you choose what products you want, and they invest
in the way you want” (interviewee #5).

Table 6.8 The Necessity of Financial Literacy Training
ID

Dept.

1

Finance

2

Finance

3

Finance

4

Finance

5

Finance

6

HR

7

HR

Q: Will the adoption of DC plans require increasing financial literacy training?
"There is no question about it [the need for financial literacy training]. ... [T]here are
some hybrid plans out there where they’re technically defined contribution plans but
the employer manages the investments rather than each employee being responsible for
managing the investments. That actually appeals to me. ...[W]e have a lot of folks who
don’t have any idea of how to invest money prudently, and diversify the portfolios. So
It would be very dangerous for them… And it would be difficult getting people
committed enough to learn what they need to learn to manage their own investments.
It’s not an ideal situation for much of our labor force."
"I don’t think that’s something [financial training] that the politicians are considering.
... [Y]ou have been holding these employees’ hands for their entire life, and now you
switch them over to defined contribution, you’re gonna have to provide some kind of
assistance with education training. You have the fiduciary duty to oversee. Otherwise
we'll have another Great Depression with a hundred millions eighty-year-old homeless
people. "
"Definitely. We are concerned that the employees, even the sophisticated employees,
may have trouble picking the right investments, so we’re trying to work with ICMA
[International City/County Management Association] to improve their program
outreaches to the employees.
"If employees are gonna be responsible for their own financial security in future, they
need to be well-educated, and on the on-going basis… It’s not fair to employees just to
implement a plan and say now you are responsible, and let them up to their own
device... I think the employer does have the responsibility for training and on-going
education for the employees."
"We partnered with ICMA and they are on call at any time for any employee. It’s one
of the benefits provided to our employees. We made that a priority because we knew
that moving to a DC plan requires a little bit more on the employee’s part and they are
managing their own future. ICMA has different plans that do not require much thinking,
you choose what products you want, and they invest in the way you want.”
"Yes, because when employees are faced with choices of mutual funds investments,
some people are not going to always make the best choice. There is a risk for the
employee. "
"There are people that are not financially literate enough to invest their own money.
Employers should do more financial training, but whether they will, I kind of doubt it.
If the downside now is having an aging workforce, wait till nobody can afford their
retire."
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8

HR

9

HR

10

HR

"The city has ICMA-RC for our 401a [plan], and they’re coming once a month to do
individual education. Once a year we have them talked to everybody during open
enrollment…”
"Just going ahead and making a transition may not be the end of financial problems for
public sector employer."
"... [W]e definitely have done that [financial training] to get employees to think about
it. It’s called the three-legs stool: One is your pension or your defined contribution
money, the other leg is social security, and the third leg is your own savings."

6.2.4 The Shared Mindset of Finance and HR Directors

Public pension issues straddle traditional boundaries between finance and
human resources, thus this study involves both groups of professionals. Prior survey
findings did not find significant differences between the perceptions of Finance and
HR directors about the pension reform issues. This contradicts the expectation that
Finance and HR people would view the pension reform through different prisms based
on their profession domains: Finance directors would be more sensitive to the
budgetary soundness of the pension plans whereas HR staff are more concerned with
the competence of the alternative model to recruit and retain qualified employees. The
uncovered congruent worldview of the two sets of professionals claims for
explanations. One interpretation would be that both groups are essentially long-term
employees working in a DB environment and that they are comfortable with the status
quo. Another assumption might be that they are unsure of what a DC transition might
bring and their unified worldview reflect this uncertainty. In order to find the valid
justification, the interview includes the question requesting explanations about the
virtually identical views between Finance and HR directors, the important quotes are
provided in Table 6.9.
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The first explanation gets supported from only two HR directors. One suggests
that most of respondents probably participated the DB model, there might be “a bias
toward the status quo if it’s good for you. That’s just a human nature” (Interviewee #7).
Similarly, another HR staff indicates that since the respondents are long-term
employees, they might prefer the fact of DB: “Most of them are eligible for a pension
and they would like that to continue” (Interviewee #9).

Since half of the interviewees are from municipalities where the DC model has
been adopted, the second interpretation does not hold substantial weight. On the
contrary, most interviewees suggest they are on the same page of their counterparts
because they shared the same knowledge about the issues and have the same goal to
guide their thoughts and actions. One of the reasons is that in the public agencies, when
dealing with pension issues, Finance and HR staff work closely and have good
communication with each other, bluntly expressed by three interviewees (interviewee
#1, #4, and #6). Therefore, the two groups share the same knowledge and concerns of
the current pubic pension system. Both of them have to admit that the DB model would
not be sustainable unless some joint efforts are taken to save the financially stressed
public agencies. The grossly inflated benefit level, especially for police and fire
pensions, will obviously raise a red flag for Finance directors, such that in union
negotiations HR people “probably became frustrated and realized that that wouldn’t be
sustainable” (interviewee #3).
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It’s interesting to see that the shared concern of both groups is from the financial
perspective—the pension costs. This point is particularly emphasized by some HR
specialists: “Personally I think it's because HR has been so much brought into the
financial level. … [Y]ou would be irresponsible as an HR person to not to take benefit
costs into consideration” (Interviewee #8). Especially under the fiscal stress, HR people
perceive the similar budgetary pressure as Finance staff. Thus, other than the personnel
issues of pension in the HR administration, “the bottom line is the cost” (interviewee
#10).

Consequently, the interview results imply that although the two sets of
specialists have different responsibilities, they “agree on the results for two different
reasons” (interviewee #2). No matter which stance is taken, Finance and HR
professionals will not deviate much from the same goal of maintaining the operational
efficiency of the public agencies. Moreover, the two groups have to share the same
view because they work for the same “boss”—the city manager, as stated by one
Finance director: “The truth of the matter is, me and HR is getting on the same boat.
Now we are going to go on the same direction to accomplish what the manager wants
us to accomplish” (Interviewee #5).
Table 6.9 The Congruence of Finance and HR Perceptions

ID

Dept.

Q: Our survey results showed that HR and Finance Directors have virtually
identical views of transition issues. We expected otherwise. How would you
explain our findings?
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1

Finance

2

Finance

3

Finance

4

Finance

5

Finance

6

HR

7

HR

8

HR

9

HR

10

HR

"Probably as much as any thing it’s good communication. Within governments HR and
finance work very closely. So we’re sharing ideas, concerns and concepts. … I think
it’s just a natural outcome of being educated on the issues and once we’re fully
educated, we end up pretty much the same place because it’s pretty obvious what the
issues are, where we’re in and where we need to go."
"… [M]ost of the finance directors are probably looking at the transitioning costs. But
if you look in long-term then the costs will go down. ... [F]or HR I think they’re looking
at from the personnel viewpoint. This uncertainty, you know what you come in to when
you start but now they’re gonna switch everything and you don’t know what you’re
gonna have when you leave. But we agree on the results for two different reasons. That
would be my opinion."
"I think we both feel the benefits were not sustainable. Obviously for budget
perspectives the finance directors are keenly aware of it. So like forward, HR also deal
with the collective bargaining side more and they saw the police and fire model was
becoming just grossly inflated. ... [W]ith union negotiations they probably became
frustrated and realized that that wouldn’t be sustainable.”
"I guess from my point of view, I work closely with our HR director and anything deals
with the pension we are both involved in, so we would kind of have the same knowledge
about it and the same concerns would be brought up in meetings that we are in."
Because we have the same goal, her [HR director's] responsibility is also for the
employees but at the same time has to protect the city from liabilities. … [I]f the HR
doesn’t share the same view as the Finance director, the ball won’t be moving. And
that’s not really an option, especially with the city manager, which is our boss. The
truth of the matter is, me and HR is getting on the same boat. Now we are going to go
on the same direction to accomplish what the manager wants us to accomplish."
"We have good communication and we are all on the same page when it came to that
transition. There wasn’t any difference of opinion between the two."
"I think part of it with both of HR and Finance folks, at least in public employer, they
probably participate the same [DB] model right now. I do think there is a bias toward
the status quo if it’s good for you. That’s just a human nature. ... Then when you take
a look at the efficiency of the models, depends on which model your organization goes
on, I don’t think the finance and HR have different goals from a recruitment/retention
perspective."
"Personally I think it's because HR has been so much brought into the financial level.
… I think because of professional itself has not had a seat at the table, you would be
irresponsible as an HR person to not to take benefit costs into consideration. I’m not
surprised that you found them to be similar because, listen, we still all want to be
around."
"I really believe that as public agencies go, both finance and HR people love the fact
[of DB] because they are long-term employees. Most of them are eligible for a pension
and they would like that to continue. They don’t like the pension model switch. Even
though there are cost savings available, but I think more and more they are starting to
understand the fact that DB model is not sustainable. And so in order to keep their
public agencies from sinking financially they have to work together to make the
transition."
"I think the shared concern is financial. ... [E]specially in this state of age, we try to
think about other things like the perceptions and tier of employee, but the bottom line
is the cost. That’s shared with finance and human resources. That’s the main concern."
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6.3 Summary

As one part of the triangulated efforts, interviews with Florida local officials
provide additional evidence about their perceptions to public pension reform and indepth illustrations of the rationale behind their inclinations. This chapter sorts through
the important interview quotes by theme and reports summaries. It discusses the
financial perspective of the public pension reform, the human resources impact of the
public pension reform, the pros and cons of the public pension model switch, and the
congruence of the Finance and HR perceptions. With the quote analyses, the viewpoints
deduced from the survey results gain further validations and interpretations.

First, the interviewees are queried about whether the current public DB plans
are sustainable and what they think is the long-term solution to the current public
pension “crisis”. As expected, almost all the interviewees define the sustainability of
public pension systems solely from the financial perspective—the affordability of
pension costs becomes the top priority when they determine whether a pension plan is
feasible. The perceptions from the sample split into two opposite streams. The DB
advocators believe the current DB plans are sustainable, or will be sustainable, if only
they are managed in a more prudent way, so the incremental changes by enhancing the
administration of the DB model is the ideal solution for them. On the contrary, the
officials from cities offering DC plans assert the DB model is not sustainable because
of its design features and contend that the DB-to-DC transition is the right way to go
for the public pension system to survive.
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Second, this study solicits answers from interviewees for three questions from
the human resources perspectives: How pension reforms would affect the public
recruitment and retention, and how a two-tier benefit structure would impact the
workforce morale. The analyses suggest most interviewees do not recognize that
pension type could serve as an employment cue for different generations. The
traditional DB promoters still believe the DB model is more attractive to applicants
than DC. But almost all of them agree that the pension model transition will not bring
significant impacts to the public recruitment especially for general employees, since
they can be hired from the private sector and the officials believe the government salary
with DC pension is competent enough.

As for the retention, all interviewees believe that the DC model without vesting
requirements would increase employee mobility within the public sector and between
the public and private sector. The DB supporters argue that the DC plan is not as
sufficient as DB plans to retain qualified employees, although they acknowledge a
certain degree of turnover is necessary for public agencies to avoid stagnancy, the socalled “Golden Handcuffs”. The officials from city that have conducted the switch do
not perceive the negative impacts to retention, because salary is more crucial than
pension type to retain public employees nowadays. At the same time, quite a few
directors observe the intergenerational differences in the pension model preference:
Younger employees are less committed than older generations to work in one
organization for long time; hence they favor the portability of DC model.
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The interviewees do not regard the potential negative impact of the two-tier
benefit structure to the workforce morale as a serious issue. Even though there might
be some resentment, they believe it could be solved by clear disclosure at the time of
hiring, so the employees are responsible for their own decision to work in the agency
with lower pension benefits. In addition, the interviewees think this issue will be selfsolvent along the retirement of senior employees, when there is only one tier left in the
workplace.

Another set of questions regards the readiness of local governments to conduct
the public pension paradigm switch from DB to DC plans by exploring the drivers and
impediments of the model shift and the necessity of the financial literacy training after
the switch. The most direct impetus for the transition is the immediate need for
governments to relieve the fiscal burden of the snowballing pension obligations. Some
DB supporters mention the political motivation to imitate the private sector practices
in order to impress the constituency. As regards to the cons of the transition, the cities
offering DB plans imply that the significant transition costs of pension model switch is
the biggest deterrent for elected officials to take the move, so they will adopt the
alternative incremental reform strategies of reducing pension obligations. By contrast,
the cities that have conducted the switch think it is better to cut short the suffering with
the tradeoff between the short-term higher costs and the long-term cost saving. Another
concern with the transition is that the financial illiteracy of public employees will incur
risks to their retirement security under the DC regime. All the interviewees agree that
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it is necessary for employers to offer financial literacy trainings to protect employees
from investment losses.

Finally, the study solicits explanations from interviewees about the congruence
of perceptions to public pension reforms between Finance and HR directors in the
survey results. A partial reason is that both groups are senior employees who are
eligible for DB pensions so there is a bias towards the status quo. However, the major
reason that Finance and HR have an almost identical worldview is because they share
the same knowledge of the pension issues and have the same goal of maintaining the
effectiveness of organizational operations. Although they may consider the pension
issues from their different professional stance, it requires a joint effort from both
departments to work for the city manger in dealing with public pension reform.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Introduction

The 2008 economic downturn exposed the issue of financial viability of the
prevailing DB pension model in public sector. The widespread concern about
skyrocketing pension obligations gave many state and local governments the impetus
to reform DB plans in order to relieve these fiscal burdens. Their reform strategies can
be classified into two categories: the incremental changes to the current DB system by
reducing benefit level or increase employee contribution, and the pension model
transition from DB to DC plans. The adoptions of reform strategies are subject to all
kinds of economic, political and social factors confronted.

Although the state retirement system in Florida has been evaluated as one of
the best-funded public pension systems, the reform initiative led by State Governor in
2011 suggests the severe fiscal pressure to maintain the sustainability of FRS. The new
pension law enacted after July 1, 2011 consists of incremental changes to the state-
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sponsored DB plan instead of the original proposal of a pension paradigm switch. In
Florida, local governments have undertaken both streams of reform strategies have
been undertaken to improve the funding status of the pension plans.

The study examines the applications of both kinds of strategies and aims to
uncover the potential issues related to the adoption of each reform tactic at the local
level. The primary motive for public agencies to conduct the pension reform is to
achieve financial solvency. Therefore, the first step of the study is to investigate
whether the incremental reform strategies are sufficient to improve the fiscal status of
the current DB model. Second, the study explores the alternative reform choice of
pension paradigm switch from DB to DC plans by unveiling the major drivers and
impediments to implement the transition. Third, the more common incremental
changes existing in the public agencies have created a two-tier benefit structure for
different generations of workforce, which posed an interperiod equity issue. The study
examines the organizational impact of this newly established two-tier system to public
agencies.

The study contributes to the previous literature about pension reforms. It fills
an important knowledge gap in the scholarly literature by presenting a comprehensive
analysis of the two categories of public pension reform strategies. It assesses the
potential impacts of the pension paradigm switch from DB to DC plans and the
readiness of Florida municipalities to conduct the transition through analyzing the
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perceptions of Florida local government officials. The study also addresses the lack of
primary data about public pension reforms in previous academic literature.

The study developed a triangulated research method, drawing on secondary
data from Florida’s local retirement system, and primary data from a survey of the
Finance and HR directors of Florida municipalities as well as interviews with the
representative officials in these cities. The findings of the study suggest that the
incremental changes about DB plans are not adequate to improve the financial solvency
of the DB model at the local level. The alternative reform approach is promoted by
financial concerns, political motives, and social pressures. However, given the latent
obstacles from the fiscal and political perspectives, public agencies may prefer the
intermediate way to start the reform action.

The rest of the chapter includes the following contents: first, it provides the
summary and discussions about the major findings for each research questions; second,
it discusses the implications of the findings to the public pension reform policy; third,
it introduces the limitations of the study and future research directions about this topic
and finally concludes with a brief summary.

7.2 Summary of Research Findings

This section provides the highlights of key findings for major research
questions, which consists of three major themes: the financial solvency of public
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pension systems, the pension paradigm switch in the public sector, and the interperiod
issue during the public pension reforms.

The Financial Solvency: Incremental Tweaks are Just Palliatives

In order to alleviate the fiscal stress of ever-increasing pension costs, many state
and local governments have implemented the reforms to sustain their public pension
plans. At the present time the mainstream reform strategy is to preserve the default DB
model in the public sector through the incremental changes, which are exemplified by
the 2011 pension reform law of Florida state retirement system. By altering the plan
design characteristics such as reducing the benefit levels and increasing contributions,
public agencies tweak their DB plans with the hope relieving their financial burden and
achieving sustainability. However, this study argues that these incremental tweaks may
not be efficient enough so that state and local governments could not rely on them to
improve the financial solvency of the public DB plans.

The study presents the evidence to support this contention through identifying
the determinants of financial solvency of local DB plans in order to diagnose whether
the plan design features are the crucial indicators compared with other financial,
political, and demographical factors. Utilizing the panel data of 151 local DB plans in
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Florida municipalities from 2005 to 2012, a regression model is established to test the
research hypotheses about the explanatory variables of the financial solvency of DB
plans. The generated results provide substantial evidences that bolster the author’s
argument.

The hypotheses of the plan design characteristics turn out to be supported,
especially for the ones of contributions. The only statistically evident benefit variable
is the normal retirement age. The associated coefficient suggests that the reform
strategy of reducing the generosity of pension benefits by increasing the normal
retirement age may not be helpful in decreasing the unfunded pension liabilities. The
longer time horizon to amortize the benefit obligation might expose governments to
more investment risks, which would further widen the gap between pension assets and
obligations.

By contrast, the contribution hypotheses achieve significance. The results
suggest that increases in the contribution rate, no matter from plan sponsors or
participants, will not improve the financial solvency of the DB plans. Conversely,
higher contribution rates indicates greater fiscal pressure to local governments
associated with relatively low funded ratio and more pension obligations, which
requires even more financial responsibilities from employers and employees to foot the
pension bill.
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The major finding of the examination about the financial solvency of local DB
plans is that changing plan design features is not the cure for the fiscal stress of the DB
model, but more like a painkiller to cope with the public pension crisis. Therefore, the
incremental reform strategies through modifying plan design features may be
palliatives at the very most to relieve the immediate budgetary burden temporarily
(Frank et. al, 2012). In the long run, tinkering with the DB model may not be sufficient
to insure its viability.

The results of other factors demonstrate the significance of prudent investment
management and realistic actuarial assumptions to the financial health of public
pension plans. This contention gets supported by survey and interview findings, which
reveal the vulnerability of DB pension to the market fluctuation. Although the DB
advocators are reluctant to admit the defects of the DB model, some government
officials have become suspicious of the adequacy of the incremental tweaks to DB
plans and realize the necessity of more feasible reform approaches to achieve a
sustainable public pension system.

Pension Paradigm Shift: Attractive and Intimidating

On the basis of the conclusion about the inadequacy of incremental reform
strategies, this study explores the alternative reform approach—the pension paradigm
switch from the DB to DC model in the public sector. The virtues of the DB-to-DC
transition have attracted interests from many state and local governments. However,
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the relative infrequency of implementations suggests the existence of significant
deterrents. With the primary data gathered through survey questionnaires and
interviews, this study collects the perceptions of the local officials in Florida cities to
investigate the readiness of Florida local governments to conduct the public pension
model change.

The recent stock market downturn resulted in the severe blow to public pension
funds. At the same time, governments collected less revenue due to the economic
recession, making it even more difficult for politicians to set aside enough pension
contributions to cover the investment loss, especially when confronting other urgent
needs of government expenditure. Therefore, reducing the pension costs through the
paradigm shift from DB to DC model is the foremost motive for governments to
conduct the transition. In doing so, governments could minimize the investment risks
associated with DB pension fund and transfer them to employees themselves. Under
the DC model, public agencies would not suffer the involuntary contribution rate tied
to the market performance, but be able to budget properly and confidently at the
acceptable level.

Findings from surveys and interviews also suggest political incentives and
social impetus to implement the pension model switch. The diminishing pension
coverage in the private sector calls for public agencies join the ranks and apply the
private practices to the public pension system. The taxpayer sentiment also forces the
governments to curb pension expenditures rather than “spoil” public employees with
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generous retirement benefits. Thus, political officials tend to gain recognitions from
their constituencies through the initiative of public pension paradigm switch in the
name of saving taxpayers’ money.

Although the pension model switch appears attractive from many perspectives
mentioned above, this study uncovers several impediments for local governments to
make the switch. One major concern is the affordability of the transition costs for public
agencies with great amount of unfunded pension liabilities. Switching from DB to DC
model would reduce the expense of the benefit amortization in the long run, but it would
increase the short-term payments to the beneficiaries that are still in the DB system,
which are cost-prohibitive for political officials that focus on the immediate budgetary
need due to their short time-horizon of operation. Accordingly, instead of implementing
the paradigm shift, some governments opted for incremental strategies to reduce
pension benefits. By contrast, some public agencies weighed the long-term fiscal health
against the short pain of increasing costs and resolved on the transition.

The potential negative impacts of the pension model transition to the public
recruitment and retention are supposed to discourage the adoption of paradigm switch.
However, the findings imply that although the transition can foster the employee
mobility within public sector or between the public and private sector, it would not
much alter the capacity of governments to recruit and retain qualified general
employees. Moreover, the turnover brought by the transition is perceived to be
beneficial to the public agencies to avoid stagnancy. The preference for the DC model
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among millennials is recognized to some extent, while the link between pension type
and recruitment/retention are not fully grasped by Florida local governments.

Another source of anxiety concerning the paradigm switch is that the
widespread financial illiteracy of Americans may threaten the retirement security of
public employees after the transition. Under the DB model, public employees enjoy the
paternalism that the plan sponsors are responsible for the investment decisions of
pension funds. By switching the pension model, employers transfer the responsibility
to employees themselves, which may put them in danger due to their financial illiteracy.
The findings indicate the necessity of proactive education of financial planning and
asset allocation to public employees, especially in light of the unsatisfying performance
of 401(k) accounts during the recent fiscal crisis. The pension model switch does not
end the employers’ job but requires their further efforts to ensure the retirement security
of public employees even under the DC regime.

The Interperiod Equity: An Ignored Matter

Intergeneration equity is another important subject of this study. This emerging
issue in the public pension system is analyzed in two facets. First the research explores
the broad aspect referring to the unfair wealth transfer from the future taxpayers to the
current generation by delaying the fulfillment of contribution requirements and/or
increasing benefit to an unrealistic level. This malpractice results in future taxpayers
bearing higher costs from the accrued pension promises to prior public servants, and
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also because of current public services. Interview results suggest public officials
believe that the direct cause of the current pension crisis is the irresponsible increase in
pension benefits and not to funding pension plans at the actuarially required
contribution rate. The misconduct of pension fund management implies the existence
of the moral hazard issue. Due to the short horizon of operation, elected officials tend
to increase the benefit to an unfeasible level or reduce the contribution to gain
recognition and impress the constituency, ignoring the long-term impact.

The study also narrows the interperiod equity issue down to the impacts of the
two-tier benefit structure established during the recent public pension reform. Many
state and local governments created a second tier of retirement benefit for new hires
with elongated retirement age and vesting periods, reduced benefit multipliers and
COLAs, etc. In doing so, governments could reduce their pension costs to relieve the
fiscal burden. According to the experience in the private sector, the two-tier benefit
structure may cause diminished morale, which may reduce employees’ commitment to
the organization and spur high turnover rate.

The empirical findings of this study suggest that most local governments
neglect the issue of the two-tier benefit structure. Even though some officials admit the
two tiers of benefits under the same roof may cause some animosity among different
generations of employees, they just regard this as a minor jealousy issue. The shared
view is this issue is simply a matter of full disclosure at the time of recruitment. As
long as the applicants are aware of the benefits they receive are less generous than
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previous employees, they are responsible for their decisions to work in the public
agency. In light of the high unemployment rate since the depression, this issue would
barely affect their decisions. Besides, many officials indicate the salary, rather than the
pension type, is the major employment cue. Since the two-tier structure is newly
introduced, the long-term impact cannot be observed now. However, the issue is
believed to be self-correcting and will die out over time along with the retirement of
senior employees. When there is only one tier left in the workforce, animosity will no
longer be present.

7.3 Implications to Pension Reform Practice

The severe damage done to the public DB plans after the 2008 market downturn
indicates that the public sector pension systems are not immune to economic
fluctuations and may not be able to keep their promises of guaranteed retirement
benefits. Although the DB advocates, biased by their own status quo, are unwilling to
admit the unsustainability of the default DB plans, more and more governments realize
the DB model is not viable, at least with the existing design features and current pension
fund management. Thus, in order to reduce the pension costs, public agencies could
alter the plan design characteristics and prudently administer their pension asset
investment.

Nevertheless, the research findings suggest that incremental strategies to
preserve the DB plans are not effective to improve the financial solvency of the DB
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model or ensure its sustainability. Like it or not, the DC model seems to be the final
destination to ultimately relieve public agencies from investment risks. Following the
historical course of pension coverage cuts in the private sector, public employees may
not be able to enjoy the privilege of the generous DB pension plans in the wake of the
negative taxpayer sentiment.

However, the overnight DB-to-DC transition may not be a feasible strategy for
governments due to several impediments identified in this study: transition costs,
political pressure, potential organizational impacts, and the retirement insecurity due
to the financial illiteracy. Thus, the intermediate approach of the model switch may
serve as the starting point for the journey of public pension paradigm switch. State and
local governments may manage to reach a middle place between the DC and DB model,
which could both boost the financial health of governments and ensure the retirement
benefits of employees. As some officials suggest, for the new hired employees, a hybrid
plan would provide a certain portion of defined benefit providing employees with the
security of guaranteed retirement income, as well as a supplementary savings with the
DC model offering the portability and possible higher investment returns. Even after
fully switching to the DC regime eventually, public employers should endeavor to
educate the employees with financial planning to avoid the risks of investment losses
due to the financial illiteracy of public employees. As Munnell (2012) suggested with
the case of Rhode Island’s 2011 reform, the reform efforts should fairly distribute the
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responsibilities among employer, incumbent and prospective employees, retirees and
beneficiaries, and taxpayers.

7.4 Limitations and Future Research

Limitations of the Study

This study adopts a triangulated research approach to utilize data from multiple
sources in order to facilitate the reliability and validity of the findings. However, there
are several limitations that the author has to acknowledge. First, because only 10% of
the Florida cities have DC plans as their primary pension model to provide pension
benefits, and most cities have just started acting to reform their local pension system,
the data gathered for chapter five and chapter six is based on the perceptions of
government officials rather than the actual impacts of the pension reform to public
agencies. Therefore the findings are drawn from the estimations of the potential issues
about the pension reform in the public sector.

The second limitation resides in the fact that this study concentrates on the local
level in Florida. This focus ensures the consistency of the legal and administrative
framework of research participants. However, this restriction along with the relatively
low validity of the results makes it difficult to directly generalize the findings to other
states, although Florida has been a renowned political and demographic trendsetter for
the nation.

178

Other limitations the author needs to admit refer to the representativeness of the
results considering the relatively low response rate of the survey, and the reliability of
the findings due to the fact that survey respondents and interviewees might not be
honest or candid about the pension issue. The controversial nature of the research
subject may lead to their self-censorship. It is conceivable that some participants
answered questions with an eye to perceived neutrality when in fact they held stronger
beliefs. The results may unveil only part of the whole story.

Future Research Directions

This study fuels the heated discussion about public pension reform since the
economic recession in 2008. While the findings of the study provide answers to the
present research questions, at the same time, they raise other topics. Through the
comprehensive examination about the public pension reform strategies at the local level
in Florida, this study paves the way for future researches to further investigate this
subject. It can serve as the starting point since the long-term impacts of public pension
reform cannot be fully grasped now. Therefore, the future research directions originated
from this study might include the following subjects: Collect the time-series data about
the pension model of the municipalities in Florida and identify the major trend of the
pension model changes; develop the scale of the public pension reform strategies
ranging from the incremental tweaks of existing DB plans to the ultimate pension
paradigm switch to the DC model; utilize the generated reform indexes to establish
regression models with the city-level political, financial, and demographical
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information, in order to find the impacts of different reform approaches to municipal
fiscal status, or the factors that may affect the decision on the selection of pension
reform strategies; observe and assess the future impacts of the two-tier benefit structure
to the workforce morale and the actual solutions to the interperiod equity issue; collect
data of the recruitment and retention in the public agencies that have conducted the
DB-to-DC transition to examine the impacts of the model switch to the employee
mobility; and apply the research methodology to the public pension system in other
states and compare the Florida cases with similar municipalities in other states.

7.5 Summary

This study provides a thorough examination of the Florida local public pension
system, aiming to uncover the more appropriate reform strategies to tackle the public
pension crisis after the 2008 economic downturn. The incremental changes exemplified
by the 2011 pension law are supposed to improve the financial solvency of the DB
model. However, analysis of the panel data of Florida local DB plans from 2005 to
2012 reveals that the reform strategies by changing plan design features may not be
adequate to preserve the financial health of pubic DB plans. Hence, the alternative
reform approach—the DB-to-DC transition—is investigated with the primary data
gathered through survey and interviews with the Finance and HR directors in Florida
municipalities. The findings suggest that mangers may be attracted to the pension
paradigm switch for the purpose to reduce their pension costs and political officials are
willing to initiate this transition to impress the constituency by mimicking the practices
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in the private sector. At the same time, local governments are hesitant to implement the
model shift with the concern of transition costs and political pressure. Thus, the feasible
way of conducting the pension paradigm shift in the public sector is to offer a hybrid
plan first for the new hires, then eventually switch completely to the DC model. In
addition, there is a unified view that the financial illiteracy is part of a large problem of
retirement security. Under the DC regime, public employers need devote more efforts
to educate the financially illiterate employees about the financial planning and asset
allocation to avoid investment risks.
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Dear Finance/Human Resources Director,

Public pensions and their future have become a central management issue for local
governments. In recent years we have witnessed a number of pension reforms as a result
of strained budgets and long-term socioeconomic realities. These reforms may foster
fiscal sustainability, but their potential impact on daily operations and long-term
management remains unexplored.
Dr. Frank and I are interested in assessing these impacts in your community. We
undertake this effort from two prisms—financial management and human resources.
From our vantage, there is a tendency to view the pension reform issue as if these were
“siloed.” We are sending this survey to finance and human resource professionals
throughout the state on the assumption that an accurate read of pension reforms requires
both perspectives for a comprehensive assessment.
The survey should take no more than 15 minutes to complete. Your responses are
confidential. You can either follow the link below to take the survey online, or
download the attached word file to answer it in pencil-and-paper and email or fax your
response back to us.
Dr. Frank and I would be happy to provide a summary of findings. Kindly provide us
with an address in the space provided. If you wish to discuss this survey or the topic,
please call at (305) 779-7870 or e-mail at ycong001@fiu.edu. Each response counts;
we will contribute $2.00 to the American Cancer Society for each completed survey.

Cordially,
Ms. Yongqing Cong
Doctoral Candidate

Dr. Howard A. Frank
Professor of Public Administration

Survey Questionnaire for Finance Directors
For the purposes of this survey, we define “pension reform” broadly to include a variety
of changes (e.g., longer vesting periods, higher employee contributions) to traditional
defined benefit plans that characterize the default retirement program in most public
agencies. Similarly, we see a “defined contribution” plan as having retirement earnings
coming solely from a 401k or 403b plan in which the employee makes all investment
choices and incurs all investment risks. We define a “hybrid” retirement plan as one in
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which retirement income is derived from defined benefit and defined contribution
streams, with contributions (either employee or employer) going to both components.
These “hybrids” may be permanent or a transitional approach en route to defined
contribution plans becoming the default model.
In considering your answers, please note that we are only interested in changes for your
civilian, non-uniformed workers. We also ask that you do not consider supplemental,
voluntary retirement plans such as 457s. Please check the number that best describes
your level of agreement or disagreement along the following scale:
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Disagree Nor Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

A. Pension Model Questions
Some have argued that the only long-term solution to the current public sector pension crisis is
the adoption of 401(k) style defined contribution plans for new employees.
Questions in this section deal with your perception about the future of the defined benefit model
as the default option for civilian, non-exempt employees.

Shifting to defined contribution for new employees is difficult because of
1 2 3 4 5
unfunded pension liabilities under the current defined benefit model
A younger workforce prefers defined contribution plans to defined benefit
1 2 3 4 5
plans
Adoption of defined contribution plans would foster greater employee
1 2 3 4 5
mobility between the public and private sectors
Adoption of defined contribution plans would foster greater employee
1 2 3 4 5
mobility within the public sector
The steady erosion of defined benefit pension coverage in the private
sector puts pressure on elected officials to reduce defined benefit coverage 1 2 3 4 5
in the public sector
Political and social forces will eventually lead to the elimination of
pensions for public sector employees, mirroring long-term trends in the
1 2 3 4 5
private sector
Taxpayer sentiment will eventually lead to the adoption of defined
contribution plans as the default model in the public sector
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1 2 3 4 5

B. Organizational Impacts of Defined Benefit Pension Reforms
While the traditional defined benefit plan remains the default plan for most local
governments in Florida and elsewhere, recent reforms such as longer vesting periods,
higher employee pension contributions, and reduced Deferred Retirement Option
Program (DROP) benefits could impact employee recruitment and retention, as well as
other aspects of benefit administration. This section addresses your views on these
possible impacts.
Adoption of recent reforms will…
Make it more difficult to retain senior personnel

1 2 3 4 5

Make it more difficult to attract well-qualified applicants

1 2 3 4 5

Increase turnover of junior personnel

1 2 3 4 5

Decrease competiveness of compensation with comparable private sector 1 2 3 4 5
jobs
Make it more difficult to attract and retain a diverse workforce

1 2 3 4 5

Ultimately reduce efficiency and effectiveness of municipal operations

1 2 3 4 5

Obligate jurisdictions to educate employees on the basics of asset
1 2 3 4 5
allocation throughout their lifetimes
Reduce pension outlays as percentage of total outlays

1 2 3 4 5

Encourage jurisdictions to provide access to low-or no-cost independent
1 2 3 4 5
financial planning
Make outsourcing easier due to lower future pension costs

1 2 3 4 5

Encourage increased savings through deferred compensation or other
voluntary plans

1 2 3 4 5

C. Organizational Impact of Pension Reforms Related to Date of Hire
Many of the pension reforms undertaken in Florida and elsewhere impact new hires
differently than current employees. Examples from the recent Florida experience
include longer vesting and service requirements. These changes effectively create a
two-tier benefit structure. Questions in this section address your perception of this
aspect of recently enacted pension changes.

Establishment of a two-tier retirement plan...
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Fosters antagonism between younger and older workers given differential
1 2 3 4 5
impacts of benefit cuts
Creates different levels of commitment between new hires and existing
1 2 3 4 5
employees
Makes hiring of the most talented prospects more difficult due to longer
1 2 3 4 5
vesting
Makes hiring of the most talented prospects more difficult due to increased
1 2 3 4 5
retirement age
Will increase participation in supplemental retirement plans such as 457
1 2 3 4 5
plans among younger workers
Represents an issue that straddles traditional boundaries between human
1 2 3 4 5
resources and finance
Receives little attention given the high unemployment rate

1 2 3 4 5

Becomes less problematic over time given the “graying” workforce and
retirement of older workers

1 2 3 4 5

D. Questions Regarding Sustainability
For the purposes of this survey, sustainability is defined as your city’s ability to make
your Annual Required Contribution (ARC) within the next five fiscal years, holding
current economic conditions and headcount constant. Actions such as those noted in
Section I (i.e., increase in retirement age, increase in years required for full retirement,
etc., will maintain fiscal sustainability
1. Approximately what percentage of your annual ARC did you fund in following years
(0-100 Percent)?
2009-10 _____________________________
2010-11 _____________________________
2011-12 _____________________________
2. What do you see as the biggest obstacles to fully funding your ARC?
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3. Assuming a time horizon of three fiscal years, please estimate the approximate
percentage of the ARC you expect to make assuming no change in current economic
conditions (0-100 Percent).
2012-13 _____________________________
2013-14 _____________________________
2014-15 _____________________________

E. Drivers of Change in Public Pension “Crisis”
In this section we would appreciate your perception of the drivers behind the current
pension crisis in the public sector by indicating the degree to which you agree or
disagree with the following drivers:
Changes in governmental accounting rules

1 2 3 4 5

Decreasing defined benefit pension coverage of private sector workforce

1 2 3 4 5

Decreasing overall pension coverage of the private sector workforce

1 2 3 4 5

Statutory Property Tax Limitations

1 2 3 4 5

Changes in State Pension Systems

1 2 3 4 5

Low returns of fixed income securities

1 2 3 4 5

Lower than historical returns on stocks

1 2 3 4 5

Cuts in intergovernmental revenue

1 2 3 4 5

Pension benefit changes in neighboring communities

1 2 3 4 5

Collective Bargaining Agreements

1 2 3 4 5

Below are a few items about yourself to be used for statistical purposes. Please
respond by clicking on your response.

I am:
Male

Ο
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Female

Ο

My age range is:
25 and under
26 - 35
36 - 45
46 - 55
56 - 65
Over 65

Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο

What type of plan are you currently contributing to?
DB plans
Ο
DC plans
Ο
Hybrid plans
Ο
Other: __________________

What type of plan will provide the majority of your retirement income from the
government?
DB plans
Ο
DC plans
Ο
Hybrid plans
Ο
Other: __________________

Do you have any of the following professional designations?
CPA
Ο
CMA
Ο
Other:____________________

Are you a member of any of the following?
State Society of CPAs
American Institute of CPAs

Ο
Ο
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Institution of Management Accounting
Association for Governmental Accounting
Government Finance Officers Association
American Society of Public Administration
Other ____________________

Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο

Thank you for your time and participation. If you’d like to have a summary of
findings, please contact Yongqing Cong at ycong001@fiu.edu, or provide your email
address:_________________________

Survey Questionnaires for HR Directors
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For the purposes of this survey, we define “pension reform” broadly to include a variety
of changes (e.g., longer vesting periods, higher employee contributions) to traditional
defined benefit plans that characterize the default retirement program in most public
agencies. Similarly, we see a “defined contribution” plan as having retirement earnings
coming solely from a 401k or 403b plan in which the employee makes all investment
choices and incurs all investment risks. We define a “hybrid” retirement plan as one in
which retirement income is derived from defined benefit and defined contribution
streams, with contributions (either employee or employer) going to both components.
These “hybrids” may be permanent or a transitional approach en route to defined
contribution plans becoming the default model.
In considering your answers, please note that we are only interested in changes for your
civilian, non-uniformed workers. We also ask that you do not consider supplemental,
voluntary retirement plans such as 457s. Please check the number that best describes
your level of agreement or disagreement along the following scale:
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Disagree Nor Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree

A. Pension Model Questions
Some have argued that the only long-term solution to the current public sector pension crisis is
the adoption of 401(k) style defined contribution plans for new employees.
Questions in this section deal with your perception about the future of the defined benefit model
as the default option for civilian, non-exempt employees.
Shifting to defined contribution for new employees is difficult because of
1 2 3 4 5
unfunded pension liabilities under the current defined benefit model
A younger workforce prefers defined contribution plans to defined benefit
1 2 3 4 5
plans
Adoption of defined contribution plans would foster greater employee
1 2 3 4 5
mobility between the public and private sectors
Adoption of defined contribution plans would foster greater employee
1 2 3 4 5
mobility within the public sector
The steady erosion of defined benefit pension coverage in the private
sector puts pressure on elected officials to reduce defined benefit coverage 1 2 3 4 5
in the public sector
Political and social forces will eventually lead to the elimination of
pensions for public sector employees, mirroring long-term trends in the
1 2 3 4 5
private sector
Taxpayer sentiment will eventually lead to the adoption of defined
contribution plans as the default model in the public sector
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1 2 3 4 5

B. Organizational Impacts of Defined Benefit Pension Reforms
While the traditional defined benefit plan remains the default plan for most local
governments in Florida and elsewhere, recent reforms such as longer vesting periods,
higher employee pension contributions, and reduced Deferred Retirement Option
Program (DROP) benefits could impact employee recruitment and retention, as well as
other aspects of benefit administration. This section addresses your views on these
possible impacts.
Adoption of recent reforms will…
Make it more difficult to retain senior personnel

1 2 3 4 5

Make it more difficult to attract well-qualified applicants

1 2 3 4 5

Increase turnover of junior personnel

1 2 3 4 5

Decrease competiveness of compensation with comparable private sector 1 2 3 4 5
jobs
Make it more difficult to attract and retain a diverse workforce

1 2 3 4 5

Ultimately reduce efficiency and effectiveness of municipal operations

1 2 3 4 5

Obligate jurisdictions to educate employees on the basics of asset
1 2 3 4 5
allocation throughout their lifetimes
Reduce pension outlays as percentage of total outlays

1 2 3 4 5

Encourage jurisdictions to provide access to low-or no-cost independent
1 2 3 4 5
financial planning
Make outsourcing easier due to lower future pension costs

1 2 3 4 5

Encourage increased savings through deferred compensation or other
voluntary plans

1 2 3 4 5

C. Organizational Impact of Pension Reforms Related to Date of Hire
Many of the pension reforms undertaken in Florida and elsewhere impact new hires
differently than current employees. Examples from the recent Florida experience
include longer vesting and service requirements. These changes effectively create a
two-tier benefit structure. Questions in this section address your perception of this
aspect of recently enacted pension changes.

Establishment of a two-tier retirement plan...
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Fosters antagonism between younger and older workers given
1 2 3 4 5
differential impacts of benefit cuts
Creates different levels of commitment between new hires and existing
1 2 3 4 5
employees
Makes hiring of the most talented prospects more difficult due to longer
1 2 3 4 5
vesting
Makes hiring of the most talented prospects more difficult due to
1 2 3 4 5
increased retirement age
Will increase participation in supplemental retirement plans such as 457
1 2 3 4 5
plans among younger workers
Represents an issue that straddles traditional boundaries between human
1 2 3 4 5
resources and finance
Receives little attention given the high unemployment rate

1 2 3 4 5

Becomes less problematic over time given the “graying” workforce
and retirement of older workers

1 2 3 4 5

D. Organizational Capacity for Pension Reform
Hybrid or defined contribution pension models require participant choice in asset
allocation throughout a lifetime. The following questions deal with your city’s ability
to provide employees investment advice.
My city currently offers...
Low-or No-Cost financial advice from independent financial
Yes Ο No Ο
planners for annual financial “check-ups”
Call-in services to financial planning services for general
Yes Ο No Ο
investment advice
Investment fairs at which investment providers give financial
Yes Ο No Ο
guidance
Online investment guidance with “model portfolios” depending
Yes Ο No Ο
on age and risk preference
Guest speakers for lunch or similar “brown bags” at which various
Yes Ο No Ο
investment topics are provided
Others______________________________________________
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Yes Ο No Ο

E. Recent and Potential Change in Your Community’s Pension Plan
In light of the recent controversies regarding traditional defined benefit pension plans
in the public sector, as well as recently enacted accounting rule changes, please check
actions that have been taken or under current consideration:
Please check the following in regards to your city:
Has Taken
Since 2007
Ο

Is Currently
Considering
Ο

Increase Number of Years for Full Retirement

Ο

Ο

Ο

Reduce Benefit Multiplier

Ο

Ο

Ο

Require Employee Contribution

Ο

Ο

Ο

Increase/Mandate Employee Contribution

Ο

Ο

Ο

Reduce Early Retirement Accruals in Deferred
Retirement Plans

Ο

Ο

Ο

Eliminate Deferred Retirement Plans

Ο

Ο

Ο

Establish Two-Tier Retirement System in which New
Employees have Modified/Reduced Benefits

Ο

Ο

Ο

Eliminate/Reduce Accrued Annual/Sick Leave in
Final Benefit Computation

Ο

Ο

Ο

Increase Number of Years Averaged in Final Benefit
Calculation

Ο

Ο

Ο

Lengthen Vesting Requirements

Ο

Ο

Ο

Decrease/Cut COLA for Future or Current
Beneficiaries

Ο

Ο

Ο

Buyout (non-DROP) of Senior Employees

Ο

Ο

Ο

Reduce Payments of Current Beneficiaries

Ο

Ο

Ο

Add Social Security to the Retirement Package

Ο

Ο

Ο

Increase in Retirement Age

N/A
Ο

F. Drivers of Change in Public Pension “Crisis”
In this section we would appreciate your perception of the drivers behind the current
pension crisis in the public sector by indicating the degree to which you agree or
disagree with the following drivers:
Changes in governmental accounting rules

1 2 3 4 5

Decreasing defined benefit pension coverage of private sector workforce

1 2 3 4 5

Decreasing overall pension coverage of the private sector workforce

1 2 3 4 5

Statutory Property Tax Limitations

1 2 3 4 5
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Changes in State Pension Systems

1 2 3 4 5

Low returns of fixed income securities

1 2 3 4 5

Lower than historical returns on stocks

1 2 3 4 5

Cuts in intergovernmental revenue

1 2 3 4 5

Pension benefit changes in neighboring communities

1 2 3 4 5

Collective Bargaining Agreements

1 2 3 4 5

Below are a few items about yourself to be used for statistical purposes. Please
respond by clicking on your response.
I am:
Male
Female

Ο
Ο

My age range is:
25 and under
26 - 35
36 - 45
46 - 55
56 - 65
Over 65

Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο

What type of plan are you currently contributing to?
DB plans
Ο
DC plans
Ο
Hybrid plans
Ο
Other: __________________
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What type of plan will provide the majority of your retirement income from the
government?
DB plans
Ο
DC plans
Ο
Hybrid plans
Ο
Other: __________________
Do you have any of the following professional designations?
PHR
Ο
SPHR
Ο
Other:____________________

Are you a member of any of the following?
Society for Human Resource Management
American Society for Training and Development
Florida Public Human Resources Association
Florida Public Personnel Association
American Society of Public Administration
Florida Public Employer Labor Relations Association
Other ____________________

Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο
Ο

Thank you for your time and participation. If you’d like to have a summary of
findings, please contact Yongqing Cong at ycong001@fiu.edu or provide your email
address:___________________________
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Appendix 2 - Structured Interview Guide
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1. In your own words, how would you define a sustainable public pension system?
In general, do you think the current public pension model is sustainable?
2. As you know, The original intention of the 2011 pension reform was to replace
the current DB plan with DC plan for new hired employees, but it did not go
that far in the end. What do you think are the drivers behind this initiative of
pension model switch?
3. How might the implementation of DC plans change recruitment? Will the
pension type preference impact people’s selection of employer?
4. How might the adoption of DC affect retention? Will switch to DC foster greater
mobility between public agencies within public sector; and between the public
and private sector?
5. How will public organizations deal with "two-tier" workforce issues? Do two
tiers of benefits "under the same roof" cause animosity among different
generation of employees and reduce morale? Or this issue will "die out" over
time along with the retirement of senior employees?
6. Do you think the need to continue the funding of those "in the DB system" is
the biggest obstacle to a DC transition?
7. Will the adoption of DC plans require increasing financial literacy training?
8. Our survey results showed that HR and Finance Directors have virtually
identical views of transition issues. We expected otherwise. How would you
explain our findings?
9. What would you recommend is the long-term solution to the current public
pension crisis?
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